BUILDING COMMUNITIES:
URBAN PLANNING AND SECURITY POLICIES

Directed by
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The book that we have in our possession is the result of cooperation and effort. The cooperation is from UNITAR-CIFAL with the Polytechnic School of Lausanne, while the effort is from the author Mrs. Charlotte Boisteau, but let us refer to its history. An accord signed between the Generalitat of Catalonia and UNITAR, the Institute of the United Nations responsible for training and research, allowed the creation in Catalonia, and specifically at Barcelona, a CIFAL center (International Training Center for Local Authorities and Local Actors) as part of the UNITAR associated Training Network. CIFAL Barcelona concentrates principally on cooperation broadly in the domain of security policies, but also stays open to other formative actions.

In March 2006, a training workshop called “Building Communities: Urban Planning and Security Policies” that gathered representatives from different cities and regions (specifically, the regions of Ile-de-France, Emilia-Romagna, and Catalonia, with the cities of Guatemala City, Bogotá, Curitiba, Los Angeles, Tswahne, Douala, Nairobi, Rabat, Shanghai, Katmandu, Rome, Barcelona, and L’Hospitalet de Llobregat). The participants discussed politics, diagnostics, and actions, while sharing their experiences and practices. The targeted objective of the workshop was to favor local-regional decentralization, to establish and reinforce the relations between administrations and citizens, and to form public policies that improve conviviality and the development of information systems.

The subject is hardly easy, and even risky for several reasons. The first refers to security public policy. If the idea to conceive, execute, and evaluate public policy is increasingly present in political agendas for several years, the limitations of public administrations is certainly also more evident. The regrettable crisis of the Welfare State also includes its most paternalistic forms. The provincial State, even with its regal functions, does not exist anymore and the balance shifts to the other extremity of the most pure and shameless form of neoliberalism. The conviction of the need of public policy is therefore parallels to the need to share responsibilities and means with other institutionalized (mayors, regions), associative, or private actors.

However, let us not forget that security constitutes one of the “last bastions” of the State, a regal function by excellence, and the very substance of the State as the exclusive tenant of the legitimate monopoly of violence, according to the very popular formula of Max Weber. This is one of the last fields that illustrates the end of the State’s monopoly and, whether approved of or not, opens partnerships in security while the State contrarily attempts to keep the appearance of being in a dominant position, notably through communication and its most symbolic elements (police, international relations, etc.).

Conviviality, community living, and social interactions are however left increasingly in the hands of actors and basic institutions (local), which open a new perspective concerning security policy extending beyond the primary models of proximity or neighborhood police, and even local security contracts. These are “true” security policies, which are conceived, executed, and evaluated with local resources and means. Exploration of this territory is nothing but its first trails, therefore with incursion assuming a risk.

The second risk makes a reference to urban development. The urgent need to find immediate solutions, followed with security propositions, has led to the development a “situational prevention”, which is nothing more than the superposition of security instruments on a territory. Still remaining, in good measure, is to reflect on formulas that permit, beforehand and on the basis of a rigid cooperation between architects, urban planners, and security
experts (among others), to include security in the initial conception and planning of cities. This would allow to incorporate security aspects, not as repressive elements, but rather preventive factors, or “ex ante”, and would facilitate the non-rupture of conviviality.

The third challenge consists of finding common debate points to communicate between different realities, diverse cultures, and dissimilar social, political, economical, and historical situations. Beyond the risk, this aspect is an impossible mission. We can foresee the total failure of communication if we pretend to find common and universal formulas or general models. On the other hand, more modestly, we can envision sharing and exchanging good and bad experiences, knowledge, and even bi- or multilateral forms of cooperation. However, one must take into account that certain realities are so distant that any approach remains unsatisfactory, and then accept the fact that dialogue and the exchange of information is not blocked.

Conscious of all these limitations, the CIFAL seminar “Building Communities: Urban Planning and Security Policies” desired to work towards exploring further the elements we noted earlier, with expectations being well reached. Yet an action of this type only makes sense if researched in greater detail. This is the reason we wished for the group to become a network core that would develop over the next years, which would also begin a scientific reflection on the subject. This is why we have asked Mrs. Boisteau, researcher at the Polytechnic School of Lausanne and expert on questions of urban violence and transformations, to be present at the seminar in order to reflect on the different contributions and try to reassemble them by giving them a framework and scientific continuity.

By looking at the results, we can only congratulate this choice, because Mrs. Boisteau accepted to take a risk faced with a challenge that other academics refused to take. Far from the classic model of a scholar seminar, which is often distant from reality and present in academic circles, this is based from realities and field experiences told by local agents that were either political, technical, or often in between as poli(tico)-technical, but remote from the academic etymology of the word. The coordination and methodological framework was not easy to accomplish, but the audacity of Mrs. Boisteau paid off, opening the door towards the cooperation between operators and scientists in a domain considered without a doubt innovative.

All research is definitely perfectible, and to deny this would be out of the scientific logic. However, the foundations of a serious work on innovative material are already in place and were needed to be done.
INTRODUCTION

Charlotte Boisteau

The 2nd CIFAL training workshop of Barcelona “Building Communities: Urban Planning and Security Policies” attempted to interpret a city’s contemporary transformations through an analysis of the role of “insecurity” in the process.

The phenomenon of urban violence, and the feeling of insecurity resulting from this, are essentially within urban contemporary issues to respond to society’s demand for security, public, private, and community methods direct the new urban policy of large agglomerations. By focusing on urban development practices attempting to physically resolve insecurity problems and feelings in cities, we wish to analyze how violence, “insecurity”, and security practices are currently the origin of a radical and significant transformation of urban space and its use by inhabitants. If social violence creates a territory, urban security policy essentially has a viable territorial impact that is sometimes a pretext for the transformation of an urban space.

Urban policy defines security and security increasingly orients urban policy, but these mechanisms remain misunderstood and the different fields of public action are little correlated. Certain questions still have no answers. For example, no one has presently assessed what works, or in other words, what generates conviviality and cohesion instead of exclusion. Participating actors that create urban spaces and their methods of intervention must also be identified. The cities of Bogotá, Barcelona, Curitiba, and Rome, including the regions of Catalonia, Emilia-Romagna, and Ile-de-France, have made public spaces a priority in their respective security policies. The cities of Pretoria, Los Angeles, and Nairobi are engaged in conserving public spaces not yet privatized, within a logic to reduce risk. The cities of Katmandu, Guatemala City, Douala, and Shanghai are attempting to create public spaces completely free from violence. The first element highlighted from speakers and participants, united through the UNITAR and CIFAL of Barcelona, is the challenge facing all these cities to improve security by implementing concrete actions to meet the expectations of their citizens. However, none of the cities listed possess sufficient analytical tools to better understand their needs and establish priorities within an action plan. This illustrates the need to elaborate decision-making tools for public policies and to reinforce the capacity of local communities, in order to implement a security policy that promotes cohesion. With the exchange and sharing of knowledge through the CIFAL-UNITAR seminar, the goal is to contribute by presenting existing expertise and ruptures. The aforementioned seminar treated the capacity of urban public policies to form safer cities. Referring to these considerations, the seminar was divided into three specific research fields: the analysis of urban violence, public and private political responses regarding urban security, and the spatial effects of security policies.

After exposing the steps taken by UNITAR and CIFAL Barcelona, we will first illustrate the specific methodology implemented through the use of auto-evaluation or peer training tools. We will then explain the scientific hypotheses on the subject and the research methodology chosen for this publication. This report, the first of a series accompanied by workshops performed by CIFAL Barcelona on the theme of security, go beyond the seminar’s acts stricte sensu by trying to respond to the challenges of a principal theme towards the comprehension of urban dynamics and their accountability by public authorities.

We will exemplify a state of knowledge acquired on the subject that will allow targeting the orientations needed for research and action to progress in their thematic approaches and their practical applications. The presentations of the different speakers will subsequently be exposed to be acquainted with experiences and practices of Northern and Southern cities through the voices of different local and territorial representatives. Juan Manuel Ospina will
present the citizen coexistence strategies implanted over the past decade at Bogotá, recognized internationally for their maintained efforts to guarantee civil security. Josep Maria Lahosa will present the characteristics making the city of Barcelona a model for security and urbanism. Clodualo Junio Pimheiro and Liliana Vallicelli will convey the mixed practices of security and urbanism directed by the city of Curitiba in Brazil. Fernando Guzmán Rodríguez will then communicate the methodology developed by the project “Urban Violence and Security Policies” at Bogotá that allows the micro-characterization of studied neighborhoods and the accuracy of insecurity diagnostics. Afterward, Lois Arkin will demonstrate alternative actions performed and maintained by the community in a case study of a neighborhood in Los Angeles. Often these community actions are present for a long duration and are inserted where public and private policies fail or are not sufficient. Finally, Karina Landman, through the presentation of the high-level academic work of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of Pretoria, will warn the international community of the dangers that exist when public space is allowed to become constantly privatized.

To conclude, we will analyze, by use of the interventions and reactions of the seminar and the results of the questionnaire submitted to participants and completed by the majority, the impact of security and urban development policy on urban community living.

1 The « Urban Violence and Security Policies: Local Public and Private Methods of Securing Urban Space” project (VUPS) is a research-action project being developed since November 2004 (and until April 2007) simultaneously in Barcelona and Bogotá. This project is developed in collaboration with UN-HABITAT and its Safer Cities program, the Urban Sociology Laboratory of the Polytechnic School of Lausanne, and the Small Arms Survey of the Graduate Institute of International Studies of Geneva. Its objective is to analyze urban violence and security policies, then create a sustainable relationship of cooperation between Barcelona and Bogotá on these themes. This project is financed by the Geneva International Academic Network (RUIG-GIAN). The results will be published in April 2007.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF CIFAL BARCELONA

Charlotte Diez

In 2005, the Decentralized Cooperation Program (DCP) from the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and the Department of Interior of the Regional Government of Catalonia (Generalitat de Catalunya) concluded an accord to create the International Training Center for Local Authorities and Local Actors (CIFAL) at Barcelona. Part of the global training network of DCP (CIFAL Network) that promotes the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals at the local level, CIFAL Barcelona’s objective is to ensure the training of local governments’officials for the construction and practice of security policies based on social coexistence.

Strong in its role as the cultural intersection of the Mediterranean, yet also confronted by major challenges caused by rapid urbanization and migration, Catalonia has taken the initiative to develop a unique specialized pole with European and international ambitions. This concerns notably the Center of Security Studies (Centre d’Estudis de Seguretat) and CIFAL Barcelona benefiting from university support and experiences from international programs, in particular those established by the United Nations System. This specialized pole acts as a privileged instrument, not only towards the construction of Catalan policies, but also towards the consolidation of cities networks in the region to obtain recognition at an international level. Within a research-action context, CIFAL Barcelona strives to promote a new security paradigm to local decision-makers. They attempt to give the necessary tools to allow decision-makers to not only respond to demands at larger scales due to the decentralization of expertise, but also to the challenges of civil security taking increasingly a global dimension caused by the growing circulation of people, information, and cultural diversity.

Faced with the profound transformation of local-global relationships and of urban government concerns, reconsidering the formulation of security problems is fundamental. This often appears at multiple territorial levels and becomes essential to identifying solutions and implementation means at a local and global level. Furthermore, faced with “total security” policies, this supports local decision-makers in managing public security according to their confrontations with crime or “incivilities”, which calls for the sanction or a better definition of the rules of civil coexistence in a structured framework (public space).

Cities are mediation spaces where multiple interests must be articulated and social interactions regulated. These are spaces constructing a form of governance that integrates micro and macro levels, from managerial neighborhood policies to managing transnational questions (international networks, notably for crime, migration, tourism, and cultural diversity). At the center of this complexity, local actors and territorial agents are presently the key actors of city development. A particular importance is given to the municipal level, which is accordingly noted by the Agencies and Programs of the United Nations. This obliges politicians and local agents to find new forms of interaction regulations within the city and consolidate confidence relationships, integrating the aforementioned local and global dimensions. This is why CIFAL is engaged to rethink security policies and operational means of community building, based on experience exchanges and dialogue between local actors (regional and municipal decision-makers, urban planners, police, mediation agents, community actors, business experts, academics, etc.).

In order to properly lead its mission to reinforce the capacities of territorial communities for local management and implementation of adapted public policies, CIFAL Barcelona develops its activities according to three principal functions: an observatory of public policy that
participates to define a transversal approach to security and to help in decision-making, a network of experts, and finally a hub for training and knowledge sharing between local decision-makers. CIFAL Barcelona focuses its priorities on two regional areas: the Euro-Mediterranean region and Latin America.

The training activities of CIFAL Barcelona are based on knowledge management techniques that allow optimizing exchanges between local actors and peer learning. This method promotes a participative and multi-disciplinary approach of training founded on practical experiences of participants. CIFAL training sessions are focused on local expertise, sharing of expertise and practices between local communities, site visits, and case-study analyses on succeeded or failed local interventions.

At training sessions, a self-assessment tool aids notably decision-makers to evaluate their own public policies and facilitate exchanges of concrete practices between participants during the workshop. The self-assessment process allows politicians and territorial managers to evaluate the performance of their community on a 1 to 5 scale, to then identify the domains needing improvement, and finally to modify their previous practices by learning from their peers (ref. Appendix 1). The self-assessment tool is an integral part of the capacity reinforcement approach promoted by CIFAL Barcelona, proposing a matrix to analyze of local practices based on a transversal approach of security. Complementary techniques, such as assistance among peers and city-to-city partnerships, reinforce mutual training, allowing continued dialogue and cooperation between regionally close or distant communities. Finally, the confrontation of different contexts and experiences generates new means of action.

The reinforced capacity of local governments to mobilize efforts and resources at a local level can become a powerful catalyst to develop trans-sectoral answers for urban security problems. The privileged relationships maintained with citizens allow local authorities to respond appropriately to community needs of articulating differences (socio-economical, cultural) and regulating disagreements and conflicts in the city. Foremost, cities are also laboratories where new forms of citizenship and positive interaction can be invented. The exchange of experiences and the networking promoted and supported by CIFAL Barcelona consolidates this multidisciplinary approach of security based on dialogue and conflict resolution between urban actors.

The final objective of this work of awareness and training consists of aiding local politicians and territorial managers to create and implement a new local security agenda based on the reinforcement of conviviality relationships and prevention. Such a process particularly attempts to:

a) Identify local security issues and assess the answers adapted to respond to them.

b) Conceive pertinent answers from coercive measures (responding to relevant acts of crime) to the resolution of disputes by mediation and dialogue.

c) Redefine the rules of coexistence, which is done notably by a regulation of activities and spaces.

d) Redefine the rules of civility.

e) Take better into account the perceptions and images of risk and vulnerability, while taking advantage of the society of information in order to promote greater secure urban environments.

f) Conceive appropriate security strategies at a local level, accompanied by necessary means for implementation at a human, financial, and technical level.
g) Identify better local actors at different levels that must be engaged in the implementation of security public policies.

h) Develop appropriate evaluation systems of security policies.

The methodology adopted by UNITAR-CIFAL Barcelona promotes the fields mentioned above through its awareness program, not only by taking into account special conditions of security that can be generated by physical interventions in urban spaces, but also forms of social participation, dialogue, and work on citizen behavior, notably by information and intercultural management. This transversal approach integrates the different steps essential to the definition and the implementation of security public policies: (a) shared goals; (b) managing civil coexistence in polyvalent spaces and urban societies socially diversified and multicultural; (c) managing responses, from prevention to rehabilitation in society; (d) implementation of policies on a basis of multi-actor partnerships and their evaluation. The self-assessment process, benchmarking, and knowledge sharing process under the training method of CIFAL follows each of these steps and serves as the general philosophy of a renewed security paradigm by the integration of complementary disciplines and action fields. Instead of simply training personnel, this rather prepares local communities to manage change and complexity by mutual comprehension, confrontation of practical solutions, and cooperation.

The 2nd training workshop of CIFAL Barcelona titled “Building Communities: Urban Planning and Security Policies” had specific objectives to supply local actors the tools to help them:

• Assess local security problems
• Formulate appropriate urban planning policies for security needs
• Conceive interventions allowing to generate community-building in urban spaces

The training workshop was organized around three activities, including self-assessment and knowledge sharing group works, case-study sessions, and practical site visits. Participants also benefited significantly from the experience of FAD architects (Promotion of Decorative Arts of Barcelona), representatives of the Department of Territorial Policy and Public Works of the Catalan government, the Direction of Prevention Services of the City of Barcelona, the cities of Bogotá and Rome, the Urban Development Institute of the Ile-de-France Region, the Research and Urban Planning Institute of Curitiba (IPPUC), and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of Pretoria.
Urban violence or violence due to urbanization?

Political actors in charge of security are becoming growingly involved in urban policy. By questioning how violence is managed, we will study how public policies, private strategies, and community actions form a governance system of security action and the effects of security public policies on urban transformation.

Two inquiries define the framework of our main issue:

1. What is the origin of the different components of a governance system in the security field? How do different actors interact amongst each other towards security? We are particularly interested in the definition of problems to resolve, fixed objectives, types of foreseeable interventions, target groups, implementation instruments, and concrete methods to their application.

2. What is the impact of this governance on urban transformations? With a great risk of fragmentation, we wish to understand if this is a result of incoherence of diverse interventions for security.

If Barcelona, Nairobi, Rome, Curitiba, Paris, Shanghai, Bogotá, Douala, etc. are different from each other by numerous criteria and do not affront the same types of violence or crime, their approach towards public policies, private strategies, and community action could nevertheless be considered pertinent by understanding whether their policies and actions are globally identical within their respective territories. In other words, is there a model of security public policy for cities, or do distinct contexts generate specific approaches?

Through various past analyses, certain researchers (Castells, 1999, Derida, 2003, Baumann, 2005) introduce the hypothesis that cities are violent due to their profound divisions, both spatially and socially, which presents a particular model corresponding to a new temporality of globalization and the society of information. These authors show that urban violence depends on social lineages, such as coexistence, gentrification, segregation, etc.

Using the previously defined issue, we propose three composite research hypotheses that articulate the two prior mentioned approaches: the construction of public, private, and community action in favor for security and the territorial impact of security policies.

1st Hypothesis: Security is becoming a mean used as justification for public policies, whether for security, urbanism, education, sanitary, etc. Essentially, when formulating political problems, different political actors comprehend differently the stakes of urban transformations.

2nd Hypothesis: Due to the commercialization of security, public strategies promoting inclusion disappear and are replaced by private strategies supporting exclusion that separate geographically the rich and the poor. However, when security public policies promote prevention, they create social cohesion that privileges community action as their principal instrument of intervention.

3rd Hypothesis: A city’s form (perceived city) acts upon the level of security (experienced city). The answers provided (public policies, private strategies, community actions) are not the same according to a city’s form and act in a concentric manner (center, sub-center, suburban), which reinforces the
Figure 1: Public policy, private strategies, and community security actions

Theses hypotheses are already noted in the prolonged research of “Urban Violence and Security Policies”. The aforementioned assumptions allowed us to understand the complex existing relationships between urban violence phenomenon and local security policies within two contexts (Bogotá and Barcelona), where the interests of public spaces and urban renovation present a strategic importance. We have shown that a city’s geography is always fragmented, and making these territories secure often causes social segregation. Considering many other cities with diverse contexts, we wish to comprehend how discrimination phenomenon, under the pretext of security, also exist in socio-political contexts with minimal conflicts through a comparison with a Colombian case study. We then wish to understand how large-scale urban renovation projects are not arguably used as a radical security measure in downtown areas by comparing cities with a Catalan case study.

Participatory and critical observations of urban phenomenon

Concerning these key questions of the development of our urban societies, we are currently affronted with a dilemma. One must utilize an observation not only participative, but also critical of urban phenomenon. This may first appear paradox, but we consider necessary a political engagement for this research financed by UNITAR. We believe that this published project is innovative through its concern to not become detached from the environment under study and its will to become completely emerged within this world, in order to fully understand its complexity. Therefore, we wished to take part beforehand of the workshop’s organization and the invitation process of the different participants.

The methodology is essentially qualitative, characterized by a constant exchange between representatives of various “urban space professions” and multiple actors that live and act in a city (understood as a macro entity that conceals the processes). Therefore, to cite the words of Jean-Bernard Racine, “only a trans-disciplinary reflection is utile in this case. One should not be simply content with the use of different disciplines, but a stronger association is needed amongst diverse actors of the city, with not only those academic, but also those institutionalized and political” (Noseda, Racine, 2005: 102).
To test these proposed hypotheses, we have chosen four phases for the research.

**In the first phase**, we established the knowledge politicians use in order to build their policies, while illustrating their qualities and their deficiencies. We have developed tools that allowed us to count and qualify, at an international scale, the intervention types regarding security and concerned actors. A questionnaire (ref. Appendix 2) was given to invited and identified local authorities as examples of the implementation of specific security practices.

**The second phase** was performed during the seminar through the collection of presentations and the notes of reactions and spontaneous interrogations of participants.

The analysis of the reactions resulting from the exchange of expertise, with the interaction between cities within group work, consisted of the **third phase**. At the end of the third phase, we produced a summary with texts and analyses that allowed us to base our project on a statement of purpose, which gives our case studies the possibility to be built upon ideal structures.

**In the forth phase**, we interrogated the cities’ representatives, clarified areas of incomprehension, and showed concerned local authorities the utility of this research in the choice of their future decisions through participation.

**Frame 1: Preconditioned considerations concerning the methodology**

| We deem necessary to advise the reader of the present methodology. The reliability of the analysis is only approximate, considering the heterogeneous nature of the research acquired. |
| Firstly, one must recognize the modest comparability possible between cities and regions of distinct sizes, socio-economic and geopolitical contexts. For instance, how does one compare and propose solutions, or advice to security problems presented in Rabat, Katmandu, or Ile-de-France? |
| In addition, the panelists and other participants, apart from their diverse political, cultural, and socio-economic origins, are not representatives of the same entity type. Certain represent territorial institutions (regions, municipalities, prefectures), while others are from NGOs, academic institutions, public-private partnerships, or even community entities. |
| Our questionnaire was submitted to all the participants before the seminar. All the participants did not wish to, or felt legitimate enough to respond to our questions. 11 participants responded to our request out of 16 representatives of the cities or regions invited. The majority of the cities that responded to our questions also only partially answered our request. Our questionnaire required a certain level of knowledge and institutional capacity (statistical organization, institutionalized data, archives, etc.). Numerous participating cities did not possess a viable geographic and statistical information system. Many others did not wish to retranscribe their obtainable information of their territory that could, according to them, hinder their capacities at an international level. The second part of the questionnaire sought to openly ask the opinion of participants and measure their insecurity feelings of their respective city. This section does not represent the multitude of opinions that could be noted within their territorial limits. Certain city representatives at the seminar also asked for the assistance within their profession to fill out the questionnaire, which only reflects the sensitivity of the respondent to often choose a language that appears “politically correct”. |

**Therefore, our study is illustrative, but little demonstrative.**
VIOLENCE, INSECURITY, AND SECURITY PRACTICES: TOWARDS THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE URBAN LANDSCAPE

Charlotte Boisteau

Urban violence and in-security

If many spoke last year of the urban violence phenomenon, due to the uncharacteristic occurrence in the French suburbs, with even the situation apparently changing more every day (Beaud, Pialoux, 2005), we would be wrong to believe that these specifics are completely new, or have even become degenerated (Mucchielli, Robert, 2002). Urban violence exists because cities exist. Have we not, however, passed from a time of violence in a city to a violence of urbanization? When a city is dense, or separations are important, or new ruptures in social tissues are brought upon by a culture promoting closure, can one truly say that nothing has fundamentally changed? Urban violence was definitely not created at the turn of the century, but this current priority is certainly not due strictly to the vigilance of public authorities. Globalization has allowed the deployment of new forms and characteristics of violence, based not only on the trans-nationalization of violent methods and means, but also the trans-nationalization of analytical models (Laroche, 2000). This also allows the privatization of locally given answers to these questions that refer to global principals, directed essentially by security consequences of globalization (Bauman, 2005).

Many texts have been written on the current state of “violence”, “growing insecurity”, or “the growth of incivilities” (Roché, 1998), but one must dissect the statements that consolidate the most used clichés by presenting diverse facts that show the decomposition of the Western World, the dangers of large cities, and the process of de-civilization of the youth will supposedly endure (Wacquant, 1992a). By following the analytical works of Laurent Mucchielli (1999: 86), we can identify three approaches to urban violence that are important topics in many literary works and political spheres. All three pose a problem:

1. The “return of dangerous classes”, or using the fear that the youth of lower income families are a burden to our societies. At first, educational deficiencies, negligent and absent parents, the destruction of the family sphere, and the dismantlement of social lines are negative indicators used thoroughly by the media to describe young delinquents. Sophie Body-Gendrot defines urban violence as “weakly organized actions by the "youth" acting against goods and people that are generally related to institutions, or disqualified and troubled territories” (1998:1). This analysis has also been performed by numerous criminologists, such as Irvin Galler, who focused on “teaching parents and older siblings the expertise necessary to teach their children”.

Many authors write the contrary to this statement, criticizing the focus on children, either to punish or to help them, which leads to a stigmatization of social groups becoming victims rather than culpable (Feixa, 2006). They also note that no study has ever shown that an educational deficiency necessarily leads to violent or deviant behavior. For other researchers (Wacquant, 2004), this declaration, used as a reference by many security policy followers, leads to inappropriate public policies. Situations of social exclusion due to prolonged

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2 Boisteau, Charlotte, under the supervision of Prof. Vincent Kaufmann and Dr. Yves Pedrazzini; Violence and Urban Transformations: Public policy, private strategies, and communitarian actions of securing urban space; doctoral dissertation in the Urban Sociology Laboratory at the Polytechnic School of Lausanne
3 Also see: Belaïd Ch., Autain C., Beaud S., Chemetov, collective (2006), Suburbs, the aftermath of the riots, co-edition Regards- La dispute, Paris.
5 We see this, for example, in a “civil” municipality ordinance passed in Barcelona at the end of 2005. They believe to be able to, and had the duty to educate intoxicated persons to not urinate in the street. However, they also prohibit
unemployment, disenrollment in school, illiteracy, and the evolution of family functional structures are elements often cited as social causes of delinquency. However, none of these factors solely describe the problem. If economic, social, or cultural poverty do not incite criminal activity, the author of crime or delinquency is often the victim of social or economic insecurity before committing an offence, which stems a particularly vicious circle of insecurity:

“Socio-economic inequalities associated to an assigned stature occur, because they consolidate or reinforce ethnical and class differences, an endemic conflict within a democratic regime. If large socio-economic inequalities generally provoke conflict and violence, assigned inequalities particularly do this even more” (Blau, Blau, 1982:119)

The explicative model guiding the work led by Judith and Peter Blau establishes the relationship between the weaknesses of social integration and the development of delinquency. They do not give a distinct explanation of the deviance of social inequality, but rather the consequences of this inequality on the future of individuals left from the social movement. Indeed, due to alienation and despair formed by attributing a lower status to an individual, the cloture regarding the fall of normalized interior order produces revolt that can induce violence.

2. The return of barbarianism, the crisis of civilization, chaos, or anarchism is the second explanation identified by Mucchielli. This can be related to the theory of the conflict of cultures (the renowned civilization shock of Samuel Huntington (1996). This concept transforms an ideological international vision at a national and local level. Sociologists such as Sébastien Roché or Huges Lagrange (Roché, 1996, Lagrange, 1995) explain, in their personal way, the growth of delinquency-related statistics as a rupture with civilized society described by Norbert Elias (1939).

Detractors of the shock of civilizations presently argue, “If the observation is undeniable, the interpretation is not. This would assume a total acceptance of a model from Elias, as from Freud, with roots from old stereotypes of the Christian civilization, such as the opposition of civilization to barbarianism, of morals to the body, of culture to nature, of angels to demons, etc. The problem with this explanation is that there is not one just one (or rather one that is based scientifically). The thorough sociological method first considers if behavior changes because of the norms that govern them, then if norms change because of the social relationships that underlie them. Therefore, one must explain the transformation of norms and social relationships” (Mucchielli, 1999:86). The theory of Huntington also shows its limits with an analysis at an international scale. Huntington exaggerates the “solidarity country syndrome”, does not take into account unforeseeable events, and denies the consequences of the mixing of civilizations. For certain researchers, the theories of Huntington represent a risk: “taking them seriously would transform tangible conflicts of economic interest, politics, territories, or nations of the current world into insolvable and inexplicable confrontations, which would then be interpreted in terms of the shock of civilizations”.

The application of Huntington’s theories on a political plan can enforce extreme positions (Rubinstein, Crocker, 1996). The position on integration is a false debate, which destroys social and spatial politics of segregation and exclusion.

3. The “return to social conflicts” is the third research identified. It borrows, without necessarily updating, the sociologic works inspired by Marxism of the 19th and 20th centuries, identifying urban dynamics and struggles to the battles of the working class. For this theory, capitalism always obliges the worker to sell their ability to work, which then stems social antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie that generate the struggle between

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Footnotes:

6 Translated by us.
7 Refer to the recent adaptation made by the French president Jacques Chirac during a television diffusion where he defined the situation in the suburbs as “a crisis of senses, a crisis of references, a crisis of identity”.
8 Translated by us.
9 Hoagland Jim, “Doing democracy right… », International Herald Tribune, 17.08.2003
classes, calling for the collective appropriation by violent means of production and the abolition of classes altogether. Contemporary analyses have distinguished themselves from the original analysis made by Marx and Engels, that expressed the edifying virtues of violence:

“Violence is the source of all ancient society that welcomes new persons within its limits”¹⁰ (Engels, 1956: 211).

Authors such as Sorel (1981), Lefebvre (1974), Debord (1967), Castells (1999), Foucault (1975), Michaud (1978), Derrida (2003) evolved these theories and helped replace the struggle of the dominated classes in a new contemporary context (urban, post-modern, informative, neoliberal, post-liberal) and the groups of this struggle in more complex categories. In countries of the South, other followers critical of Marxist ideals have redefined the role of the proletariat in “revolutionary” violence. The problem lies less on the situation of workers than the growing exclusion of the most impoverished, or those surviving “outside the workplace” in informal, underground, and illegal economic spheres. The author Jean-Paul Sartre, also critical of Marxism, illustrates that “violence is not a mean among others to obtain an end, but a deliberate choice to obtain an end by any means. This is why the maxim of violence is “the end justifies the means”¹¹ (Sartre, 1983: 180).

The modern city is an unachieved project, due in large part to the deficient management of public security affairs. This analysis (Lefebvre, 1974) appears to adequately take into account the social dynamics and contemporary politics in an urban environment. However, this remains highly opposed, because the functionality of society by social relationships is interpreted by a process done uniquely in economic terms of “production relationships”.

If one can believe that “urban” violence exists because cities exist, to think that history only repeats itself would be false. The essential “qualities” of contemporary violence, as those apparent in cities, are truly not those of “past” violence (Clastres, 1977). The violence present within a rapid urbanization process affecting the entire planet is primarily related to the process of globalization (Derrida, 2003 Castells, 1999, Garcia Canclini, 1999). Certain researchers hypothesize that cities are violent because of their deep spatial and social divisions, which brings forth a particular model corresponding to a new temporality of globalization and the society of information based on inequalities, perhaps strategically premeditated (Baumann, 2005). Contemporary societies are therefore less becoming societies of classes rather than those divided by multiple factors, spatially as much as economically or socially.

**Public, private, and community security actions**

The means implemented to respond to constant complex forms of violence, and the feelings of insecurity relatively connected to them, are not always efficient. They especially show their limits within a local or national territorialized public action. From the thesis of Max Weber, “the modern state is a dominating institutionalized group that looks to (with success) monopolize, within the limits of a territory, physical violence as a method of domination in order to reunite the material means of direction in the hands of its leaders”¹² (Weber, 1959: 133), which is therefore presently inadequate. If the State exercises a certain form of legitimate violence, they no longer regularly possess the monopoly and “the State has disintegrated when confronted with new technologies of information instead of being able to
master them. These technologies have revealed a powerful aspect of network building and decentralization, while also putting into question the central logic of hierarchic instructions and bureaucratic surveillance. Our societies are not disciplinary prisons, but chaotic jungles" (Castells, 1999: 362).

The globalization of this phenomenon appears to show the limits of local responses. However, to aboard experienced situations within a national territory, the role of local authorities must be reinforced in prevention, repression, and solidarity fields against delinquency. To attain this objective, a “city movement” was developed in France in the 1980’s under the initiative of the mayors’ commission on security. According to the commission, five crucial sectors and their interdependences must be acknowledged: the social environment and lifestyle, the future of the youth, the search for the renewal of administrative methods, the new orientation of justice, and the teaching of prevention. The commission and the report “Bonnemaison”, named after its initiator, introduce a new dynamic of local prevention in numerous European cities, notably at Barcelona. This is the first city to recognize the role of community initiatives concerning security:

“It’s unthinkable to believe that guaranteeing an optimum level of security and liberty is possible without taking into account the co-responsibility of citizens within an urban lifestyle. In this sense, it is evident that the fundamental element for this new concept of security is the city itself. The effectiveness of large legislative and governmental options depends on the social appropriation that the community performs” (Lahosa14, 2000:52).

Public security policy is still the topic of numerous debates. If many governments around the world bet on “total security” (which does not signify “security for all”), the era of Big Brother described by Orwell in his book 1984 has not come to pass, because there is no unique dominating actor. Instead, there are diverse dominators that protagonists respond to by means of heterogeneous violence. The public policies implemented by authorities no longer satisfy the need of security caused by the growing sentiment of insecurity15, with new public-private partnerships being used. The development of these partnerships originates from the idea that governmental authority is no longer capable of controlling urban spaces alone, with the costs of a “State-led war on crime” exceeding the financial and institutional capacities of the majority of local and national governments.

The public responses to criminality are comprised of two sections: repression and prevention. Repression performed by central governments to reinforce security is done by hiring more police officers, increasing prison sentences, and applying theoretical repressive methods difficult to implement and debatable, such as “tolerance zero”, curfew for minors, or reducing the age for judicial responsibility used in many American states (Body-Gendrot, 1998). The choice of repression has the advantage of producing immediate effects that can satisfy the requests of public opinion and effectivity needs from the political class, as the analysis of the April 2002 French elections illustrates (Cohen, Salmon, 2003). Research on interior security shows that electors request more security, which means more police officers, more repression, and acceptance that the growth of imprisonment is a consequence of effectively neutralizing delinquents (Bigo, 2005). However, this example is paradox, since the cost of repression is much higher than prevention, with limited results (Sansfaçon, 2004).

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13 Translated by us.
14 Translated by us. Josep M. Lahosa Canellas is the Director of the Prevention, Security, and Mobility Service of the mayor of Barcelona.
15 If “crime growth” is a popular theme written about these past decades, the statistics and quantitative data provided by organizations specialized in this problem (INTERPOL-International Police, UNICRI-United Nations Intergional Crime and Justice Research Institute, WHO-World Health Organization, UNDP-United Nations Development Program, UNODC-United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, etc.) do not however verify this conviction, yet often commonly accepted. Although attacks on property have often increased, crime considered violent (homicides, aggressions, etc) has been stable, if not decreased. Nevertheless, the progression of the fear of crime is important to consider, which is shown in the majority of victimization studies (notably the International Crime Victim Survey, UNICRI-UNODC).
Violence prevention occurs in two settings. The first imposes police officers as the principal actor, while the other, decentralized, focuses on local authorities, associations of civil society, or both. The choice between the two options often creates rivalries between governments and municipal powers, as seen in Spain. Cities that choose prevention often do not possess the legal or financial means to assure its implementation and longevity (Vanderschueren, 2000). For certain experts, prevention remains a central element to all democratic actions against criminality (Bromberg, 2003, Lahosa, 2000, Sansfaçon, 2004). This however does not oppose against repression, but rather defines its limits and reduces crime by attacking its causes (Vanderschueren, 2000). According to these experts, the best approach to respect norms and regulation is to create conditions that shift situations of infraction, or even guarantee the application of laws under social control, “before” crime and delinquency occur, with prevention remaining a social, civil, and individual principal. Progressing an individual at all levels furthers the individual away from violence. As our current research work also shows (Boisteau, 2005c), the decentralization of security expertise allows a preventive and constructive approach to security questions, because the answers are adopted to the reality within neighborhoods.

There exists a relationship between the decentralization of expertise and the rise of private actors in the security sector. New economic strategies emerge and are taken advantage of by actors possessing the required resources. Alternative and costly solutions are proposed and the global market of security is in constant progression. A globalization of security technologies and ideology is taking place, but without roles and responsibilities of those supposedly accountable for the guarantee of security being clearly defined, neither at a local or international level. Furthermore, there is presently a trend of a trans-nationalization of private security groups acting as private security agencies, industrial spy services, protectors of corrupt political systems, and even new forms of mercenaries (Laroche, 2000, Bigo, 2005). According to UN-HATIBAT and its program “Safer Cities”, in 2000, the global costs of security reached 5% to 6% of the GNP in Northern countries and 8% to 10% in Southern ones, correlating to the high development of private security companies. These companies have reached an annual growth of 30% in Southern countries, compared to 8% in Northern countries, with the final years of the 20th century (Vanderschueren, 2000:4). In many countries, the number of private security agents outweighs those of officers employed by the State. For example, Bogotá has 10,500 police officers, compared to 86,419 private security agents.16

Little has been written on community security initiatives, since they participate before prevention policies without generally being recognized for their contribution. We nevertheless highlight certain research that undertakes this question (Feixa, 2006, Pedrazzini, Sanchez, 1998). Community actions are indeed an alternative towards the promotion of “community living” within an urban space.

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16 86,419 is the number of employees in the private security sector, according to the Colombian government June 10th, 2005 (http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2005/marzo/16/04162005.htm). Luis Gonzalo Pérez Montenegro, general secretary of the Superintendence of Vigilance and Private Security, in an intervention at a round-table discussion “Urban Violence and Security Policy” organized by the VUPS project and the mayor of Bogotá September 8th, 2005 states, “We have an active personnel of over 120,000 men, 2,500 dogs, and 3,462 vehicles that exercise in vigilance and a private security activity in Bogotá” (translated by us). “What does private vigilance mean? It’s a remunerated activity benefiting a public or private organization, developed by a natural or juridical person. Prevention activity aims to stop perturbations towards security, individual tranquility, and well-being through the surveillance of a good or others by a material’s and team’s fabrication, installation, commercialization, and utilization for vigilance and private security”. Translated by us, Superintendence of Vigilance and Private Security: http://www.supervigilancia.gov.co
Social and spatial effects from security policy: urban space in question

Much research has been done on new security urbanism (David, 1999, Caldeira, 2000) and the architects aiming to respond to security problems through design and the choice of materials.

If we take into consideration the “Californian School” (Davis, 1999, Soja, 2001), public space has transformed these past years into a space of fear, with certain users considered even invasive or aggressive. If the most innovative public responses identify social exclusion as the major cause of crime growth and propose definitive solutions towards desegregation, the trend is contrarily to privatize urban space. These types of responses reinforce social segregation on a strictly financial basis (Kaufmann, 2002). In order to protect those, the rich, from a criminal environment created by others, the poor, partitioned, closed, and gated communities are erected far from city centers. Due to a cause and effect relationship, these spatial responses constitute “zoning” crime, with certain neighborhoods experiencing considerably high rates of violence, while others avoiding this phenomenon (Guillaume, 2001).

The existence of closed (gated) and ghettoized (“ghetted”) communities is due occasionally to a paranoiac perception of incurred risks. The shopping mall model, where one can eat, shop, go to the movies, and play also corresponds to the growing demand of vigilance. Intra-urban migrations continue to grow, with wealthier populations escaping to “secure” zones, while the poor stay permanently in their residences. On the contrary, the gentrification process occasionally evicts the working class from their traditional habitat areas (Guglielmo, 1996).

In numerous cities, crime and insecurity have formed space. However, this transformation of space refers to social disparities, allowing the emergence of new environments. Geography of violence corresponds to the geography of security. Urban space becomes gradually less inclusive and no longer performs its function of social lineage, often reducing citizens’ mobility and stigmatizing ancient areas as being dangerous. Cultural globalization exports specific architectural and urban aspects to numerous democratic societies:

“The gated communities of California were the global prototype (…) while the condominius fechados of Latin America used comparable neighborhoods in Portugal as their example”\(^{17}\) (Glasze, 2000: 71).

However, enclosure and partitioning do not strictly concern the wealthier classes. Space fragmentation is not only universal, but also still widespread in all city neighborhoods (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002).

“A partitioned, segregated city of rich and poor ghettos, industrialized and collegiate zones, abandoned centers, and discarded suburbs is the result of urban agoraphobia, or the fear of public spaces, that attempts to counter this by using the automobile and guarded residences by “police force”. High and middle classes do not only use this option. Poor sectors also try to protect themselves and generate their auto defense mechanisms (…) This partitioning is potentially volatile, but presently not considered solely the source of daily urban insecurity. It is socially unjust, politically anti-democratic, and culturally miserable” (Borja, 2003b)\(^{18}\).

At times, such partitioning can be related to accessible means to assure the protection of residents in a neighborhood, but also informal, even illegal networks can form that either maintain order or commit “vigilantism” (Boisteau, 2005b). Due to the absence or the inadequate public responses, governmental in particular, for proven or supposed violence, the private sector utilizes punctual, provisory, and inequitable responses that endangers

\(^{17}\) Translated by us.
\(^{18}\) Translated by us.
quality of life and city accessibility, while amplifying the risk of auto-defense in non-protected neighborhoods. Boarders are created in the urban tissue and civilian mobility is threatened.

The necessary combination of approaches

Whether to denounce its perverse character or request for its reinforcement, security is presently at the center of urban society’s preoccupations. Nevertheless, no social actor, neither political nor private, appears currently capable to propose adequate solutions to these new concerns.

These dynamics are rarely seen as a cause and effect relationship, or within an inter-sectored logic. Presently, no relationship exists between different sectors and actors, either directly or indirectly concerned by urban violence phenomenon. The “Urban Violence and Security Policies” project\(^{19}\) states the important correlation between security and urban spaces. However, no one has systematically integrated public security policies, city urban planning policies, preventive and community actions, the benefits of the private sector, and daily life within a community context.

\(^{19}\) Refer to the 1\(^{st}\) footnote.
PRESENTATIONS

Juan Manuel Ospina.

Secretario de Gobierno de Bogotá

1. The novelty of Bogotá

Fifteen years ago, Bogotá was a city where its inhabitants, mostly born in the four corners of Colombia, and very few of them locals, or “cachacos”, felt somewhat rootless, without a sense of belonging or responsibility toward the city, held up in its routines and purposeless, where problems and apathy grew day by day.

However, the situation changed drastically, rapidly transforming Bogotá, the capital city of Colombia and driver of the transformation of a country wracked by the tragedy of war, besieged by violence and its main cause, drug-trafficking. It was a country where the historical and structural weakness of its central government was the main characteristic of its condition.

The country fortunately changed thanks to the Constitution of 1991, established to seal a pact of peace and reconciliation after successful negotiations with the guerrilla group M-19 and, secondarily, with the Popular Army of Liberation (EPL). The Constitution lays down in its first article that: “Colombia is a social state based on the rule of law as a unitary, decentralised Republic, with autonomous territorial bodies, democratic, participative and pluralist…”

Some years before, the popular or direct election of city mayors and the increase of the participation of departmental bodies in the national income, through transfers by the central government, had been approved. The Constitution widened the scope of this regional strengthening, under the policy of decentralisation with autonomy. It also enabled the opening of spaces to different or alternative political forces from the two historical Liberal and Conservative political parties.

These two elements, enacted through the local electoral processes, especially the election of mayors and applied to the situation prevailing in Bogotá of rootless citizens detached from traditions or simple routines, made a change of direction possible in political and administrative scene of the city. The mayors stopped being the representatives of the old interests, and acquired a more civic, non-partisan, character, in which the person of the candidate, his team and his manifesto carried more weight than old loyalties.

Starting with that political change, the city council ceased being a club of notables—national politicians or from the bogotano high society—and began to be formed by professional politicians, young people that rose from the local level, the administrative committees of the 20 localities in which the city was then divided, all of them a product of the new constitutional order. The council, however, had not yet been able to take the huge modernizing step taken by the government of the city after the popular election of the Mayor, in large measure because the change of the council depended on the still to be resolved transformation or restructuring of the political parties.

This new phase of the city was especially marked by the administrations of Jaime Castro, the first one of Antanas Mockus, Enrique Peñalosa, and the present one of Luis Eduardo Garzón. These administrations differed from one another, with different social priorities and representations and different political ideologies and even contrary elements. These have, however, driven a continuing and noteworthy process of change. The firm tendency has been
to "build on that already built", to give rise to continuity in the administration of the city, without abject imitation, since each administration has had and developed its own priorities and focal programme cores.

2. The mayors of change

Jaime Castro, of the liberal party, constituent of 1991 and a fervent supporter of municipal independence, laid down the base for the strengthening of the organic statute of Bogotá (decree-law 1421 of 1993), that stopped the practice of co-administration by the City Council, especially in regard to public contracting, and opened the way for the decentralisation of the city, which is still the main unfinished task for the political and institutional transformation of Bogotá.

Antanas Mockus in his first administration, through an effective policy of civic culture, initiated a process of changing the awareness of the city: the concept of collective responsibility, based on shared purposes that are no longer dreams but become real. It is a matter of citizen education connected with responsibility as compliance and internalization of rules and regulations, and the recovery of social sanction and awards. In terms of security, these principles would materialize, during his second administration, in the Police Code of Bogotá of 2003.

The objective was the construction of civic responsibility, which was achieved to a great extent. The matter of security and civic coexistence was in direct relation with the compliance with rules and regulations and the corresponding behaviour of the citizens. Compliance with the law would open the way for an organized civic coexistence and therefore the security of the citizens. In order to face the reality of violence and crime, Mockus adopted an epidemiological approximation based on the localization (geographical reference) and risk factors, for which a system of observation was organized, in order to gather and analyze periodic statistical information.

Enrique Peñalosa focused his administration on the material development of the city; its public spaces were considered as the main urban generators of social equality. Public libraries, schools, parks, green zones and bicycle paths were the distinctive feature of his administration. Complementary to this was the "Transmilenio", a system of mass transportation that revolutionized public transportation and had a great impact on urban planning in Bogotá.

Security was understood to relate directly to the quality and control of these public spaces. Street lighting, the control, not to say persecution, of peddlers, the war against private cars and parking in public spaces were the landmarks of Peñalosa’s administration and of his vision of the security in the city. The protection of public spaces and in general of all public matters, is the valuable heritage this administration left to the city.

Luis Eduardo Garzón as far as he is concerned recognizes the advances made by the previous administrations in terms of the modernization of habits and the physical construction of the "public city", but remarks that this modern city must be simultaneously human. It is not a matter of choosing but of achieving both purposes. To think more on the cyclist than on the bicycle was a slogan of his campaign that clearly expressed his concern and his proposal. "Bogotá without indifference" would become the motto of his administration, with which he mobilized the city around the fact that 54% of its population is under the poverty line. Social investment increased from an average of 50% to 68% of the city annual budget. Garzón reminded his fellow citizens that material progress cannot make them forget the social crisis and the problems and uncertainty of the economy. He referred to the political imperatives of a social state based on the rule of law that no only recognizes human rights but also commands the taking of the necessary actions to guarantee their exercise and progressive
fruition. It was no longer a matter of recognizing political rights, characteristic of the nineteenth century liberal state, but also the economic, social, cultural and environmental rights.

Garzón responsibly tackled the subject of decentralisation, expressing that the administrative and political organization of Bogotá was inadequate for the achievement of a truly democratic rule of the city and apportioning of resources so that the city lives, builds and governs from its territories, its twenty localities, in unison with the inhabitants.


In a schematic form and to facilitate its presentation and analysis, we shall deal with the facts of this period dividing them into six subject areas:

3.1 The foundations of the policy of security

They are years in which conceptual advances are made, and in which public safety is not seen as something pertaining exclusively to the national government and the police. It begins to be associated with citizen actions and culture (Mockus) and with city planning and public spaces (Peñalosa). A more integral, more civic vision begins to form.

However, its concrete development in the framework of the city continues to be assumed as a public service to be rendered by the State and not as a public asset to be built and enriched as a task of society, with the active participation of the citizenry which, without substituting the authorities, brings to it fundamental elements, in the exercise of citizen co-responsibility. This is one of the points that most clearly mark a difference with the current administration, which is undoubtedly of a social democratic nature.

3.2 The local sphere of the policy of security

This space has slowly opened up. From the police stations we changed to the “Centres of immediate attention” (CAI’s) that tried to bring the police service nearer to the community. They were part of the master plan of the elected mayor Andrés Pastrana with his policy of the friendly policeman that aimed to relocate the police to the neighbourhoods, near to the inhabitants. It was in 2002, with the advice and support of Barcelona, that communal policing was established in Bogotá, the police level with greater approval of the citizenry.

A national law had in 1993 given birth to the local fronts of security, organized by the police together with the inhabitants of a city-block to cooperate in its surveillance, with communication with the police station or CAI or a siren to alert in case of an emergency. This was the participative component of the policy of security, a marginal participation limited to surveillance.

In 2002, local councils of security were established, operating in an irregular manner until 2005 when they were restructured to transform them into the central element for the definition, implementation and evaluation of the local plans of security established by the agreement of 2005. From 1993 on, through the local development funds and the local administrative committees (JAL) - bodies of political representation in the localities - resources were assigned for investment in security, mostly for the creation of local fronts of security.
Private sector intervention in security was embodied in the programme led by the Chamber of Commerce of the so-called “safe zones”, where the businessmen of a particular sector of the city, generally from the commerce sector, joined and agreed with the corresponding police station and CAI on the organization of police presence, and assigned financial resources for transportation and communication equipment.

The Garzón administration found the elements for the building of the local component of the policy of security, but it found they were scattered, without mechanisms of organization and coordination of work, and without the setting up of purposes, responsibilities and goals.

3.3 Understanding and analyzing conflicts and follow-up and evaluation of the policy of security

With the organization and setting in motion of the Unified System of Information on Violence and Crime (SUIVD) in 1995, the gathering and periodic analysis of the statistical information from two government agencies —the Centre of Criminological Investigations (CIC) of the metropolitan police and the Institute of Forensic Medicine— was organized. It focused on the so-called ‘high impact’ criminal offences: homicides, deaths in traffic accidents, suicides and non intentional deaths; personal injuries; theft of personal belongings, vehicles, motorcycles; robbery of banks, businesses and houses. As has already been stated, quantitative analysis and a focus of an epidemiological type were stressed.

Even though the geographical localization of data was done, the analysis of the statistics did not deepen the understanding of the contexts, local as well as city-wide, in which they occurred, and which are the sources of violent and criminal behaviour. They were simplified analyses both for diagnostics and for the formulation of actions by the authorities. Although they were effective during the first phase of implementation of the policy, they later lost effectiveness, since all public policies also are subject to what we can call the phase of diminishing performance. The fruits of these analyses were, among others, the so-called “square hour” that set up an hour limit for closing of bars and discos (3 a.m.) and the campaigns against fireworks during the Christmas season.

A supposition more or less implicit in the policy of security and its development is that public safety in Bogotá could be focused and managed leaving out the strongly conflictive context of Colombia; that the problems that threaten civic coexistence and security are endogenous, generated by causes, dynamics and acts within the city and responding to circumstances pertaining to it. This vision was questioned by terrorist actions in Bogotá, especially the bomb in the club El Nogal in 2003.

3.4 Individuals and public safety in the city of Bogotá

The organized participation of citizens was limited to the local fronts of security, which as we have already seen, took place in only a marginal way. The economic sectors, specially the commercial sector, participated with their support for the already mentioned safe zones.

In comparison, there was an enormous presence of private security firms in Bogotá which in total had a staff ten times bigger than the metropolitan police— dedicated to the surveillance of the interior of the residential complexes of all social strata and the shopping malls in all parts of the city. These basically operated without any coordination with the policies or concrete actions taken by the authorities in charge of the surveillance of open spaces; the public space.
3.5 A peaceful solution for social conflicts

The Constitution of 1991 allows the administration of legal processes by individuals, in their condition as conciliators or friendly arbitrators, applying to that end alternative instruments for the resolution of conflicts. From 1996 on, the District of Bogotá initiated a project of mediation and conciliation centres or units in the different localities, formed by an interdisciplinary team—a psychologist, a social worker, and a lawyer—that complement the traditional system of the administration of law. For its part, the law 497 of 1999 established the judges of peace elected by the community, who decide in conflicts taking into account and respecting the values of the community. They are judges that assume that the conflicting parties are the agents of the conflict and not a subject of legal proceedings. In 2001, the first 100 judges of peace were elected for a period of five years.

3.6 Equipping for the security of the city

The law 418 of 1997 allowed the territorial bodies (municipalities and departments) to create account-funds for the financing of programmes of security and civic coexistence with 5% of the value of public works contracts realised in their territory. To the district fund, the Treasury additionally transferred the collection of the industry and commerce tax paid by private firms that render security services in the city. These resources were allotted to the financing of buildings for the police: stations, firemen quarters, CAI’s, transportation: vehicles and motorcycles, and communication systems. It also built installations for the operation of systems of alternative or complementary justice, houses of justice and centres of conciliation.

In 2003 the master plan of equipment for justice, defence and security of Bogotá was issued, for investment in infrastructure over ten years, defining the regulations of the corresponding services of equipment from an integral perspective of territorial type. It assumed that equipment and installations are an integral part of the physical and social, urban and provincial system and no mere functional infrastructure, independent from one another and in the spatial context in which they are found and in which they interact. The plan also aims at opening a space to use the equipment for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, as a guarantee of citizen safety.


In January 2004 the administration of Luis Eduardo Garzón began, which finds the full implementation of what we have described above. The statistics that express the results of these policies are clear and significant: violent deaths had dropped from 3,350 in 2001 to 2,795 in 2003; homicides, from 940 in the first quarter of 2001 to 816 in the second quarter of 2003, which corresponds to a rate of homicides of 23 per 100,000 inhabitants. We must recall that in 1995 it stood at 58.8. From 2002 on, however, it began to show a diminution of its rhythm of decline.

As to the offences of an economic type there was a notable, drastic drop in kidnappings, extortion and bank robberies which in Colombia are associated with the actions of armed groups. One must remark that this reduction had a fundamental role in the strategy of the national government which succeeded in forcing the FARC guerrillas to abandon their strategy of domination of the regions around Bogotá. The success of these military operations radically bettered, in 2003, the perception of security of bogotanos. But the impact was temporary, as shown by the figures of a survey on perception of security done in 2004-2005 by the Chamber of Commerce that returned to a tendency to perceive a gradual betterment, without “temporary ups and downs.”
Behind these successes there began to appear worrying signs centred on situations that strongly affect the daily coexistence of the common men and women and that can become sources of great violence if they are not met opportunely. It’s a question of street thievery — the “raponazo” to use the colloquial term— domestic violence and sexual offences. The attention of politics must be directed to great economic phenomena but also to those crimes whose victim is your neighbour.

Young people in a situation of high vulnerability or exposed to the menace of violent actions, as perpetrators or as victims, were not duly taken into account. The displaced persons that arrived from the different regions of the country, forced out of their land by war or poverty, were not visible in the policies of the District, beyond the assistance commitments in health and education ordered by law.

During the last two years, another change begins to appear: there is a rise in the percentage of violent actions and homicides, including those in closed spaces. During the second half of 2005, the already mentioned survey of the Chamber of Commerce showed that violent deaths were practically equal in public and closed spaces.

Bogotá is definitely not isolated from the reality of violence and crime that Colombia has suffered for years. Guerrillas, drug-trafficking and the paramilitary, the accused trio of the contemporary history of the country, were also present in the city, forcing it to feel their presence and menace. With the policy of negotiation with the paramilitaries of the Uribe government, a new inhabitant of the city is introduced, the warrior reinstated in civic life, and the perspective of future actions of these groups radically changes as they enter a dynamics typical of a post-conflict. Did they think they had won the war? Had they effectively won the war?

It is doubtless a new scene for the old groups coming from the war and drug-trafficking, a scene in which their total organization of people and infrastructure begins to transform itself into urban criminal bands more interested in controlling illegal businesses and profits - prostitution, smuggling, sale of hallucinogens, extortion, illicit land deals - than in the management and control of war territories to displace and defeat the guerrillas.

In an economically globalised world, with a competitive export product, such as cocaine, these criminal groups find in Bogotá a useful platform to launch into the activities of international crime. This is just the beginning but they have a promising perspective, since globalization is also attractive for those criminal groups, to which they offer fruitful markets to buy and sell.

It is clear that the policies followed until then by the different mayors, with their undeniable successes, had to be, however, seriously reformulated in order to include the new realities of civic coexistence and crime in the city and, indirectly in the country, so as to recognize the significance of other factors that had not been duly evaluated in the past.

Likewise, the policies of civic coexistence and security had to assume and express the ideas on life in society, the priorities of government and the sense and content of public action and citizen co-responsibility that had propelled Luis Eduardo Garzón into the mayoralty. The changes were embodied in 2004 in the formulation of the Development Plan as well as in the corresponding investment budgets. The year 2005 marks the initiation of these changes and 2006 will be the year of their consolidation, as the citizenry is beginning to perceive. For the second semester of 2005, the survey of perception and crime of the Chamber of Commerce, showed an eleven point rise in the perception of security and the index of direct crime victims was equal to that of Barcelona and Santiago de Chile.
5. The integral system of security and civic coexistence

For the administration of Luis Eduardo Garzón, the safety of the citizenry is a public asset, not just a service that promotes the necessary structural conditions to guarantee a dignified life for all and their full exercise of their rights, in an environment of solidarity, mutual respect and freedom. It is a necessary condition to achieve the individual and collective realization of human rights and the protection of the physical and moral integrity of all persons.

This vision of civic security puts forward that:

The safety of citizens is a result of an integral policy that includes complementary actions in the social, economic, institutional and police spheres.

The safety of citizens and civic coexistence are necessary conditions for the enjoyment of individual and collective liberties, in the framework of an inclusive social dynamic.

Finally, an equilibrium between rights and duties backs up the co-responsibility existing between public bodies, the citizens and the community in general, making possible the production, increase and enrichment of citizen safety as a public asset.

The logical development of this approach is the consolidation of an integral system of security, civic coexistence and justice for Bogotá that permits the coordination of the institutional options at the disposal of the city in order to fulfil the tasks pertaining to civic coexistence and security. The system is based on five fundamental topics:

The promotion and guarantee of human rights in order to promote an inclusive development.

The prevention of criminal offences and vulnerabilities in populations facing high risk of falling into situations of lack of peaceful coexistence and violence, together with attention to the victims of these situations.

The strengthening of plans and programmes of action with the participation of the citizenry, both in the social and territorial sectors.

The strengthening of public institutions through a merciless fight against all kinds of illegal activities, especially corruption, and in favour of the efficiency and transparency of the management of public affairs.

6. The central points of the policy of security and civic coexistence of Luis Eduardo Garzon’s administration

Based on what has already been laid out, the policy followed by the administration of Bogotá can be divided into six main topics.

6.1 The pacts of civic coexistence and security as an exercise in co-responsibility.

In August 2005, the Mayor together with the District Solicitor’s Office and the Chamber of Commerce signed the Pact for Security and Civic Coexistence that established a framework for the main policies of the administration around the effective exercise of citizen co-responsibility, and the organisation of security and civic coexistence actions in order to achieve precise objectives in the social and territorial sectors, complementing and supporting
the work of the authorities, strengthening social cohesion, and preventive actions that affect civic coexistence or the condition of persons whose rights can or may be violated.

To date, sector pacts have been signed with taxi drivers, private security firms and the spare parts trade, this last to control the theft of vehicles. The city government is now working on a pact with shopping malls and secondary schools and universities. It is a successful experience that permits the adaptation of actions to the challenges encountered, the conditions of the partners and the evolution of the situation. There is a tripartite technical secretariat; Secretary of State, District Solicitor’s Office and Chamber of Commerce, in charge of the follow-up, the recommendation of eventual adjustments, and the identification and design of new pacts.

Within this perspective, one finds the local security pacts, whose setting in motion is a task of the present year and which we will discuss next.

6.2 Security in the local scene

The city government considers that for the success of the policy and the betterment of the security perception of the citizens, it is fundamental to advance in the consideration and treatment from the neighbourhoods, of the conflicts pertaining to civic coexistence and the menaces to safety, implementing it with a criteria of proximity to the action and the decisions of the authorities with respect to citizens, making more visible their presence.

This decentralising dynamic is consistent with the policy that is being followed by the city government, in the search to strengthen the management and actions of the local mayoralties in order that they can really act as local governments.

The guiding principle of the process is provided by the local security pacts which are structured on the corresponding diagnostics of conflicts, civic coexistence and safety in each locality, and which were realised during the second half of 2005, including a map of the local actors, the determination of risk generating factors, and the analysis of the local security problems as well as a validation of the diagnostic by the community.

Once the diagnostic is established, the objectives are defined, activities are planned, and the commitments of the local and district authorities, and individuals, are established, as well as the support given by the citizen organizations. Thus is born a local security plan which under the direction of the local mayor, together with the commanding officer of the police station, and within the framework of the local security council, becomes the local plan of action.

A task still remaining for 2006 is the transformation of the local security fronts into an element that propitiates the participation of the citizens in the local security strategy.

6.3 Civic coexistence based on the recognition and guarantee of human rights of people at risk

Civic coexistence and its correlate, the safety of citizens, demands of the city government the development of integral actions with respect to the recognition of the condition of populations victim of situations of exclusion, such as the persons displaced by rural violence and poverty (120,000), reinserted from the armed groups (4,500), peddlers (75,000) and the young people menaced by violence and crime, be they victims or perpetrators, whose number is indeterminate, even though it is estimated that there exists in Bogotá some 650 violent, or semi-violent groups.

As to the displaced and reinserted persons from the war, the District follows a complementary policy with the national government. Its greatest challenges are the offering
of conditions that permit their recovery of economic autonomy through a stable job with a dignified salary and conditions, or the initiation of productive units of associative character. Additionally and directly related with this last issue is everything related to the facilitation of permanent housing. One must take into account that 60% of the persons arriving in Bogotá in the situation described above wish to remain and live in the city.

With the peddlers, which during the previous city governments were marked as factors of insecurity, the District is now working to achieve an effective harmonisation of the collective right to public spaces with the individual right to have a minimal income. With this purpose the Master Plan of public space was issued in 2005 in order to define the regulated use of the same with the participation of the vendors, after passing through processes of organisation, training and financing of their initiatives.

In respect to youngsters there are to date several isolated programmes that are being implemented but an in-depth policy is still lacking to clarify the horizon of action.

6.4 The criminal justice system in the city

The city government is responsible for the service of the so-called administrative justice telephone line - about the environment, transit, the application of the police code - of the family and the alternative or complementary line. The policy of the Garzón government has put forward the restructuring of the service so the hotlines will operate as a coordinated system where each component has a role in a complementary manner. Additionally, voluntary civic coexistence actors have been trained; facilitating logistic facilities in order to do their work. They have received support to improve the ability of citizens to access them. By the end of this administration 16 new Houses of Justice and 6 units of conciliation will have been built, in order to guarantee the space required for the development of their work.

The revision of the Police Code was concluded to adjust to the experience left by three years of its application, and the postulates of the new policy of civic coexistence of the city.

6.5 Analysis and follow-up of reality and results of the policy of security

The city government is working to change the inherited epidemiological and statistical analysis to a more comprehensive and qualitative view of the problems of civic coexistence and the reality of violence. This analysis will cover the perpetrator and the victim with the background record and the past circumstances in order to put the facts in a context; it will also strengthen the geographical reference of the information and include the appreciations and evaluations of the local scenes. It will also begin the study of the new forms of insecurity assumed by the lack of civic coexistence and the insecurity in the city and its surrounding region.

6.6 Support to the strengthening and modernisation of the police for the accompaniment of the citizen

The resources of the surveillance and security Fund that support the actions of the authorities have increased in a significant manner reaching annual rates of growth of 10%. This measure has been accompanied by modifications of the policy of investment taken by the Fund. For the strengthening of the mobility of the police, a change from purchasing to the annual renting of vehicles and motorcycles is aimed to results in an increase in the totality of the equipment by 30%. In 2005, 350 more motorcycles were provided to the metropolitan police.
The 26 additional CAI’s that were going to be built until 2003, will be ready during the first half of this year and will be complemented by mobile CAI’s in order to increase the capacity of action and reaction of the police force. Two new police stations will also be opened.

Finally, after ten years of discussion, by August the city will have a System of one single emergency number, 123, which will speed up the communication of the citizen with the authorities and the capacity of the authorities to respond.

For the city government of Bogotá, the task undertaken is bearing fruit. It has allowed us, in a pragmatic way, to take advantage of the advances and achievements realised by the city in this field. It acts thus without being dogmatic or having unique solutions, and with the capacity for interpreting the new realities and to place the subject of citizen safety in the centre of a democratic policy that considers that social progress, the consolidation of liberties, and the defence of human rights are identified with the defence of rights and respect for human life, opinions, spaces of action and assets of all citizens without the exclusion of any one. And that it is, additionally, a battle against legality and corruption, and for the rule of law, harmonisation, the exercise of citizen co-responsibility and democratic tolerance of differences, which should be the source of creation and not of conflict.
Le modèle Barcelone.

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Introduction

Un des aspects les plus susceptibles d’avoir un impact sur la vie sociale des villes est celui qui concerne la sécurité ou l’insécurité et, plus concrètement, la perception que l’on peut avoir de celle-ci. Cette perception se construit sur la base de réalités et d’expériences, mais aussi, et de manière conséquente, à partir de sensations et de représentations de ce que l’on considère comme dangereux et, dans le cas du milieu urbain, des territoires et de ceux qui les habitent.

C’est dans ce sens qu’il convient de montrer comment les recherches et le sens commun nous indiquent que le sentiment de sécurité/insécurité va au-delà de l’absence de délits, c’est une perception et, en tant que telle, une construction sociale : c’est ainsi que les recherches réalisées montrent les différences mais aussi les relations entre peur diffuse et peur concrète, la première étant identifiée comme celle perçue par rapport à des phénomènes à caractère général et basée sur des risques indéterminés, la seconde étant directement liée, de manière fondée ou pas, aux possibles expériences personnelles.

Ainsi donc, c’est dans le milieu urbain que s’affirme, bien plus clairement, cette ambivalence : la ville peut être le lieu de la solitude au cœur de la multitude ou un espace privilégié de cohabitation et de tolérance ; elle peut être l’empire du bruit et de l’incivisme ou un espace agréable pour passer du bon temps ; elle peut être l’espace de l’insécurité et du danger face à des conduites asociales ou encore l’espace que la communauté revendique et s’approprie.

Prévention, répression, solidarité et participation de la communauté

La politique de Barcelone en matière de sécurité publique est envisagée sur la base de quatre critères principaux : prévention, répression, solidarité et participation de la communauté.

Prévention : avec l’objectif d’agir avant que ne se produise le conflit, en intervenant sur les causes, en s’informant, en connaissance de la réalité ; en travaillant sur la prospective des demandes sociales et sur la perception du conflit ; sur le territoire, en intervenant sur la qualité de l’espace ; avec des réponses de proximité.

Répression : on considère qu’il est impossible de travailler en termes préventifs dans un climat d’impunité et c’est dans ce sens que le projet revendique la répression comme un élément de la politique préventive. En coopération avec d’autres administrations, et en coordination avec les services qui interviennent sur le territoire ; en travaillant dans le sens d’un assouplissement de l’administration de justice et en favorisant l’accès des citoyens ; en œuvrant pour un retour à la confiance dans le système de justice.

Solidarité : tant avec la victime qu’avec l’agresseur ; l’acheminement vers une société plus libre est donc à situer en rapport avec la capacité de récupération sociale, tant des auteurs que des victimes. Dans ce sens, il est clair que parler de sécurité revient à parler de l’usage de la liberté, et c’est dans ce cadre que l’adoption de politiques visant à encourager une culture de l’engagement de la communauté est considérée comme fondamentale.
Participation : à l’appréhension de la réalité, à la conception de politiques et au contrôle de leur exécution par le biais de structures de participation (les conseils, les commissions ah hoc, etc.), un instrument de co-responsabilisation qui implique, de la part des citoyens, une position proactive face au risque, en proposant des réponses aux agents sociaux, et en rendant à la communauté la capacité de résoudre les conflits.

**Le territoire, un espace social**

Barcelone est une ville où les quartiers qui la constituent ont une vie très intense. Aussi le modèle de sécurité proposé n’aurait-il pas été complet sans le travail réalisé au sein des Conseils de Sécurité et de Prévention des districts qui quadrillent la ville et où sont déployés les services d’accueil du citoyen.

La complexité de la perception que les citoyens ont de la sécurité exige des réponses, non seulement pour la réduction de la criminalité mais aussi à cette perception sociale, c’est dans ce sens qu’il est nécessaire de les définir en considérant qu’il s’agit de rendre possible une société tolérante, solidaire, participative et co-responsable des politiques publiques de sécurité, c’est pourquoi il faut prévoir des politiques qui anticipent le conflit.

C’est dans ce sens qu’il convient de dégager deux aspects fondamentaux de la définition du modèle de sécurité appliqué à Barcelone.

D’une part, l’espace dans lequel se produit le conflit et où doivent être mobilisées les ressources nécessaires pour récupérer ou réparer les relations dérégées, le territoire connu et reconnu par les citoyens ; d’autre part la nécessité de permettre à la communauté d’approcher la résolution des conflits. Au moment de la définition du modèle de sécurité de Barcelone, on a dit avec emphase que les critères de proximité et de subsidiarité politique et administrative étaient essentiels pour la mise en œuvre d’une politique démocratique de sécurité publique.

De fait, cette façon d’agir visait à apporter une réponse à l’échec des modèles dont l’axe directeur est le système de contrôle, en proposant une approche globalisatrice qui intégrerait les réponses pénales et serait sensible aux différences générées au sein des divers territoires de la ville.

Dans cette perspective, ce sont les autorités locales, les maires, qui se trouvent dans la meilleure situation pour donner une réponse équilibrée aux demandes d’améliorations émises par les citoyens et les citoyennes ; leur position, juste au premier plan des demandes, et les moyens des services publics leur permettent un ajustement de la réponse demandée.

La politique de sécurité publique a ainsi pour principal critère d’application le territoire le plus proche et pour référent le maire.

**Les axes du modèle**

L’un des prémisses de l’intervention que l’on se proposait de mettre en œuvre à Barcelone était de modifier ces dynamiques d’intervention publique qui se limitaient à mettre en contact le malade et le thérapeute, le délinquant et le policier ou le marginal et le travailleur social. Tout au long de ces années, l’un des apports les plus intéressants et innovants à Barcelone, et dans l’ensemble de l’administration locale, a été celui d’intégrer la communauté comme partie prenante dans la conception des politiques et que celle-ci le fasse dans le cadre de la co-responsabilisation ; il semble donc évident que le succès ou l’échec des choix gouvernementaux ou législatifs dépendent de l’appropriation que la communauté peut en faire.
C’est dans ce sens que le modèle de sécurité de Barcelone s’est organisé sur la base des axes suivants : connaissance de la réalité, coopération des institutions, coordination des politiques et mise en œuvre de programmes.

**Connaissance de la réalité**

Les recherches mettent en évidence, sur le terrain du délit ou du crime, la coexistence au minimum de trois définitions de ce que l’on peut considérer comme un fait délictuel : la définition juridico-pénale, celle de la police et celle des citoyens qui ne maîtrisent pas les concepts juridiques ; par conséquent nous avons trois réalités bien différentes.

Il est évident que dans ces réalités, les différents acteurs, qu’ils soient individuels ou collectifs, intègrent une certaine représentation sociale de la criminalité et en fonction de cette image qui est la leur, mettent en œuvre des interventions, des actions et des politiques, formalisant ainsi une rétro-alimentation du système même. Au moment d’analyser la réalité appréhendée, celle-ci est conditionnée par la définition acceptée.

Dans ce sens, si nous dégageons les principaux critères de ces trois définitions de la criminalité ou de la délinquance, nous observons comment :

- la définition judiciaire intègre ce que les tribunaux connaissent et ont sanctionné par une sentence ferme.
- la définition policière intègre ce que les services de police considèrent comme un délit ou une infraction pénale, avant sa classification par le système de justice, et qui est connu par le biais de la plainte ou de l’enquête d’office.
- la définition populaire comprend ce que la population, profane en matière de lois, définit comme délinquance, indépendamment des classifications pénales et indépendamment des cas où une plainte a été déposée ou ceux pour lesquels la sentence a déjà été rendue par l’administration de justice.

C’est ainsi qu’en fonction de la définition adoptée en matière de délit, on utilise l’une ou l’autre méthode pour en évaluer les impacts. Dans ce sens, les principales méthodes pour analyser la réalité de la sécurité et/ou de la délinquance utilisent comme producteurs de l’information les deux acteurs de l’acte délictuel : l’auteur ou la victime.

Si nous nous centrons sur les méthodes les plus utilisées, nous devons avoir présentes à l’esprit les limites de chacune d’elles : les statistiques rassemblent ce que les services déetectent, et nous savons tous que cette connaissance peut être biaisée par le fonctionnement même des services et par le niveau de confiance que la population éprouve à leur égard. Nous pouvons dire que plus que des indicateurs de connaissance, les statistiques sont des indicateurs de l’activité des services qui les collectent.

Les enquêtes, bien qu’ayant leurs limites, se placent sur le terrain de la connaissance globale de la sécurité/insécurité et permettent de travailler sur la base des composantes objectives et subjectives mais aussi avec un univers très large. Signalons quelques unes de ces limites :

Néanmoins, les enquêtes restent la méthode qui relate le mieux ce qui se passe réellement ; elles permettent de mesurer les impacts que la sécurité/insécurité ont sur la population en générale, de vérifier les différences entre victimes et non-victimes, de mesurer les impacts psychologiques et économiques du délit, les différences de comportement et les changements d’attitude des citoyens, leurs préoccupations, leur niveau de confiance dans les institutions, les mesures adoptées d’auto-protection, etc. En définitive, elles permettent d’analyser les
deux versants de la sécurité : le versant objectif, la victimisation et le versant subjectif, les attitudes et les peurs.

Actuellement, même si les discussions méthodologiques sont encore d’une intensité souvent épique, le sens commun a permis de rompre la dynamique d’exclusion ou de substitution d’une méthode par une autre. Aujourd’hui, on utilise de plus en plus souvent plusieurs méthodes pour apprécier la connaissance de phénomènes aussi complexes que ceux de la criminalité et de la délinquance.

Dans ce sens, il est stérile et inutile de discuter quelle approche est la meilleure ou la pire, chaque source ou méthode pouvant en soi être bonne ou mauvaise, puisqu’à partir d’une certaine définition du fait délinquant, elle mesure une réalité différente de celle considérée par les autres méthodes. C’est pourquoi les autorités et les citoyens doivent aborder les données sur la délinquance de manière critique, en contextualisant - en fonction de l’auteur - l’information reçue, l’usage primaire auquel elles sont destinées, les circonstances dans lesquelles elles ont été obtenues, la méthodologie utilisée et l’univers étudié.

Urbanisme, sécurité et gestion des conflits dans l’espace public20

Personne ne peut affirmer que l’urbanisme n’exerce aucun effet direct sur la délinquance ou sur l’apparition de conflits dans l’espace public. Car, il est évident que l’espace public intervient dans la mesure où il multiplie ou, au contraire, réduit les occasions de s’adonner à des activités illicites par le biais, par exemple, d’un bon système d’éclairage public, d’une meilleure conservation des matériaux qui évite le vandalisme, ou à travers la participation des habitants à la gestion des grands ensembles de logements publics.

Il est donc nécessaire d’intégrer des axes de travail permettant d’assurer la mise en place d’un urbanisme capable de promouvoir un environnement stimulant, propice à l’expression de l’individu et au développement d’un sentiment de solidarité dont les habitants puissent se sentir fiers.

Toujours selon cette idée, et si l’on analyse la situation actuelle de cette relation sécurité urbaine-urbanisme dans les villes, nous pouvons conclure que les implications de l’action urbanistique sur les questions relatives à la prévention et à la sécurité de la cité se produisent à trois niveaux et dans trois domaines basiques :

- le premier concerne les caractéristiques et les conditions que présentent, généralement dans les villes, les phénomènes de ségrégation et de marginalisation sociale, économique et spatiale.

- le deuxième est lié aux facteurs de nature diverse qui conditionnent génériquement l’appropriation sociale de l’espace public, et particulièrement les formes négatives de son fonctionnement, comme le sont l’insécurité physique et subjective et le vandalisme.

- le troisième se réfère aux problèmes de cohabitation et de co-responsabilité dans les immeubles d’habitation collective.

Nous sommes convaincus que l’un des objectifs de l’urbanisme est d’offrir des espaces publics qui, entre autres fonctions, permettent la cohabitation des différents secteurs de population, en évitant l’apparition de frontières urbaines et sociales parmi les usagers. En conséquence, nous proposons quelques critères pour une gestion réduisant l’apparition des conflits dans l’usage des espaces publics des villes dont les objectifs seraient les suivants :

20 À partir des travaux du groupe de prévention del Consejo de Bienestar Social de Barcelona. (Prévention du Conseil du Bien-être Social de Barcelona).
□ La planification et la conception des espaces publics, en particulier des places et parcs, devraient comporter des études d’impact social qui tiennent compte du contexte et des besoins sociaux de la population. Il faut donner la priorité à la réalité sociale et aux besoins sociaux de la population sur tous les autres critères, en adaptant la conception de ces espaces à leur utilité et à l’usage que les citoyens pourront en faire.

□ Dans le but de promouvoir une appropriation sociale adéquate des espaces publics en construction, il faut encourager une large implication de la communauté (structures du quartier et du district, syndics, etc.) dans le processus de conception et de construction des places et parcs de la ville.

□ Dans la mise en service de tout nouvel espace public, il paraît opportun d’orienter l’usage et ne pas laisser de place à l’improvisation. Une dynamisation des espaces publics est aussi importante que leur construction. Dans ce sens, il serait bon de définir les critères qui permettent un accompagnement dans la phase de mise en service des nouveaux espaces, dans le but de leur assurer un usage collectif et harmonieux.

□ La participation citoyenne à la conception et à la gestion de la prévention du conflit et de l’insécurité urbaine est un droit qui incite à encourager les citoyens à prendre connaissance de la planification des parcs et places les plus proches de leur domicile et leur permet de s’y impliquer.

□ Tout comme ont été testés et implantés, ces dernières années, de nouveaux systèmes de participation citoyenne dans le but de pallier l’insécurité dans les villes, nous proposons de prendre des mesures préventives afin d’éviter des comportements inciviques dans nos parcs et places. Pour toutes les raisons évoquées ci-dessus, il serait opportun de planifier et de mener des campagnes citoyennes en faveur d’un usage correct et civique des espaces publics.

□ Bien que les places et parcs soient publics et leurs caractéristiques urbaines spéciales, il faut faire en sorte que la population prenne conscience du fait que, si ces espaces sont à la disposition de tous les citoyens, il existe cependant des usages incompatibles. Comme la place et le parc, la sécurité est un bien collectif.

**Face aux années à venir**

S’il est possible d’affirmer que les propositions et l’application du modèle Barcelone ont permis d’affronter avec succès quelques-uns des défis que la ville s’était fixé, il faut également souligner l’émergence de nouveaux phénomènes sociaux et la nécessité d’ajuster les réponses aux nouvelles situations et aux nouveaux besoins de la ville, ce qui nous incite à revoir le modèle de sécurité de Barcelone et par extension la formalisation du modèle de sécurité pour la Catalogne dont la ville s’est sentie orpheline.

Aussi, dans les années à venir, faudra-t-il au minimum trouver une nouvelle formulation des réponses de l’administration judiciaire aux problèmes des villes, spécialement telle l’impulsion d’une justice de proximité ou municipale, à laquelle la Mairie de Barcelone peut beaucoup apporter. Il faudra ensuite innover dans la gestion des espaces publics et dans leur utilisation à bon escient, en tenant compte plus particulièrement des relations entre l’urbanisme, la morphologie des espaces et la sécurité. Il faudra également qu’au niveau de la Catalogne on définisse quel doit être le modèle d’intervention publique en matière de sécurité : quelles structures et quels modèles opératifs et de coordination institutionnelle, tant entre les services de police qu’avec les différents acteurs doivent intervenir ? Enfin, on ne peut omettre de mentionner les nouvelles situations créées à partir de l’enracinement dans la ville de citoyennes et de citoyens issus de contextes culturels différents générant de nouvelles situations, certaines en conflit avec la situation majoritaire ; dans ce sens, la révision du
modèle de sécurité de Barcelone doit également tenir compte de ces nouveaux phénomènes sociaux.

Aussi devons-nous réfléchir aux points suivants :

La ville et la justice

C’est dans la ville que se sont produits les changements les plus significatifs des structures sociales contemporaines et où, à l’avenir, seront nécessairement établies les nouvelles formes d’intervention et de relation sociale. Par ailleurs, la place particulière qu’occupe la justice dans la perception sociale -sur les bases de la confiance des citoyens dans le système démocratique- implique que les gouvernements des villes ne doivent ni ne puissent renoncer à intervenir dans la définition d’un cadre normatif de la vie sociale et politique. C’est pourquoi il ne faut pas s’étonner que les municipalités envisagent des axes d’intervention visant des politiques rééquilibrantes d’accès à la justice et tendant à réduire la judiciarisation de la vie dans les villes.

De plus, il est évident que la perception qu’ont les citoyens de leur relation au milieu urbain - avec les conditions qui lui sont propres- dépend en grande partie du succès de ces politiques. Dans ce sens, il faut considérer que la situation actuelle de la sécurité dans les villes peut altérer -et de fait, c’est déjà le cas- la demande à l'administration judiciaire.

Aussi, si l’on analyse l’état actuel de la sécurité dans les villes, on constate des changements significatifs et récents, et il apparaît depuis quelques années de nouvelles typologies délictuelles, de transgression des normes : par exemple l’ancrage dans la violence de prédation, qui tend à un style de vie qui encense les biens de consommation tout en étant incapables de les protéger.

Par ailleurs, une certaine monétarisation de la sécurité et de la justice est en train de se produire, établissant de grandes différences -dans leur accès- quant au pouvoir d'achat des citoyens, qu'ils soient victimes ou agresseurs.

Par le passé, nous avons vu comment les réponses au conflit étaient prévues en des termes strictement punitifs, ce domaine de la vie sociale et politique constituant souvent le patrimoine des forces conservatrices, sous la devise Loi et Ordre.

Cependant, ces dernières années, les villes21 ont démontré leur volonté d’intervenir dans la discussion et dans la conception des réponses au thème de la délinquance et du système de contrôle, qui peut avoir une réelle incidence sur l’imprégnation démocratique de nos pays.

Aujourd’hui, il est nécessaire de souligner que la simple structuration des services (policiers, judiciaires, sociaux, pénitentiaires, etc.) n’est pas suffisante. La complexité des phénomènes délictuels, l’apparition de nouveaux comportements et l’impact de cette complexité sur la société obligent à concevoir des modèles d’intervention publique qui soient capables de moduler leurs réponses institutionnelles et communautaires sur le critère de récupération sociale tant du conflit que des acteurs qui interviennent dans celui-ci.

C’est pourquoi, dans les dix dernières années, les villes ont dû continuer à élaborer des réponses aux conflits à partir de deux critères de base : l’optimisation des ressources et la durabilité de la réponse. C’est dans ce sens qu’ont été développées des politiques d’intervention de proximité tenant compte des lieux où se produisent les conflits et où doivent être mobilisées les ressources pour les résoudre. Et c’est sur cette question qu’émerge un aspect qui, selon toute probabilité, impliquera une importante modification du fonctionnement des services publics et probablement de la ville elle-même : les relations entre

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21 Réseau Sécurités Europe. Forum Européen pour la Sécurité Urbaine. 1994-95
la ville et l'administration judiciaire, le rapprochement de la justice et de l'environnement urbain.

Cette relation peut être envisagée sous l’angle d’une double perspective : d’un côté, la structuration d’une justice municipale beaucoup plus proche des citoyens qui répond aux demandes qui lui sont faites sur des paramètres d’équité, de justice, de rapidité et de pertinence ; de l’autre, l’encouragement dans la ville d’une culture de tolérance au conflit et d’acceptation de mesures alternatives à la répression, par la médiation, la conciliation, la réparation des dommages, etc. Si ces mesures servent à réduire l’excessive judiciarisation des conflits générés dans la ville, à moyen ou à long terme elles doivent aussi poursuivre l’objectif de décriminaliser certains actes en les extrayant de l’administration judiciaire et en rendant leur résolution possible par la communauté même qui, par le biais de mesures alternatives, doit assumer sa responsabilité dans la gestion de ses propres conflits.

La justice de proximité est-elle la justice des pauvres ? Est-il conseillé que les affaires de moindre importance arrivent au système judiciaire ? Les conflits entre voisins sont-ils susceptibles d’être classés par le système pénal ? Les nouveaux phénomènes de vandalisme et les conduites asociales doivent-ils être résolus par l’administration judiciaire ?

Cette situation -la généralisation de ces typologies et l’incapacité du système à donner une réponse adéquate- modifie les demandes des citoyens auprès de l’administration judiciaire, et il semble bien évident que cette modification, tant de la situation objective que de la perception sociale, nous incite à envisager les fonctions judiciaires comme au-delà de la correction punitive des transgressions, d’éviter d’apporter une réponse aux problèmes dérivés de :

• la sur-judiciarisation de la vie des villes,
• la délégation de la résolution des conflits, même les plus minimes, que les citoyens confient à l’administration judiciaire,
• la saturation de l’administration judiciaire,
• l’émergence de nouveaux phénomènes asociaux ou délictuels,
• le manque de confiance dans le système de justice,
• les limites des réponses actuelles du système de justice.

Ainsi donc, les villes doivent mettre en œuvre des politiques de rapprochement de l’administration de justice avec le milieu urbain, de promotion de l’accès des citoyens à la justice ; des politiques qui permettent même de transformer le mode opératoire du système judiciaire et de réduire l’impact des conflits sur la vie sociale.

Nous sommes convaincus que l’administration judiciaire ne peut renoncer à s’impliquer dans la vie sociale et politique. Tout en respectant l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, on ne peut
cependant pas renoncer à œuvrer pour l’optimisation de son fonctionnement -par un rapprochement de la justice avec la ville- et pour l’amélioration de son accès aux citoyens. C’est dans cette perspective que nous croyons possible de mettre en œuvre des politiques :

• de rapprochement de l’administration judiciaire vers les territoires
• de promotion de la justice de paix
• de structuration d’un système de médiation et de conciliation des conflits dans le cadre de la communauté
• d’impulsion d’une culture dé-judiciarisingant la vie sociale
• de responsabilisation des citoyens dans la résolution de leurs propres conflits
• d’impulsion de la participation sociale

Le défi qui consiste à trouver une proposition utile et réalisable nous oblige, au préalable, à tenter de définir ce que nous entendons par “justice de proximité” :

Un système global de la réponse publique à la résolution des conflits : le système peut englober des structures de type judiciaire (tribunaux de paix) ou de type extra-judiciaire (conciliation, médiation, etc.).

Un système non organique qui doit intervenir dans le cadre des conflits générés dans les territoires des villes. Ces conflits, et en particulier leur accumulation, sont en train de dérégler la vie sociale des villes en influant de façon très importante sur l’exclusion sociale.

La compétence sur les espaces : nouveaux usagers et nouveaux usages

Lorsqu’en 1980 débutent les premières actions de récupération et de rénovation urbaines à Ciutat Vella, ces actions sont clairement envisagées dans une perspective d’amélioration et de valorisation de l’un des territoires sensibles de la ville. L’impression d’abandon du quartier qui existait parmi les habitants aurait pu trouver une réponse, de la part de la Mairie, proposant une rénovation physique du quartier avec des perspectives strictement urbanistiques. Cependant, comme le souligne le travail d’Aguirre, Picé et Sabaté, elles se démarquent des orientations défensives – le « défensable » espace anglosaxon-, et prétendent en revanche favoriser l’usage collectif et démocratique des espaces urbains par tous les habitants de la ville, et contrecarrer ainsi l’exclusion et la ghettoïsation de certaines zones traditionnellement associées à la marginalité et à la délinquance.

Néanmoins, cette politique de rénovation et de récupération de la ville génère une multiplicité d’espaces, d’usages et donc de conflits qu’il faut affronter : c’est dans l’espace public qu’a lieu le plus grand nombre de relations sociales et c’est donc également là où le conflit apparaît le plus évident. De nouveaux modèles de relations, d’usages et d’occupations de l’espace, l’emplacement de nouveaux pôles d’attraction des visiteurs, juste au beau milieu de la vieille ville, la dynamisation par des activités récréatives et culturelles, la récupération des places publiques contribuent à recréer une ville où la gestion de l’espace public devient vitale.

Dans ce sens, il faudra, à l’avenir, ouvrir des axes de travail et d’analyse autour de l’espace urbain et de la gestion des conflits qui s’y gèrent. Il est bien évident que dans ce rapprochement, il faut tenir compte tant des aspects physiques (morphologie, options constructives, matériaux, mobilier urbain, capacité de conservation) que des aspects

22 Aguirre, C., Picé R et Sabaté J. Seguretat ciutadana i urbanisme (Sécurité citoyenne et urbanisme). Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona [Mairie de Barcelona], 1990.
symboliques et d’appropriation de l’espace. Tout au long de ces dernières années, certaines propositions ont été mises en œuvre dans l’objectif de permettre, d’une part d’identifier les domaines d’intervention et d’autre part d’effectuer, à Barcelone, certains travaux d’évaluation de l’état des espaces.

Il convient donc d’intégrer dans notre révision du modèle de sécurité de Barcelone tous les liens qui rendent possible un urbanisme capable de promouvoir un environnement stimulant, propice à l’expression de l’individu et au développement d’un sentiment de solidarité, dont les habitants pourront se sentir fiers.
Introduction

The formation of the city is a dynamic process deriving from several factors. The city is made of buildings, streets, vehicles, and, above all, of its inhabitants. Therefore, any interference in the urban environment should not consider only physical aspects, but also the social, cultural, economic, and political contexts.

Feeling safe in cities is part of a very complex context. The fast growth of urban centres brings with it increasing poverty and disorganisation, generating more frustration and social oppression, as people become more miserable. The public sector and society cannot offer this increasing population, at the same pace of its growth, the infrastructure needed to assure acceptable levels of quality of life. As a result, we face social unbalance and higher levels of aspiration, which leads all factors to the same ending: social deviation, criminality, and violence.

The Brazilian Context

From the 1950’s on, Brazilian cities have suffered an intense process of urbanisation. The exaggerated growth, added to the shortness of funds, has resulted in chronic crisis for most cities, which has generated impacts from housing to sanitation, from environment to transport.

CURITIBA, Paraná State Capital, located in the South of Brazil, had 350,000 inhabitants in the 1960s, and it presented one of the highest annual growth rates if compared to other Brazilian cities: around 5%. Such growth was mainly due to the mechanisation of plantations in the inner parts of the State, generating a great release of workforce, that left rural zones and small cities in search for better opportunities of life and, mainly, of work.

There are 26 municipalities that together form Curitiba’s Metropolitan Region, which has also absorbed the population proceeding from the countryside of Parana State. In the last decade, the city of Curitiba presented an average annual growth rate of 2.2%, adding up to a population of 1.7 million inhabitants; the Metro Region, with a 3.2% average growth rate, summed a total of 3.1 million people – including the capital.

Curitiba has been planning its future since 1965, with the creation of IPPUC – Institute for Research and Urban Planning of Curitiba. In 1966, the Master Plan was approved, and since then, transport, street network, work, leisure, social promotion, and housing have been thought together as part of an integrated view of the city.

The model adopted by the Master Plan changed the radial growth pattern established in 1942 (Agache Plan) to a linear model for urban expansion. Integrated transport, land use, and street network were the instruments for accomplishing that goal. Therefore urban space was gradually shaped into the structure of the Master Plan through consecutive zonings, which established where residential density was desired and convenient, according to the capacity of the public sector to offer services and public transport of good quality to all the population. For the implementation of this model, structural corridors were built, along which residential
and commercial density have been encouraged, as well as compatible services, by concentrating investments and infrastructure.

The planning of Curitiba focuses on promoting quality of life. In practice, it searches for shortening distances between dwelling and work environments, and offering leisure options near the masses, therefore avoiding the creation of restrictive functional spaces that feature only commerce, industry, or the concentration of exclusively high or low income population. Through the mixture of uses and investments, a more humanized city is created, where demand and services meet, generating diversified and less violent neighbourhoods.

The Master Plan guiding democratic access and promotion of diversity

Since the 1970s, the structural corridors turned into development axes that induced the growth of the city. They presented the extension of the centre of Curitiba in a linear shape, therefore providing access to infrastructure and urban equipment. The democratization of services and public investments has generated the feeling of opportunity and social inclusion in the citizens of Curitiba.

The guidelines of the city’s plan aim at a multiplicity of uses in order to strengthen urban spaces. Along the structural corridors, incentives encourage the construction of a continuous commercial gallery parallel to the streets, on ground level and first floor, in a way to generate a long commercial axis to the pedestrian, who can walk comfortably and protected from weather changes. The diversity of uses and large number of residential buildings along the corridors assure the constant presence of people, even after commercial hours. It is along the structural axes that high-rise buildings are to be built.

Equal treatment is given to all parts of the city, despite differences on income generation. Schools, libraries, day-care and health centres are designed under the same architectural concept, regardless of where they are implemented, as a sign of respect for the citizen. One example is the public transport system, with its social fare and quality of services extended to all the population. The buses are part of an integrated network of routes, and stations offer multiple options for displacement along Curitiba and 11 cities from the Metropolitan Region, always under the same fare. The tube-station, an icon of the city, offers comfort and speed for passengers to board and disembark and is seen downtown as much as in the periphery. Besides its efficiency, the stations also offer safety, being above pedestrian level and transparent, which allows people to see and be seen.

It is a known fact that high quality amenities is used and preserved by the community. Examples are seen around the city, where by honouring ethnic groups and offering pleasant leisure and sports facilities, we have reached high levels of preservation and conservation. Some examples are Ukrainian Memorial, Japanese Square, and Polish Woods. The quality of life in Curitiba is also assured by maintaining 51.5m² of green area per inhabitant. Either in parks, woods, and squares, or on the streets, trees require constant attention from the authorities. Therefore, maintenance teams are constantly pruning, in a way to assure good visibility and light, as well as the feeling of safety.

In the heart of the city, part of a street has been dedicated for pedestrians since 1972. The landscape of Rua XV de Novembro (the Flower Street) has been protected, by legal means, against major changes, in a way to preserve the history and the pedestrian scale. It presents special lampposts and efficient lighting, besides surveillance cameras installed along the street. In the neighbourhoods, in proper schedule, some streets are designated to hold crafts or food fairs. This strategy to promote the interaction among citizens generates an environment typical of small towns, and is greatly accepted by people.
However, as in other urban centres, the city has been undergoing a process of emptiness in its traditional centre. The consolidation of neighbourhood centres has resulted in an independence of services that were once exclusively offered downtown. Taking this into account, and adding restrictions regarding parking areas and circulation of vehicles downtown, we are facing a movement of migration within the city, where people search for distant ‘residential-like’ centres for living. The migration of people from the central zone has initiated a process of degradation, lack of investments, increase of violence, and vandalism. As a result, downtown streets are empty at night and over weekends, which makes one to feel unsafe.

In order to change this situation, the city is working on a project called “Landmark Zero”. It is designated to recover and rehabilitate central areas in Curitiba, covering two large axes and Tiradentes Square, where the city began 313 years ago. Among many actions, the project focuses on: restoring historical buildings; improving urban spaces, such as squares, sidewalks, and paving; proposing new areas for social and cultural interaction; generating incentives for new enterprises related to commercial and residential activities; and increasing safety. The project counts on community engagement, as well as the cooperation of the private sector. Also, to assure the presence of people and the interest for recovering the “heart” of the city, schools and universities have been admitted in the central zone, since they help keeping a dynamic environment all day long.

In the districts, the municipality is represented by the Citizenship Streets, a part of the decentralised administration. In these nine public buildings public services, commerce, leisure and cultural activities are offered, as well as offices for municipal and military police. With the public sector closer to the population, popular participation and social inclusion are enhanced.

Despite frequent investments and projects on the scale of the pedestrian, focusing on a more democratic city, its growth pushed for a dynamic that is typical of great metropolises, taking as an example new shopping malls and closed residential condominiums. Curitiba has faced the consequences of these enterprises that establish the ‘elitization’ of some private services, social segregation, and the devaluation of the traditional town centre.

Shopping malls are very appealing to consumers, since they generate a supposedly safer environment. On the other hand, their windowless walls create closed boxes, surrounded by corridors without dynamism, usually dangerous for the pedestrian.

The increasing presence of closed residential condominiums also brings problems to the city. Most of the time they are designated to average-high income classes that are in search of safety. In the urban context, these condominiums end up creating isolated ghettos of restricted access, promoting what we call the “architecture of fear”. It is seen on constructions with great walls, electric fences, barbed wire, etc. As in shopping malls, the large extension of walls deprives the pedestrian, who is “outside”, from the feeling of safety provided “inside” the enterprise. The isolation caused by the new security systems result on a population in need of urban life and citizenship. The ostensive safety gives room for a feeling of fear that does not always correspond to the reality, very characteristic of the “architecture of fear”.

Municipal decrees regulate on the height of walls, in order to minimize the impacts caused on streets. Therefore, the maximum height allowed for walls facing the streets is 2.2m; for large perimeters, 70% should allow visibility. Unfortunately, these conditions are not always well accepted by entrepreneurs.
Social Inclusion, Housing, and Poverty

In Brazil Housing Agencies – COHABs – have been responsible for social housing policies since 1965. In 1967, 2,100 houses were built, composing the village Nossa Senhora da Luz dos Pinhais, the first large-scale project on housing in Curitiba, near the industrial zone. Low-income housing buildings started to be developed since the 1960s, in a concept that isolated them from the urban surroundings, by an avenue that defined their perimeter. Inside the settlements, urban amenities were placed, such as schools, squares, and community centres. To access them, discontinuous internal streets composed a nearly medieval design. This urban design defined such a discontinuity in the city that it has resulted in the creation of poverty ghettos, isolated from neighbouring communities.

At the end of the 1970s, an important change in the concept of low-income settlements changed the scenery of social exclusion in Curitiba. Together with Ippuc, the Housing Agency focused on urban development with intense social activity and integration with the existing street network. It was noticeable that generating a proper living environment was as important as offering infrastructure and services.

In Curitiba, housing is thought of together with social inclusion. Smaller groups of low-income houses and buildings are placed within existing neighbourhoods, prioritising places with easy access to urban equipment and public transport. The architectural concept of buildings is diversified, varying urban design and landscape, and also allowing different uses regarding services and commerce. The insertion is assured by a new street network design, which allows integration and avoids the creation of ghettos. As a result, citizens experience a feeling of “belonging” in houses that are fully integrated to the city’s context.

Curitiba is among the cities with best social indicators in Brazil. The illiteracy rate is near zero and the average income is one the highest in the country (around US$600), therefore composing a population with good consuming potential. Despite its prosperity in many areas, the city has experienced an increase in number of poor population, reaching above 12%, which means that around 208,000 people are in the poverty zone, living in illegal settlements or slums.

In a way to cope with social conflicts, poor communities are prioritised for the implementation of social projects, health, educational and cultural equipment, such as the Lighthouses of Knowledge and Trade Schools. These aim at teaching skills, encouraging entrepreneurship, approximating dwelling to workplace. The results are quite positive, either for the construction of dignity and skills of the citizen, or for the creation of a more valuable environment and articulated with the local urban scenery.

In 1993, a project called Village of all Trades developed the concept of associating work and dwelling in the same place, in two-story constructions, where first floors hold commercial activities. This program is seen in poor communities, where urban infrastructure was provided and areas were rehabilitated through landscaping and sanitation works. In 1997, another project provided urban restructuring, employment, and income generation to 18 districts in the periphery of Curitiba – the Job Line. A 37km avenue was built as a new developing axis, providing high-quality public transport. Sheds were built along the avenue to host small companies, and offer them administrative assistance and tax incentives for two years. Once small businesses are ready for the market, new companies occupy the “incubators”. The program is now undergoing an evaluation in order to optimize the implemented infrastructure and social reach.

While central areas undergo out-migration, as mentioned before, an increasing contingent of poor population is settling in the boundaries of Curitiba, starting a process of urban sprawl toward surrounding cities, where plots are more affordable. These areas are often consist of rivers and spring waters, as as such have areas of high environmental fragility. The families
that settle along rivers are often at risk, subject to floods and diseases, as well as the violence that results from such social context.

A large long-term project is under development in order to restructure the boundaries of Curitiba. It encompasses four dimensions: urban, environmental, socio-economic, and management. It is called The Friendly Neighbour’s Belt. The project consists on the creation of a favourable environment for exchanging experiences and building partnerships with the cities in the Metropolitan Region. As a result, cities should be able to develop a higher level of inter-municipal cooperation to cope with the degradation of rivers and spring waters, social demands, and weakening urban structure.

Among other proposals, the Friendly Neighbour’s Belt works on improving mobility for vehicles and pedestrians, creating bike paths and linear parks along rivers, building urban equipment in partnership with surrounding cities for better health and education services. Families living in illegal settlements will be relocated to proper areas. In the same scope, a project for *Ecovillages* is under development, to host communities capable of fulfilling needs with minimum environmental impact, using alternative technologies for constructions.

In spite of successive political-administrative changes along time, the continuity of structuring policies in managing the city is strong. This is definitely one reason that causes the experience of Curitiba to be different from other cities.

Ippuc – the Institute for Research and Urban Planning of Curitiba, advances toward the future, assuring the integration of planning policies, the maintenance of quality of life and urban space, facing the dynamics of the city’s growth. However, we should not forget that planning is only one of the elements that the public sector can use to reach safety in the city. The efficiency and reliability of police and judicial institutions should also be taken into consideration together with the commitment to social responsibility of each sector in the society.
Coordination between town and country planning, town planning and the system of public security in Catalonia.

Laia Soriano-Montagut Jené
Secretary for the Territorial Planification

The Secretariat for Town and Country Planning of the Ministry of Town Planning and Public Works of the Government of Catalonia has, among other functions, those of planning, coordinating and monitoring policies affecting town and country planning, the mountains, the landscape and the coastline.

The ability to carry out these actions is due to the Autonomous Catalan Government having exclusive competence over town and country planning, as well as competence in matters of the autonomous police force. In this line the Government has passed various Acts and Regulations to develop these matters.

In Catalonia there coexist two types of planning: territorial and urban. The first is on a supra-county scale (a county or “comarca” being composed of group of municipalities) and the second is local or supra-local, so that the degree of specificity and connection is different. In this sense, territorial planning starts from large-scale directives, recommendations, standards and planning, covering an assembly of counties; while urban planning takes the form of standards, plans and other specific documents of direct application in a municipality or group of municipalities.

In accordance with territorial policy legislation, the outline territorial plans and territorial directives contain three basic themes: open spaces, urban settlements and infrastructures of mobility. During 2005 the Ministry drafted a series of criteria for territorial planning, and in January 2006 published the first edition. The criteria are grouped into three systems:

Criteria on the system of open spaces

• To encourage diversity of territory, maintaining the reference of its biophysical origin

• Protection for natural spaces, agrarian and not developable in general, as components of territorial planning

• Preservation of the landscape as a social value and an economic asset in the territory

• Moderating the consumption of land.

Criteria on the system of settlements

• To encourage social cohesion in the territory and avoid the spatial segregation of urban areas

• Protection and strengthening for the town planning heritage which articulates the area

• Facilitating an effective housing policy integrated into urban planning

• Encouraging the coexistence of activities and housing in urban areas and rationalising the installation of industrial or service estates

• Supplying means of regulation and spatial orientation for second homes
• New urban growth must be compact and in continuity

• Urban growth must reinforce the nodal structure of the territory.

Criteria on the system of infrastructures of mobility

• Mobility is a right and not an obligation

• Facilitating public transport through the polarisation and compacting of the system of settlements

• Special attention to the roadways which structure the urban developments in the territory

• Integrating Catalonia into the European systems of urban networks and transport by means of infrastructures concordant with the nature of the territory.

These directives are important as they set out the guidelines for action which the territorial plans must follow, in accordance with the principles of hierarchy, no conflict, congruence and coordination, and also instruments in town planning.

In relation to public security it must be said that these directives “act” as informal control over the population and that the elements forming them encourage the prevention of delinquency:

• Social cohesion of the territory versus spatial segregation in urban areas

• Protection and strengthening of the urban heritage => feeling of belonging

• Encouraging the coexistence of activities and residences in urban areas => multifunction factors / mixing

• Preserving the landscape => agreeable surroundings => care of the surroundings => feeling of belonging

• Measures for regulation and spatial orientation of second homes in order to rationalise them and prevent more segregation in the territory

• New growth has to be compact and in continuity => social cohesion

• Urban growth must reinforce the nodal structure of the territory => cohesion between towns

• Facilitate public transport => social cohesion => increased vigilance and/or control at various points in the territory.

Among the four types of territorial plans (general territorial plan / outline territorial plan / sector territorial plan and directing territorial plan) the plan that has the closest special relationship with public security is the sector plan (PTS). This PTS must contain an estimation of the resources available, territorial needs and deficiencies in the corresponding sector, a determination of priorities for action and a definition of the standards and rules for territorial distribution. Its ambit of application is all the Catalan territory, and with respect to its processing, each autonomous department must:

a) Prepare the territorial sector plans in its competence

b) Consult the appropriate organisations as to the suitability of the plans
c) Propose approval of the plans to the Executive Council

In this sense, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and Public Works must collaborate with the department responsible for preparing the sector plan and issue the essential report.

The PTS is important because, in accordance with the legislation on the public planning system of Catalonia, police and civil security, the ministry competent in matters of security (that is, the Ministry of the Interior) must prepare four territorial sector plans: the Civil Protection Plan of Catalonia (approved in 1995), the Civil Protection Map of Catalonia, the Police Map of Catalonia and the General Security Plan of Catalonia. For this reason it is appropriate to open a profile for collaboration and coordination between the Ministries of Interior and of Town and Country Planning and Public Works in order to prepare and execute these plans.

Again, the content of town planning supplies very useful information for the analysis and study of criminology in towns and cities and in the geographical location of certain sectors and activities. Special attention is given to:

The report: reflecting the characteristics of the population located on the territory, their financial and social conditions and forecast development. This population analysis also includes details relating to the female population and to age groups. It must also be adapted to the planning directives and the needs of those who carry out jobs of domestic caring and management, with special respect to parameters of accessibility, mobility, security and the use of the urban fabric.

The social report: containing an analysis of possible alternative locations as reserves for the construction of council housing, observing the objective of avoiding excessive concentrations of this type of housing and encouraging social cohesion by preventing the spatial segregation of people according to their income level.

The information plans: these contain graphic information on the natural, environmental, cultural, socio-economic and demographic characteristics and on the relevant town development for town planning purposes, and add vulnerable areas through the existence of natural and technological risks and areas affected by environmentally significant impacts; and ambits and elements the subject of protection according to the applicable sector legislation.

Thus, this information set out in plans or maps can be a very reliable instrument in preventing delinquency and localising possible areas or sectors of criminal tendencies, according to their vulnerability (hot areas motivated or accentuated by tourism, prostitution, drug trafficking, leisure, strong economic activity, high social status, etc.).

Among the initiatives of 2004, the Catalan Government passed the Act for improvements in urban areas and towns requiring special attention, creating the Programme of ‘districts and urban areas for special attention’. This Act, subsequently developed, understands by ‘urban area for special attention’ the district or urban areas, geographically differentiated, mostly destined to permanent housing, which are found or can be found, if no action is taken, in one of the following situations:

• Process of urban deterioration (progressive degradation of the buildings / persistence of deficiencies in facilities / insufficiency or lack of quality in the urbanisation, roads, drainage and open spaces)
• Demographic problems (loss or ageing of the population / growth at excessive rate)
• Particularly serious financial, social or environmental problems
• Persistence of substantial social and urban deficiencies and problems of local development.

The regulation establishes priorities for receiving finance from the Fund, firstly for the older areas and centres, secondly for housing estates, and thirdly for the areas of marginal urbanisation and areas with a high presence of housing units which do not meet the minimum conditions of habitability required.

It is important to note the content provided in the legislation for projects which have to be submitted to obtain benefits from the aid, as they must envisage interventions in one of the following fields:

• Improvement of public space and provision of green zones
• Rehabilitation and equipment of collective parts of buildings
• Provision of facilities for group use
• Incorporation of information technology in buildings
• Promotion of the sustainability of urban development, especially with respect to energy efficiency, savings in water consumption and the recycling of waste
• Equality of gender in the use of urban space and facilities
• Development of programmes which bring social, planning and economic improvements to the district
• Accessibility and removal of architectural barriers.

These fields of action are fundamental in making the towns more secure and also act as measures of prevention of delinquency and increase the informal control of it.

In this line, the Ministry has already launched three calls for applications for aid under the Programme for districts and urban areas for special attention.

**Proposals in matters of public security in relation with territory and town planning:**

As explained above, the Secretariat for Town and Country Planning has drawn up a first sketch of directives/lines of action in order to create more security in urban spaces and enrich town planning design with the cooperation of other disciplines (criminology, security public, the public in general, etc.) in order to:

1. Improve the physical surroundings, connect centre with periphery, avoid isolation and free spaces which separate districts and areas. Break down the divisions between suburbs/ marginalised or isolated districts and the urban centre through their interdependence (create it).

2. Mix various densities and types of building in the suburbs and provide them with intermediate and green zones, also mixing different economies and social status among the people.

3. Provide the peripheral districts with the qualities of the centre (such as work/services/educational, sports and leisure facilities) with the purpose of decongesting traffic, parking and public transport.
4. Decentralisation. Physical, social and financial accessibility in the different places.

5. Improve services, facilities and infrastructures by adapting them to the diversity of activities of daily life. Bearing in mind that large infrastructures must not become urban barriers and, in the event that this should be inevitable, the effects of segregation that they provoke must be ameliorated.

6. Combine various uses in the territory (whether in the public spaces, interurban, etc.) with the object of unifying and compacting the town.

7. Maintain the environmental quality of the surroundings. Deal with and maintain the urban furniture (benches, lamp standards, etc.). Promote common spaces, community elements such as parks and sports facilities for public use.

8. Promote rehabilitation and avoid operations of urban surgery which involve trauma for the local residents.

9. Urban parks: do not locate them in isolated surroundings or with their backs to the district. They must have multi-use facilities suited to the population which has to use them. In this sense, promote working areas in the suburbs / marginalised or isolated districts in order to facilitate employment and basic services and make these areas into equitable communities for women as well as for men.

10. The town planning operations must contribute to connecting territories (although not adjacent) and break down the marginalisation of degraded districts, in the process of degradation or with potential for it.

11. Provide the town with the following elements of continuity and prevention of delinquency / diminution of the perception of insecurity:

12. Lighting: in public areas (streets, urban spaces, pavements, roads, avenues, interurban roads, etc.), private areas (urbanisations, etc.), semi-public and semi-private (neighbouring spaces);

   - without discriminating the time of day or night. Lighting has to be provided before the daylight becomes insufficient to identify the surroundings.

13. Visibility / Openness: destinations clearly located and easy to find. Considering also installing mirrors on corners where it is impossible to see. Open curves and angles less than 90º give better visibility and security.

14. Accessibility: easy, safe and direct. Proximity of the public transport stopping points with respect to the residential areas. Insofar as possible, avoiding pedestrian underpasses.

15. Active surroundings: linked with multifunctional areas, public spaces, streets, etc., also involving the movement of people by day and night.

16. Responsibility: it is essential for the public / local residents to adopt the territory as their own and feel responsible for its condition, attention and protection.

17. Attention and maintenance of the space: keeping the area clean, tidy, restoring it when necessary. If the public / local residents look after the space surrounding them and take care of it, adopt it as their own, this space will become an asset protected and worth protecting.
18. Urban elements / Multifunctional surroundings: promoting and encouraging the multifunctional use of the spaces. Supplying a diversity of uses in a single space.

19. Restructuring the uses: transforming the existing uses now inappropriate into others which are necessary and productive for society.

20. Vigilance: such as vigilance cameras, emergency call points, entrances and exits which are easy to identify, etc., in the town centre, in public transport stations / stopping points, car parks, industrial estates, in isolated areas (residential, non-residential, commercial, leisure, etc.), and in all public spaces in general.

21. Routes that are clear, buildings that are not labyrinthine, as against tunnels and pedestrian underpasses.

22. Reduce density: avoid and minimise areas with a large density index, which in turn create insecurity and increase the opportunity for delinquency.

23. Environmental hygiene and noise: unhealthy factors of pollution and noise caused by motor vehicles (motorcycles, cars, lorries, etc.), by factories, industries, etc., help to increase the discomfort and coexistence of people, and also can cause allergies and illnesses. They foster the degradation and marginalisation of the surroundings.

24. Encourage the sense of belonging to and identification with the territory, e.g. by organising elements with cultural / historical / ideological connotations in the public spaces, such as meetings, talks, discussions, meeting points, shows, concerts, etc.

25. Think of the needs of children (children’s playgrounds, creative spaces and pedestrian areas), of women and the elderly (increase the width of the pavements, create pedestrian areas in the town and their interconnection with services and uses).

In conclusion, taking into account the essential participation of the different authorities and multidisciplinary teams in urban design, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and Public Works of the Catalan Government hopes to improve the directives of public security in urban and urban periphery planning design, with the cooperation of the Ministry of the Interior, and to open a channel of communication through which to prepare the Civil Protection Map of Catalonia, the Police Map of Catalonia and the General Security Plan of Catalonia.
SCHEDULE: LEGAL REFERENCES

Territorial planning:
- Act 23/1983, of 21 November, of territorial policy
- Act 1/1995, of 16 March, approving the General Territorial Plan of Catalonia
- Act 24/2001, of 31 December, recognising the High Pyrenees and Aran as a functional planning area, by amendment of article 2 of the Act 1/1995
- Decree 142/2005, of 12 July, approving the Regulation governing the procedure of preparation, processing and approval of outline territorial plans
- Act 7/1987, of 4 April, establishing and regulating special public actions in the conurbation of Barcelona and in the counties within its direct area of influence
- Decree 177/1987, of 19 May, developing the planning and coordination of the regional ambit provided in the Act 7/1987

Urban planning:
- Legislative Decree 1/2005, of 26 July, approving the Redrafted Text of the Town Planning Act
- Decree 287/2003, of 4 November, approving the Partial Regulation of the Town Planning Act 2/2002, of 14 March
- White paper approving the Regulation of the Town Planning Act

Public security:
- Act 4/1997, of 20 May, of civil protection in Catalonia
- Decree 210/1999, of 27 July, approving the structure of the content for the preparation and homologation of municipal civil protection plans
- Act 4/2003, of 7 April, of organisation of the public security system of Catalonia

Generic inspiring principles:
- Spanish Constitution
- Act 13/1989, of 14 December, of organisation, procedure and legal regime of the Administration of the Government of Catalonia

Incidental matters:
- Act 8/2005, of 8 June, of protection, management and planning of the landscape
- Act 16/2002, of 28 June, of protection against noise pollution
- Decree 245/2005, of 8 November, fixing the criteria for the preparation of maps of noise capacity
- Act 5/2003, of 22 April, of measures for prevention of forest fires in urbanisations not in immediate continuity with the urban section
- Act 6/2001, of 31 May, arranging lighting for protection during the night
- Decree 82/2005, of 3 May, approving the Regulation developing the Act 6/2001

Programme of districts and urban areas for special attention:
- Act 2/2004, of 4 June, for the improvement of districts, urban areas and towns requiring special attention
- Decree 369/2004, of 7 September, developing the Act 2/2004, of 4 June, for the improvement of districts, urban areas and towns requiring special attention
Améliorations de la sécurité et de la cohabitation dans les territoires urbains: approche méthodologique d'un point de vue micro-territorial pour la formulation et la mise en œuvre de la politique publique de sécurité.23.

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Le problème

Les pouvoirs publics locaux, quel que soit le continent, ont de plus en plus de responsabilités et d’exigences en matière de lutte contre la violence et la criminalité urbaine. Cependant, malgré les résultats significatifs que certaines villes ont obtenus en peu de temps24, les stratégies et actions visant à améliorer les résultats des politiques publiques de sécurité paraissent avoir atteint des limites non clairement identifiées.

Ces limites, obstacles à l’amélioration des résultats, sont plus perceptibles en termes quantitatifs: une augmentation ou une faible diminution du pourcentage de criminalité25 et une augmentation du sentiment d’insécurité.

D’un point de vue quantitatif, les statistiques de la criminalité sont l’outil de développement et de gestion le plus considéré par les collectivités locales et leur permettent d’orienter leurs actions face à la criminalité urbaine. Pourtant, malgré la multiplication des efforts de gestion des politiques publiques et les investissements financiers croissants dans la sécurité citoyenne, les chiffres ne reflètent pas proportionnellement les efforts engagés. Plus important encore, le sentiment d’insécurité de la population ne décroît pas significativement mais, dans certains cas, est plus prononcé.

De plus, le sentiment de sécurité et les statistiques de la violence impactent sur l’opinion publique à l’heure du bilan de la population sur l’action et l’efficacité des autorités locales dans leur obligation d’assurer la sécurité publique.

Malgré les récents efforts des villes du Sud comme du Nord, les politiques publiques n’ont pas la possibilité d’adaptation suffisante qui permettrait à la relation entre la vision objective et subjective de la sécurité d’être explicite et opérationnelle (c’est-à-dire entre le quantitatif et le qualitatif). Cette situation incite la recherche de solutions et représente également un terrain d’étude que le projet VUPS (Violences Urbaines et Politiques de Sécurité) a souhaité mettre en évidence en introduisant la variable micro-territoriale et l’analyse qualitative à partir d’études de cas à Bogota et à Barcelone.

Comment réunir quantitatif et qualitatif ? En commençant par comprendre les dynamiques de la violence et de la criminalité urbaine à différentes échelles de la ville : de la ville en passant par la localité et la zone jusqu’au quartier et au pâté de maisons.

23 Rapport élaboré à partir de la méthodologie développée dans le projet VUPS et appliquée au travail de terrain à Bogota, 2005.
24 L’exemple de Bogota qui depuis les années 90 tend à l’amélioration est la preuve d’efforts politiques récents en termes de politiques de sécurité.
Cette compréhension, à partir de l’identification du micro-territoire urbain, permet dès lors d’établir la distance nécessaire entre le diagnostic de l’insécurité et les réponses publiques. En d’autres termes, si les territoires urbains au sein de la ville expérimentent une délinquance, une criminalité et un sentiment d’insécurité variés, cette réalité doit être prise en compte par les politiques publiques de sécurité.

Ainsi, en matière de sécurité, le lien pouvoirs publics / habitants doit être consolidé étant donné qu’il représente l’une des solutions capable d’améliorer la reconnaissance des problèmes de cohabitation et de sécurité dans les micro-territoires. Ce lien permet la formulation et la mise en œuvre de politiques de sécurité qui introduisent la variable qualitative.

La perspective

A partir de l’expérience et des résultats obtenus pendant un travail de terrain mené par le projet VUPS à Bogota, une formule au contenu pratique dénommée méthodologie est proposée.

La méthodologie scientifiquement expérimentée a pour objectif de donner de l’importance aux scènes urbaines et de faire apparaître le lien potentiel entre les visions objectives et subjectives de la sécurité qui doivent être prise en considération par les politiques publiques. Un tel lien est considéré depuis l’approche micro-territoriale de la ville et à partir des variables qui définissent les actions communautaires en relation avec celles des pouvoirs publics.

Il est donc question d’exposer une méthodologie qui réunit le quantitatif et le qualitatif pour rendre possible ou faciliter l’action publique et communautaire à partir du micro-territoire.

1. Les hypothèses de la perspective méthodologique :

La sécurité. La sécurité publique est une compétence municipale partagée au niveau national. La sécurité fera bientôt partie de l’agenda local et sera une priorité des pouvoirs publics dont l’action se focalise sur l’augmentation des investissements et le renforcement institutionnel continu.

La conception de la sécurité exprimée par la politique publique va au-delà des visions purement politiques et sectorielles des autorités locales et intègre diverses perspectives explicatives du problème, telle que la faible institutionnalisation ou l’expression du conflit socio-économique.

De même, les niveaux d’analyse de la politique intègrent les aspects suivants : l’image du citoyen, respectueux, ou non, des règles de cohabitation, la conception des modèles de ville en marge, ou encore les expressions du conflit social.

Les types de réponses apportées par les autorités locales sont également intégrés : du renforcement de la citoyenneté jusqu’au renforcement de l’autorité en passant par l’intervention dans l’espace public et une augmentation significative de l’investissement social.

La décentralisation. L’attribution de compétences aux villes en matière de sécurité publique suppose la mise en œuvre d’un processus de décentralisation. Le développement et les caractéristiques du processus de décentralisation, propre à chaque pays, en termes de gestion
du pouvoir ou d’autonomie a des conséquences sur la politique publique de sécurité et sur le sentiment d’insécurité de la population.

De plus, l’objectif est de porter l’attention sur la tendance de plus en plus importante à produire une « décentralisation interne » dans l’espace urbain, ce qui se traduit par les formes d’action suivantes : une police de proximité26, des organisations communautaires de quartier27 ou des plans locaux de sécurité28.

Cela suppose une attribution progressive de fonctions spécifiques aux territoires de la ville et le développement d’actions pour l’amélioration de la sécurité en fonction des besoins et des problèmes de ces micro-territoires (notamment les zones résidentielles, commerciales, historiques ou touristiques, les zones de rénovation urbaine, les quartiers et les pâtés de maisons).

Le fait de pouvoir cerner les différences au sein du territoire urbain, permet d’obtenir une vision plus générale du diagnostic d’échelle de la ville et d’optimiser les actions publiques et privées consacrées à la sécurité (par exemple, les programmes et les actions de collaboration entre police et commerçants, ou entre police et quartier) et d’amplifier leurs impacts.

La politique publique. La notion d’intégralité des politiques publiques suppose non seulement de compter sur la perspective de gestion pour aborder les problèmes structurels auxquels il faut faire face, mais également avec l’action simultanée et concertée des différents secteurs de l’autorité locale (l’éducation, la santé, les loisirs et le sport, le bien-être social, la sécurité publique, entre autres) par la mise en œuvre de programmes et la mise à disposition de biens et de services pour servir des populations déterminées (vendeurs ambulants, population carcérale, jeunes, etc.), et de cette manière, minimiser les facteurs de risque de violence et de criminalité urbaines (absentéisme scolaire, marginalisation, fragmentation des espaces urbains)29.

Cette notion d’intégralité doit également signifier l’introduction de la variable territoire dans la politique publique de sécurité. Le territoire est considéré en tenant compte des différentes échelles d’approche de la ville : localité, zone, upz30, quartier et pâté de maisons. Cette variable territoriale permet de chercher à identifier et à comprendre les dynamiques des conflits de cohabitation, de la violence et des activités délictuelles ainsi que les transformations de ces dynamiques en relation directe ou indirecte avec l’action des pouvoirs publics par le biais des politiques publiques de la ville.

De même, elle permet de comprendre les dynamiques présentes au sein des populations associées à ces réalités de violences et de criminalité ainsi que leurs sentiments et explications sur la sécurité et l’insécurité dans leurs propres espaces quotidiens d’échange et d’interaction.

Comprendre les dynamiques de la violence urbaine et du sentiment de sécurité / d’insécurité des habitants implique une approche différenciée par rapport au territoire de la ville. En d’autres termes, il s’agit d’effectuer l’observation également à partir des micro-territoires urbains, ce que les politiques d’échelle urbaine unique, s’appuyant sur le territoire homogène de la ville prise dans son entier, ne permettent pas de détailler, ni même souvent, de constater.

26 Dans le cas de Barcelone, que d’autres villes ont essayé de mettre en œuvre.
27 L’expérience de Nou Barris à Barcelone ou la Fondation Culturelle de jeunes dans la localité de Suba à Bogota servent d’exemples.
28 Diverses expériences se sont développées dans ce sens à partir du programme « Villes plus sûres » de l’ONU-HABITAT, en particulier dans les villes d’Amérique latine telles que Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires et actuellement à Bogota.
29 L’action simultanée et concertée des divers secteurs de l’administration locale constitue l’une des explications les plus acceptées sur la manière par laquelle il a été possible d’obtenir de bons résultats en matière de sécurité à Bogota sur une période de temps relativement courte. Voir Gérard Martin et Miguel Ceballos 2004.
30 Unité de Planification Zonale.
L’approche générale du territoire de la ville laisse des vides dans lesquels l’action des pouvoirs publics perd son efficience. En outre, ces vides peuvent être occupés par des acteurs non légitimes qui augmentent l’échelle de la violence ou par des acteurs organisés de la société civile n’ayant pas d’articulation claire avec les programmes et les projets de la politique publique et qui peuvent même aller jusqu’à s’organiser pour lutter contre elle (avec, par exemple, le refus du déplacement des populations vulnérables en cas de rénovation urbaine).

Par conséquent, la politique publique de sécurité devrait incorporer la notion de micro-territorialité, de façon à compléter la vision territoriale prédominante de la ville et à différencier les territoires urbains, tant dans le diagnostic que dans la mise en œuvre des politiques.

La participation. Les acteurs de la sécurité font partie des pouvoirs publics (hommes politiques, professionnels de l’administration publique, policiers…) mais également des secteurs privé et communautaire. Ces derniers s’organisent, incités ou légitimés par la politique publique, soit par initiative propre ; ils se caractérisent par le ralliement autour de problèmes ou thématiques ponctuelles qui affectent leur quotidien et leur espace urbain (ex. commerçants, organisations de jeunes, défense de l’espace public)31.

La participation à la sécurité publique permet de développer des moyens plus efficaces d’amélioration des conditions de sécurité à l’échelle urbaine du micro-territoire, comme cela a été le cas des dénommés fronts de sécurité formés par les résidents au niveau d’un pâté de maisons ou d’un quartier à Bogota. De même, avec l’introduction récente d’instruments tels que les pactes de sécurité on cherche à faire converger les objectifs et les efforts des différents acteurs de la sécurité (publics, privés et communautaires) vers un même segment du territoire urbain de la ville32.

Le diagnostic. Traditionnellement, l’élaboration de la politique de sécurité de la ville commence par l’établissement du diagnostic, soit général, soit thématique, de la situation de violence et de criminalité urbaines, en prenant compte d’un seul territoire urbain comme cadre de l’analyse et de l’action.

Ce diagnostic général, nécessaire et utile, finit par caractériser et orienter l’action des pouvoirs publics en matière de violence et d’insécurité. En revanche, les micro-territoires urbains, et leurs dynamiques de violence et de criminalité, ont peu de chances de se voir reflétés et traités de manière directe et efficace car ils ne sont pas toujours observés par celui-ci.

Dans tous les cas, l’absence systémique d’approche micro-territoriale dans la politique publique de sécurité a des conséquences importantes sur ses résultats, surtout ceux de type qualitatif ou subjectif, c’est-à-dire dans la perception d’actions efficaces ou d’insécurité que finissent par avoir les habitants.

32 De plus, dans le cas de Bogota, pour l’année 2005, ces pactes de sécurité dans les localités ont comme fondement la recherche de l’égalité, l’insertion sociale, l’attention aux populations vulnérables, l’amélioration de la qualité de la vie et la contribution à la formulation de politiques publiques intégrales.
2. Le pari méthodologique.

La caractérisation.

Les situations violentes et liées à la criminalité peuvent changer assez rapidement du fait des dynamiques propres aux modalités délictuelles ou criminelles, soit par l’impact des politiques publiques, que ce soit dans la ville comme dans ses territoires (localités, communes, unités d’aménagement de zone – upz -, quartiers, etc.). De même, de tels changements peuvent obéir à la manière d’agir ou de réagir des citoyens confrontés à la politique publique et à la violence urbaine.

En référence à ce qui vient d’être exposé, le diagnostic général à l’échelle de la ville doit être révisé à intervalle régulier ou l’action des pouvoirs publics court le risque d’incohérences et d’inefficacité, comme par exemple la stigmatisation d’un groupe de population ou d’une zone comme dangereux.

Dans ce dernier cas, le phénomène de stigmatisation se présente habituellement sous la forme d’une croyance partagée par la société qui associe le comportement des jeunes aux actes de vandalisme et aux incivilités commises dans l’espace public ou stéréotype la formation de bandes.

Une révision périodique de la caractérisation est aussi nécessaire dans les petites unités territoriales où les impacts sont plus perceptibles et proches. En effet, le diagnostic général peut être perçu comme trop « large » pour ces unités car, dans les conditions normales d’analyse à l’échelle de la ville, il est facile de perdre de vue la dimension micro-territoriale et spatiale des problèmes de sécurité.

Par conséquent, la proposition méthodologique est la caractérisation de la violence et de la criminalité dans le micro-territoire urbain. Elle est adaptée aux conditions d’échelle du territoire urbain et à l’existence de ressources financières disponibles restreintes et prévoit des étapes d’actualisation du diagnostic.

Dans ce sens, la caractérisation établit les facteurs de risque de violence et de criminalité en fonction des territoires, avec une perspective quantitative / qualitative complémentaire au diagnostic général et la participation des acteurs communautaires.

En outre, la micro-caractérisation est perçue comme un premier pas important pour faire avancer le développement progressif du diagnostic.

2.1. Les dimensions de la caractérisation :

Le territoire. La variable territoire est inclue dans sa dimension micro-territoriale du point de vue de la géographie urbaine, c’est-à-dire en prenant en compte les dynamiques socio-économiques et culturelles qui construisent et identifient les communautés locales et dont les changements mettent en danger ou affectent le tissu social de ces mêmes micro-territoires urbains.

L’échelle micro-territoriale permet également d’observer de manière séparée les interventions ponctuelles sur le territoire dans le cas par exemple d’opérations de rénovation urbaine ou d’actions de récupération de l’espace public (par exemple, le déplacement de postes de vente ambulants) ou de réaménagement (par exemple, les parcs et zones piétonnes).
Cartes de l’une des zones (localité de Suba) sélectionnées par le projet VUPS à Bogota. Le travail de terrain a été réalisé à l’échelle de la localité, de l’UPZ et du quartier (Hunza et Costa Rica).

Territoire urbain de Bogota et ses 20 localités

Localité de Suba à Bogota

Emplacement de l’UPZ 28 dans la localité de Suba

Détail de l’UPZ 28 « El Rincón »

Quartiers Hunza et Costa Rica dans l’UPZ 28

Quartier Hunza de la localité de Suba

Pour servir l’objectif de la caractérisation et en cas de difficultés face à la division administrative ou analytique du territoire urbain, la question qui se pose est : comment micro-territorialiser ? La réponse : à partir des statistiques et de la géoréférenciation.

La participation. La participation à la formulation et à la mise en œuvre de la politique publique de sécurité est l’une des autres variables que la perspective méthodologique se propose d’inclure. En effet, les citoyens ont des intérêts différents, assument des rôles et développent des actions distinctes face à la violence urbaine, de même, face à la politique ou en réaction à l’absence d’action des pouvoirs publics.

Les expériences communautaires et les formes d’organisation de la société civile, qui vont de la formation d’entreprises de sécurité privée aux stratégies des commerçants, ou à l’organisation de quartiers ou de pâtés de maisons pour faire face à la petite délinquance, sont des éléments porteurs de savoir, d’informations, qui s’édifient sur la base légitime de la participation dans la sphère publique.

L’institutionnalisme. Il existe au niveau local des instances officielles et non-officielles pour traiter les conflits, telles que la justice communautaire (médiation, conciliation, juges de paix), et planifier le développement et l’investissement public (conseils de sécurité au niveau local, fronts de sécurité, formulation de plans locaux ou zonaux de sécurité)33. Le potentiel de cet institutionnalisme local offre la possibilité d’une approche et d’une action micro-territoriale.

33 Les exemples de cet institutionnalisme se réfèrent à Bogota où il existe 20 localités qui représentent les unités administratives divisant le territoire de la capitale pour son administration. Pour chacune d’entre elles, des conseils locaux de sécurité existent, formés de représentants des différentes entités gouvernementales et délégés dans chaque localité et coordonnés par un conseil de quartier présidé par le Maire.
La caractérisation suppose et permet la reconnaissance, le développement et le renforcement de l’institutionnalisme local.

2.2. Le contenu minimum de la caractérisation :

La caractérisation s’applique également lors de situations où il existe une restriction d’informations et de ressources. Elle suppose alors l’emploi exclusif de sources secondaires existantes dans différentes agences gouvernementales, organisations académiques et entités de recherche scientifique qui étudient les thèmes urbains. Elle prend en compte les aspects suivants :

- analyse des caractéristiques physiques, démographiques et sociales (par exemple, emploi de documents techniques d’aménagement urbain tels que les plans directeurs de la planification territoriale ou les opérations urbaines, etc.).
- situation financière (ressources disponibles pour la sécurité).
- facteurs générateurs de risque : situations de conflit, violences et délits.
  - Morts violentes et délits de fort impact.
  - Sentiment de sécurité et plaintes (augmentation).
  - Participation. Promotion et impulsion (actions communautaires).

2.3. Les phases de la caractérisation :

La formulation de la caractérisation de la violence et de la criminalité urbaine du micro-territoire est constituée des trois phases suivantes :

1) statistiques : le quantitatif.

Classification du crime : 2 champs, 3 catégories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Champs</th>
<th>Catégories (délits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sécurité humaine</td>
<td>Homicides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blessures personnelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrimoine économique</td>
<td>Vols : personnes, résidences, commerce, véhicules, entités financières.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Indicateurs :
  - Taux pour 100.000 habitants
  - Taux par kilomètre
  - Variation en pourcentage
  - Proportion de la localité avec la ville
**Graphique 1 Localités dont le taux d’homicide est supérieur au taux moyen de Bogota. 1995-2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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DAPD, Subdirección de Desarrollo Social, proyecciones de población. Bogotá D.C.

Tableau 2. UPZ avec un taux d’homicide supérieur au taux de Bogotá, 2002

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Tableau 3. Homicides par kilomètre dans les localités de Bogota, 2004

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<th>Homicidios por km_</th>
<th>Tasa de Homicidios 2004</th>
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Fuente: SUIVD, DAPD


2) travail sur le terrain : le qualitatif.

⇒ Objectif : répondre aux trois questions suivantes :

- Quelles sont les informations à collecter pour la caractérisation ?

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<tr>
<th>Collecte d’informations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Déliés</td>
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76
• Comment les collecter (la manière) ?

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<tr>
<th>Moyens</th>
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<th>Caractéristiques</th>
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<tr>
<td>Parcours sur le terrain</td>
<td>Sentiment de sécurité dans des espaces déterminés</td>
<td>Parcours avec membres de la communauté. Questionnaire complété sur le parcours.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Délimitation des zones</td>
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<td>Dialogues citoyens</td>
<td>Espace d’autodiagnostic</td>
<td>Réflexion sur la situation de sécurité. Identification des problèmes. Solutions alternatives</td>
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<td>Cartes de sentiment</td>
<td>Distribution des problèmes de sécurité sur le territoire</td>
<td>Groupement des problèmes autour des espaces urbains de la communauté (parcs, stations de bus, rues, écoles, etc.)</td>
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<td>Groupes Focaux</td>
<td>Construction de cadre explicatif de situation de sécurité</td>
<td>Groupes de personnes aux caractéristiques communes (âge, sexe, profession, lieu de résidence, etc.) Travail orienté par un médiateur.</td>
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<td>Entretiens</td>
<td>Approfondissement de l’analyse des problèmes</td>
<td>Identification des acteurs clés</td>
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• Comment systématiser et présenter l’information ?

3) Validation sociale : la légitimation politique.

La validation sociale a des effets positifs sur le sentiment de sécurité et la gestion de l’insécurité réelle. En outre, elle permet l’élaboration des plans de sécurité locaux et l’engagement de leur mise en œuvre.

Les pactes de cohabitation ainsi que les actions communautaires promues depuis le champ politique ou reconnues par les pouvoirs publics ou la société, les organisations de commerçants et les organisations sociales formées autour d’un facteur de risque comme la toxicomanie sont des exemples du public potentiel auprès de qui il faut valider la caractérisation du micro-territoire en matière de sécurité citoyenne.
Los Angeles Eco-Village: An Overview.

Lois Arkin
Co-founder of the Los Angeles Eco-Village

“L.A. Eco-Villagers are reinventing the way we live in our city.”

Beginnings

LAEV in its current location started in 1993 after extensive dialogue among the volunteers who comprised the Design Team working with our non-profit organization. During the previous five years, the non-profit Cooperative Resources and Services Project (CRSP) and its volunteers had been planning to develop the ecovillage on a vacant 11 acre site about seven miles from the current location. We changed the location after a good deal of soul searching as a result of the Los Angeles Riots or Uprisings following the Rodney King verdict in 1992.

During the prior five years—the late 80s—our grass roots volunteer Design Team had accomplished two major goals with the City of Los Angeles. We were successful in having the proposed 11 acre city-owned “surplus” property removed from the city's planned public auction sale of the site. That site remains in public ownership today, nearly 20 years later, for a potential ecovillage development. Secondly, we succeeded in having the Los Angeles Eco-Village Demonstration included as a program in the City’s Housing Element which is part of the City's General Plan. This meant that public policy was in place acknowledging the value of a demonstration “ecovillage [that was] a holistic approach to community development effectively integrating the social, economic and ecological systems of a neighbourhood for long term sustainability.” This type of language in a public document in the U.S. was a milestone for the late 80s/early 90s. The words “ecovillage” and “sustainability” had not yet come into common usage in the U.S.

After the Riots, the Eco-Village Design Team decided to scrap the plan to develop the 11 acre city-owned suburban oriented site. Instead, we envisioned “retrofitting” my neighbourhood. Several fires raged in the intensely urban and troubled neighbourhood. Frightened residents did not talk to one another and did not allow their children outside to play. Daily, one could observe illegal activities on the street: drugs and drug sales, prostitution, and gambling. Intense graffiti and the frequent sound of gunshots was a constant reminder of the gang warfare in the area. "Retrofitting” meant we could start the processes of creating an ecovillage with virtually no financial resources whereas pursuing the new development on the 11 acre site would mean a 15 to 25 year development plan at an initial projected cost of $15 million. Being a small grassroots organization with very limited financial resources and no paid staff, we were anxious to begin something after nearly 10 years of meeting and planning. The Riots gave us a new way to think about an ecovillage: a retrofit of the neighbourhood’s existing systems—social, economic and ecological— rather than a new construction development.

On the positive side, it was a working class neighbourhood. Thirteen historically significant apartment buildings housed approximately 500 persons from diverse backgrounds. We could walk to 20 different bus lines and soon-to-be, at that time, two subway stops. We could also walk to four supermarkets and numerous small shops and stores. With downtown only three miles away and a closer office centre within walking distance along with several colleges and public schools, there were potentially many job opportunities. Griffith Park in the local

Cf. www.usc.edu/isd/archives/la/la_riot.html
mountains (one of the largest public parks in the U.S.) was accessible by an easy bus or bike ride, and the ocean, a convenient but longer bus ride, made the neighbourhood attractive for getting to recreational and retreat places away from the urban intensity.

Beginning the Retrofit: Socially, Economically, Ecologically: A Sampling of Activities

Open Door Policy.

I kept the front door to my office and home wide open whenever I was at home and awake 8 to 16 hours a day. Neighbours were invited to drop in whenever they wanted to talk or seek resources for any problem. I simply made up my mind to do it and not be afraid.

Brunches in the intersection of our two streets.

Several times each month on weekends, Eco-Village volunteers set up a table and a few chairs in the middle of the intersection, put up a few hand-made stop signs on both sides of the table, brought out a teapot, some cups, fruit and a few cookies and offered tea to anyone walking or driving by. Pedestrians and drivers thought we were a little crazy, but we knew from extensive research that we were safe, that the cars would slow down. Eventually, more neighbours began to stop by for these traffic calming intersection teas.

Photo 1: City Repair planning meeting in street for the transformation of the intersection to a public plaza.

Lois Arkin

Positive Gossip.

Eco-Village volunteers would drop by several times each week and walk the streets together, stopping to talk to any neighbours we could find. In very friendly ways, we would engage them to find out as much as we could about them. Telling other neighbours about the nice things we learned about their neighbours motivated many to want to meet one another. Volunteers created a number of social opportunities for neighbours to come together, for example, playing music in the street, earthday and seasonal celebrations, special speakers that would come to the neighbourhood, and food sharing gatherings.
Learning Names.

For neighbours who complained that they didn't have time to get involved, we asked them to do one very small thing. Try to learn the name of one neighbour each week, and then "when you see that person on the street, say 'hello' by name like 'Hi Jose.'" We started telling this to everyone we met in the two blocks, both adults and children. Within a few months, it was hard to walk down the street without someone calling out to you by name. It changed the whole tone of the neighbourhood in a very short time.

Children’s' activities.

We began to work with the children in a variety of ways. Just getting out in the street with adult volunteers and playing with a ball, drew kids and their parents' to the windows. "Gee," the parents thought, "if those people are playing ball in the street, it must be safe for our kids to play with them." Kids started coming out to the streets when they saw us. Our friendships with the children and their parents grew and deepened. Soon we were engaging the children in a fruit tree stewardship project: kids got to select a fruit tree to plant, celebrate the planting together, and take charge of the harvest from their trees the following year. We began to teach some of the children conflict mediation techniques. We started taking the children on bicycle field trips and even did a few weekend family camping trips. We helped the children start a Recycling Co-op which provided them with small amounts of money. Eventually, volunteer Eco-Villagers began an outdoor classroom garden in my front yard for the primary school adjacent to my home. Kids learned more about gardening, about the whole nutrient cycle of planting, eating, composting, in relation to sun and water. Their science scores shot way up. They started to bring their parents to the garden. We didn't refer to any of this as having a "program." We didn't use much money, and no one was paid. We just used our good will. We were learning to be neighbours.

The Sense of Safety is Created in a Six Month Period.

Within six months of starting several of the processes described above, the feeling of safety and security in the neighbourhood had turned around 180 degrees. By the second year, seven volunteers had moved to the neighbourhood forming the beginning of an intentional community. The seven of us began to have weekly meals together. It was an exciting time. We celebrated with glee each time any of us observed any of our other neighbours doing something neighbourly without one of us instigating it. The idea of community was
beginning to take. Each of us had skills and resources to share with one another and the neighbourhood at large, and we were learning much from our pre-existing neighbours as well.

**Interfacing with Local Authorities**

During the period when we were still focused on the 11 acre site, I did a great deal of public advocacy on issues of sustainability and mechanisms for creating permanently affordable housing such as community land trusts and limited equity housing cooperatives. As a result I was successful in having the Eco-Village demonstration included in the City's official housing policies, as noted above.

By the second year after the retrofit activities started, I was invited by our Councilwoman to sit on the Community Advisory Committee of our local redevelopment area to advise on housing and social needs in the area. My single issue on that committee during this past decade has been, of course, sustainable community development.

Because our area was so blighted, we had the option of having the two block Eco-Village neighbourhood included within the boundaries of the new redevelopment area. Two other special planning areas were also available for us to be included in. One, the Station Neighbourhood Area Plan or SNAP, won a national award from the American Planning Association for including such provisions as child care, parks, live/work spaces, pedestrian orientation, community gardens, shared streets and even a car-free demonstration neighbourhood. Several Eco-Village residents and volunteers worked with the city planners to ensure inclusion of many of these items in the SNAP. Each of the special planning areas has potential use of public monies associated with them. For example in the SNAP, for profit developers have to pay a percentage of their development costs into special city funds for parks and childcare. Some of these monies might then be allocated to community organizations to develop parks or childcare facilities.

Eco-Village has utilized these plans in a variety of ways. We worked with one non-profit organization, the Bresee Foundation at the south end of Eco-Village, to close off about 20,000 square feet of a street adjacent to Bresee's youth centre. The street was developed into an ecological park for teen-age youth. There is a 500 foot streambed planted with native grasses and designed to clean storm water and have it percolate back down to the water table instead of going into the storm drain which goes directly to the ocean with all of the pollutants from the street. The park also has a playground for small children, and lots of benches for the teenagers to hang out on with their friends.

One long-time knowledgeable Eco-Villager, Joe Linton, developed a proposal to our local public transportation agency, using guidelines from the SNAP to create a shared street in which cars would have to be respectful of pedestrians and bicyclists. The local public agency funded it, and then the City kicked in more money. Now there is a set-aside within the city of $250,000 to redesign our entire main street from one end to the other, about 1,000 feet long. We expect this effort to start in 2007 with a variety of community input. In 2005, we decided to get a head start on this project by inviting Mark Lakeman of the City Repair organization35 in Portland to work with us to transform our intersection into a plaza. Now we regularly retrain cars to go around us when we are using the plaza for social activities, such as public tours.

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35 Cf. www.cityrepair.org
Acquiring Property through the Ecological Revolving Loan Fund (ELF)

Because our purpose was overall neighbourhood sustainability—socially, economically and ecologically—we knew we would have to buy property. Property values in the neighbourhood remained very depressed for several years after the Riots, and L.A. had a significant earthquake in 1994, which further lowered property values. This all worked to our advantage as great numbers of people left the city and real estate values plummeted. Owners of one large apartment building in the neighbourhood were in default to the bank on their $1.2 million mortgage. I decided we would buy this building for no more than $500,000. Almost a year later, CRSP (our non-profit organization) did buy it with loan money raised through our Ecological Revolving Loan Fund (ELF) from about 35 different sources. We were able to pay all cash for the half-vacant deteriorated building. All of the loans came from people we knew, primarily in Los Angeles, but including several from other parts of the world. Of course, we had to prepare a proper business plan to show the lenders how we would pay them back. A few years later, CRSP acquired a second building adjacent to the first, also with loans made to the ELF. This year, 10 years after the first acquisition, all of our loans will be paid back—$1 million for these two buildings. Gaia Trust of Denmark, which, in the mid 90s was helping to establish and advance the ecovillage movement worldwide, was one of our first lenders with a substantial loan. This helped us leverage the other monies needed to acquire the properties including some public monies from the Redevelopment Agency and the Housing Department[36].

Developing an Intentional Community

Today nearly 40 people have moved to the neighbourhood intentionally, wanting to live more cooperatively and more ecologically. Many are demonstrating on a daily basis higher quality living patterns at a much lower environmental impact than the average city dweller in Los Angeles. Of course, everyone does not participate in all ways. However, many in the intentional community attend weekly community meetings where they make decisions by consensus. Many also participate in regular gardening parties, or other community work days. Close friendships have developed. About half of the intentional community members no longer own cars and are engaged in small home based businesses. Bicycle culture is very strong in the community, and one member started a bicycle repair business[37].

Retrofitting Buildings

We have been retrofitting and rehabilitating our buildings for the past ten years. Recently we took three of our largest units 100% solar. Our policies on retrofitting include using the most local, most recycled content, least toxic and least polluting materials. We have taken a permaculture approach to the landscape which is now rich with orchards and edible gardens overseen by a six member garden committee which meets monthly. The economic aspect of retrofitting has begun in earnest. CRSP has spawned a Community Land Trust Formation Committee and a Limited Equity Housing Co-op Committee. Eventually CRSP plans to transition ownership of the land under our buildings to the Community Land Trust; and sell the buildings to the resident Eco-Village Co-op group. Monies from the sale of the buildings will go into the ELF and may be used to continue acquiring and retrofitting other neighbourhood properties for permanently affordable ecological and cooperative living and working spaces, thereby continuing the recycling of money in the community.

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[36] For the story about how we created and used our loan fund, see: www.newvillage.net/2makingmoney.
[37] Cf. www.bicyclekitchen.com
And on Into the Future

During the past year, CRSP has begun to develop a network for others interested in starting new ecovillages in the Los Angeles area or expanding their existing small intentional communities to whole neighbourhoods. The network, known as the Los Angeles Communities Dialogue Group or LaComDiG, meets monthly at different local communities. The emerging CRSP Institute for Urban Ecovillages provides a variety of workshops and special events for learning the many aspects for living sustainably in our city. We frequently provide short stay accommodations, and our weekly public tours draw people from throughout the world to experience life in the L.A. Eco-Village.

For more info on Los Angeles Eco-Village, visit our websites at www.laecovillage.org and our very new (March 2006) emerging interactive wiki at :

http://www.communitywiki.org/odd/LosAngelesEcoVillage/HomePage
Integral Urban Project and Safety. Building barriers or bridges?

Karina Landman

CSIR Built Environment

Introduction and background

The notion that the physical environment can either increase or reduce the opportunities for crime is not new. Internationally, it has been studied extensively over a number of decades. There is general consensus that if the environment is planned, designed and managed appropriately, certain types of crimes can be reduced. Environmental design has formed an integral part of many crime prevention initiatives in countries such as the UK, USA, Canada, The Netherlands and Australia. The environment can also play a significant role in influencing perceptions of safety. Certain environments can impart a feeling of safety, while others can induce fear, even in areas where levels of crime are not high. In this regard, planning and design measures can be utilised very successfully to enhance feelings of safety in areas where people feel vulnerable.

The study of the relationship between crime and the physical environment has resulted in various theoretical approaches and a number of schools of thought have emerged since the early 1960’s. Some of the more familiar approaches include Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), situational crime prevention and place-specific crime prevention. The CSIR Built Environment bases their work on a South African interpretation of international approaches as well as research conducted locally, and has defined the concept as follows:

*Crime prevention through environmental design aims to reduce the causes of, and opportunities for, criminal events and address the fear of crime by applying sound planning, design and management principles to the built environment.*

Different approaches to crime prevention in the built environment

Despite broad similar goals encompassed in the different approaches, *environmental design to prevent crime* as an overarching meta-concept, has given rise to different manifestations in practice. Two broad streams can be distinguished, namely an integrating and a segregating approach. Although they are discussed as two separate streams/approaches, the distinction is not always clear in practice, resulting in some practitioners or institutions implementing aspects from each. It is not always possible to completely categorize certain authors / theorists into one of these two groups but rather point out a tendency to lean towards the one or the other, either in general or related to a specific publication. This may often be due to the over-emphasis of some of the principles in a specific context or situation. These two approaches will be discussed briefly.

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38 The CSIR (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) is a science council in South Africa that operates through grant funding from government and contract research. The council covers a wide spectrum, including units such as Materials and Manufacturing, Nature, Resources and the Environment and the Built Environment. CSIR Built Environment focuses on research and interventions in the built environment.


40 This discussion is based on a paper entitled “Boundaries, bars and barricades: reconsidering a segregated approach to crime prevention through environmental design”, submitted to The Journal of Architectural and Planning Research, 2005 by K. Landman.
**Integrating approach**

An integrated approach to crime prevention in the built environment is broadly based on interventions that support the establishment of an open, incorporating and assimilating urban environment to reduce conflict through association and cooperation. This is to be achieved through a number of principles and interventions. The principles that generally accommodate an integrated approach include surveillance, visibility, image and aesthetics and symbolic thresholds. These principles can be achieved through a range of interventions in the built environment including through mixed land-use, 24 hour use, celebration of the street, higher densities through appropriate built form and building typologies, accessible, smaller parks, symbolic rather than actual boundaries, the right psychological signals and open and pedestrian friendly roads and sidewalks with entrances on the streets and buildings overlooking the public space41.

**Segregating approach**

A segregated approach to crime prevention in the built environment support interventions that emphasise the strengthening of boundaries and the separation of areas in the urban environment to reduce opportunities for conflict and/or friction. This is to be achieved through a number of principles including the minimisation of the degree of shared public space inside residential areas, territoriality and defensible space, target hardening and access control. These principles can be achieved through a range of interventions in the built environment including hard boundaries between public and private spaces, single use territories, separation of land uses, target hardening measures such as high fences, secure gateways, steel shutters and burglar bars, and measures of access control such as restricted road access, avoidance of through pedestrian routes in neighbourhoods, limiting multiple access points, CCTV cameras, parking lot barriers, entry phones, PIN numbers and visitor check-in booths42.

**Tensions and outcomes in practice**

There are examples where interventions based on both these approaches have reduced opportunities for crime in the built environment. Despite this, more research is necessary to confirm the effect of both of these on crime. However, it is not only the effect on crime prevention that should be considered. The question is what are the impact and implications of these approaches in practice? From the previous section it is not surprising that there would be an increase in tensions between proponents of different approaches as many of the principles and interventions often are in direct contradiction to each other. In addition, the outcome has also been different. The segregated approach has given rise to increasing fortification in cities and as such has been criticised by many writers43, including leading

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CPTED protagonists. An overemphasis on law enforcement and target hardening measures can lead to a “fortress mentality” and the creation of a “fortress city” and may also raise levels of fear. An over-emphasis on the segregation approach has contributed to rising tensions in the UK between the “Safer by Design” policies (promoted by the police), where the emphasis on target hardening and access control, and the “inclusive neighbourhood” strategies (promoted by the Social Exclusion Unit 2002), that is aimed at addressing social exclusion in cities. There are also signs of similar tensions emerging in South Africa.

Application of different approaches in South Africa

Integrating approach

Warwick Avenue Triangle urban regeneration project is an example of an integrated approach to CPTED in South Africa. It is located around the main public transport interchange in Durban city centre and aimed to provide an improved level of service to the 400 000 commuters who pass through there on a daily basis. The 2 000 taxis and 70 000 train and buses that use the area daily are serviced by some 8 000 kerbside traders. Through the project, the eThekwini municipality has invested R40 million in the area in creating what is classified as ‘community wellness’. The projects range from supporting small entrepreneurs like traditional herbalists, healers and food suppliers, to the planning, design and implementation of physical infrastructure including bridges, roof extensions and sanitation facilities located at and under the freeway system adjacent to the rail station. Great attention was taken in the planning and design of the area to be sensitive to the different histories and to include the diverse cultural needs, as well as to contribute to the safety of the commuters.

An intensive CPTED workshop was held in June 2000 to inform designers and other actors of the merits of incorporating CPTED into the urban renewal process. Consequently, many of these principles were incorporated in the various designs, for example mixed use areas around the market, well-designed market area and stalls for traders, design for passive surveillance (including a ‘see-through’ pedestrian bridge to the station), well-designed pedestrian routes to link public spaces and model interchanges, appropriate street lighting, and 24 hour use in some areas. Violent deaths have reduced tenfold since the project commenced: at project commencement more than 50 violent deaths, excluding taxi related incidents were reported annually; in 2003 five deaths were reported.

Segregating approach

Unlike the previous group, there are a great number of projects that incorporate a segregated approach to CPTED in South Africa. Some of the most extreme among these are the so-called gated communities. Gated communities in the country can broadly be categorised into two main groups, namely enclosed neighbourhoods and security villages. Enclosed neighbourhoods refer to existing neighbourhoods that have been fenced or walled in and where access is...
controlled or prohibited by means of gates or booms that have been erected across existing public roads. Security villages and complexes are private developments that are planned and designed to be physically barricaded from the surrounding neighbourhood. They include secure townhouse complexes, office parks, and large security estates that combine a residential component with commercial and recreational facilities including small shops, golf courses, tennis and squash courts and even amenities such as schools and post offices. The physical nature of the different types of gated communities often differ; also in terms of the extent of target hardening and territorialisation. While some would only have a perimeter fence and remote controlled gates, others have extensive security measures, including electric fences, access controlled gates with 24 hour private security patrols and guards at the gate, as well as CCTV cameras.

Impact and implications of the privatisation of urban space

While there has been a range of findings related to the proliferation of gated communities in South Africa, it became evident that the physical changes in the built environment had several impacts, including:

- A reduction in the degree of accessibility to public spaces and facilities available to all urban residents due to the creation of privatised super-blocks.
- A shift in traffic and movement patterns, displacing traffic (vehicular, cycle and pedestrian traffic) to busy arterials, causing traffic congestion, increased travelling times and increased vulnerability to non-motorised traffic, as well as increased noise and air pollution along these arterials.
- A reduction in the efficiency of service delivery due to problems for municipal service vehicles to access secure neighbourhoods, as well as technical problems such as insufficient turning spaces inside these neighbourhoods for large vehicles.
- A reduction in the response times of police and other emergency services, such as fire-trucks and ambulances, due to inaccessible roads or neighbourhoods.

• An increased deterioration of roads due to less (inside) or more (outside) traffic making use of these roads than was originally designed for.

These impacts have huge implications for the daily use patterns and experiences of urban residents, as well as for the local municipalities in terms of the urban functioning and management. Gated communities therefore give rise to the privatisation of public space, services and governance to various degrees, depending on the type and contribute to segregation at three levels: physically, socially and institutionally 49.

Living in the enclaved society therefore creates a dilemma. On the one hand there is a desperate need for mechanisms to promote personal safety and a sense of security in South Africa. In many cases law enforcement initiatives are seen as unsuccessful to prevent crime or merely as not enough. Consequently residents respond in their own way, by applying for street closures or opting to move to security villages. This in turn stimulates the market demand for these types of developments. On the other hand, there is a need to consider the medium and long term impacts and implications of these extreme responses to crime in the built environment, including urban fragmentation and segregation, the privatisation of public space through access control and the violation of constitutional / human rights when people are prohibited from enter what is technically still public space50.

The question is therefore whether living in the enclaved society is likely to contribute to crime prevention in the city as a whole, or whether it will only reduce crime inside the enclaves and for how long? By hardening the target (neighbourhood) one may in fact violate other CPTED principles as relevant to the area outside the gates and fences. As such, one cannot only consider the safety of people living inside the enclaves, but need to look at CPTED, as well as local crime prevention from a more holistic perspective51.

Planning and designing safer environments: the process

Within the South African context, CPTED incorporates the following:

• physical planning and the planning approaches used at the strategic level;

• the detailed design of the different elements - for example, the movement system and the roads, the public open space system, individual buildings on their separate sites, etc., and

• the management of either the entire urban system or the different elements and precincts that make up the urban area52.

The manual, Designing Safer Places provides guidelines for the development of a local CPTED strategy that can be used by Local Authorities to implement CPTED in practice. Assessing and analysing crime and the environment through this process will lead to an understanding of crime in an area within the broader physical environment and assist in identifying the spatial characteristics of a particular crime location. There are many ways to apply CPTED principles and different mechanisms to implement strategies, programmes and projects on a


51 Kruger and Landman 2003, op. cit.

local level. The process is therefore a guideline only and can be adapted to suit particular needs. This process consists of five activities, with a number of tasks under each of these:

**Activity 1:** Identify the crime problems

**Activity 2:** Assess the physical environment

**Activity 3:** Assess the social and institutional environment

**Activity 4:** Synthesise and analyse the information

**Activity 5:** Develop an appropriate response

This is not a linear process - many aspects of these activities should be addressed in an iterative and integrated manner.

**Building barriers or bridges?**

The emphasis of local crime prevention initiatives should therefore be on public participation to build bridges rather than on fortification that creates barriers. Relying too heavily on physical barriers against crime often causes fragmentation and segregation, and ultimately tension and conflict within the city. This highlights the importance of community participation in local crime prevention, both to identify the crime problems and hot-spots, and to understand the complexity of and assist in solving the problems. It has also shown that planning against crime is a local government function requiring partnerships between the police, the municipality, and the community they serve. To succeed, this approach to local safety will require integration at three levels:

- First, there is a need for crime prevention initiatives that are based on initiatives promoting **spatial integration**, including mixed-use, a celebration of the street and public spaces, higher densities through an appropriate built form, symbolic barriers and opportunities for natural surveillance. Mixed-use can furthermore be achieved by people using the same streets and the same facilities at the same time of the day. It also calls for the improvement of public spaces for all urban residents, including the reduction of derelict vacant land and the development of existing public spaces.

- Second, there is a need for **social integration** through inclusive participatory processes in which local residents take part in the identification and solution of their crime problems. This not only encourages local empowerment and social cohesion, but also provides a more accurate reflection of public needs as regards neighbourhood crime.

- Third, there is a need for **institutional integration**. In this respect, local development plans can be a valuable mechanism to guide the process and ensure that planning against crime becomes a reality in practice. When crime informs these plans by identifying locations for strategic interventions, greater integration can begin to occur. It will also help to make the development plans more responsive to people’s priorities. This will also ensure that crime prevention responses take into account their impact on the surrounding neighbourhoods and the rest of the city.

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Given the need for communities to become involved in creating safer living environments, the question is whether the tendency to form enclaves is the most appropriate response. By closing off streets and erecting barricades around existing neighbourhoods, the CPTED principle of target hardening is applied at the cost of the other principles. It is suggested that a more effective and sustainable way of dealing with crime at a local level is through the implementation of a comprehensive, integrated community-based crime prevention strategy. This will ensure that crime prevention measures are implemented in a coordinated way so as to minimise the possible impact that interventions implemented in one area could have on other sectors of the community. Such a strategy should respond to local problems and the local context and should address crime problems holistically. The strategy should therefore be based on a detailed safety audit that involves a study of local crime problems and patterns, socio-economic conditions, local crime prevention capacity and the physical environment. The process outlined in the Making South Africa Safe manual provides a useful basis for the development of such a strategy. In order to ensure that local crime prevention initiatives are implemented in the most effective way, it is appropriate for local government to take the lead in developing the strategy. By taking up this responsibility, local government can ensure that the needs and fears of all citizens are considered and addressed. By including everyone in the development of a community-based crime prevention strategy, the need for people to enclave themselves will also be reduced, contributing to building bridges between communities rather than barriers.

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URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY POLICY

Charlotte Boisteau

Based on presentations, discussions, results of the questionnaire distributed to the participants, and group work developed during the event, we wish to respond to the previously stated hypotheses, which aim to understand the governance system in the security field and its relationship with urban transformations.

As we describe the framework of necessary and preparatory methodological considerations for the analysis (ref. Frame 1), one must first take into account the diversity of the referred contexts. These are cities, metropolitan zones, and regions that possess their unique characteristics and can difficultly be compared to one another.

The objective is not to perform a comparative study, but rather to refer to diverse entities and show a viewpoint while testing the plurality of the situations. The incomparability of the situations was often stated as impossible for the seminar’s organizers to respond to distinct preoccupations using the same program. Several programs were chosen and CIFAL Barcelona, with the support of UNITAR, decided to create two international networks (the Mediterranean region and Latin America) for regionalizing problems and adapting responses.

The participating cities and regions of the 2nd CIFAL Barcelona-UNITAR workshop are different sizes and population densities. Each functions through different political systems, but all are urban entities confronting increased internal and external migrations. Due to rapid urbanization, these local entities also are faced with the growth of daily incivilities and offences, the persistent fear of citizens that doubt the State’s capacity to maintain order, and the assurance of security of the cities’ inhabitants.

Table 1: Population (number) and density of inhabitants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Density (inhab./km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td>1,031,376</td>
<td>5,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douala</td>
<td>1,612,924</td>
<td>2,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>4,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td>671,846</td>
<td>13,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane – Pretoria – (municipality)</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>9,838,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curitiba</td>
<td>1,757,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>3,819,951</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>7,104,645</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalet de Llobregat</td>
<td>259,135</td>
<td>20,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>2,542,003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>1,578,546</td>
<td>15,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>1,622,860</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Density (inhab./km²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilie- Romagne</td>
<td>4,150,975</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalunya</td>
<td>6,813,319</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Île de France</td>
<td>11,264,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Statistical Institutes

Note the diversity of the present actors at the seminar that responded to our questionnaire. Certain represent a local authority, while others are from social service, urban planning, or social developments of their city (political and technical). Others are even representatives of international and non-governmental associations and organizations.
Urban Violence and the feeling of in-security

In the questionnaire, when we asked participants to describe qualitatively seven crimes or offences in order of their occurrence (from the most frequent to the least frequent) transpiring in their cities and regions, the responses were very diverse and highlighted the relativity of a crime’s or an offence’s signification according to each individual (ref. Table 2). Whether collective, individual, or symbolic violence, no paradigm of violence exists that has a unique sense or implication. Whatever the adopted definition, in the absence of international law, an act is perceived as violent or non-violent according to the standards of a society. For example, Colombian and Spanish violence refer to distinct offences, with each one qualifying as an offence or a transgression in relation to institutionalized standards in their respective societies. Relativity is not only cultural or political, but also judicial. In Katmandu, poorly managing waste disposal, or to be badly managed disposing waste, constitute major offences that the city attempts to counter through heavy fines\textsuperscript{57}, while Tshwane counteracts burglary and theft with violence, and Nairobi concentrates its efforts in reducing homicides. Therefore, there are multiple definitions of security. The feelings of insecurity are also totally subjective according to the stated position of a specific actor.

\textsuperscript{57} Our questionnaire were completed by the participants of the city of Katmandu before the recent insurrections (April) against the Nepalese monarchy occurring in the capital city.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime/offences in order of importance</th>
<th>Barcelona</th>
<th>Bogotá</th>
<th>Douala</th>
<th>Emilie-Romagne</th>
<th>Guatemala City</th>
<th>Katmandu</th>
<th>Nairobi</th>
<th>Rabat</th>
<th>Tshwane</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>Lesion</td>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>Criminal damage</td>
<td>Vehicle theft</td>
<td>Deposition of objects</td>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>Drunkenness</td>
<td>Theft (not mentioned elsewhere)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Theft within a vehicle</td>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>Pick pocketing</td>
<td>Theft using another vehicle</td>
<td>Property theft</td>
<td>Illegal deposition of waste</td>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Theft using violence</td>
<td>Vehicle theft</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
<td>Pick pocketing</td>
<td>Lesion</td>
<td>Unauthorized parking</td>
<td>Property theft</td>
<td>Drug consumption</td>
<td>Agression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Vehicle theft</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
<td>Physical aggression</td>
<td>Residential burglary</td>
<td>Theft using violence</td>
<td>Black-market commerce</td>
<td>Purse-snatching</td>
<td>Purse-snatching</td>
<td>Theft from or outside a vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>Commercial theft</td>
<td>Armed theft</td>
<td>Vehicle theft</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>Illegal construction</td>
<td>Spousal abuse</td>
<td>Narcotic trafficking</td>
<td>Theft with aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>Theft using firearms</td>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>Interfamily violence</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Theft using violence</td>
<td>Property damage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Other theft using violence</td>
<td>Motorcycle theft</td>
<td>Vehicle theft</td>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>Disappearances</td>
<td>Illegal immigration</td>
<td>Vehicle theft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Statistical sources that allow the quantification of criminality are multiple. We identified seven major resources: State police, regional police, local police, judiciary courts, lawyers, medical sources, and victimization studies (ref. Table 3). Their existence is often related to the capacity level of national and local governments and the temporal procedure for training and execution of institutions. Existing criminality studies at an international level often refer to one of these sources.

Table 3: Sources of criminality data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City-Region</th>
<th>State Police</th>
<th>Regional Police</th>
<th>Local Police</th>
<th>Judiciary Courts</th>
<th>Lawyers</th>
<th>Medical</th>
<th>Victimization Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalunya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilie-Romagne</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, if we take into consideration the difficulties to interpret the different definitions of crimes or offences, or the multiplicity of quantitative methods, the fact that statistical studies are often unreliable from comparing numbers of several different sources is not surprising. No global observatory of criminality exists, but these methodological barriers impede heavily its creation and development. Josep Maria Lahosa illustrates this idea in his presentation, stating, “In terms of public management, the studies realized at a large scale, such as the International Study of Victimization (UNICRI/UNODC), are not useful, because they present the territory as uniform, which exposes an ecological and geographical farce”.

We performed this exercise by asking our participants to measure their own feelings of insecurity in the city where they have resided over the past 10 years. We observed the difficulty, even the impossibility of interpreting these results without knowing precisely the socio-historical reality of each context that would allow for a more rigorous interpretation.

The administrations collecting statistical data also are from different geographic scales (ref. Table 4). Data always corresponds to a predefined geographic space, such as a nation, a region, a metropolitan zone, a city, a municipality, and arrondissement or district, and finally a neighborhood. A city or region can collect data from different levels. For example, Guatemala City can compare its local data with data available at a national level realized through the census of its respective territory. Therefore, the city benefits from two levels, the city and the district, of data collection and analysis. At times, the data is collected at a neighborhood level.

As the geographical scale is reduced, knowledge of committed infractions within a city or region are more precise, with responses proposed by public authorities, or other concerned actors to reduce crime, better adapted to the situation. Fernando Guzmán Rodríguez demonstrates this in his presentation of the methodology specifically developed by the “Urban Violence and Security Policy” project, which supports the micro-characterization of territories where these infractions are committed.
Table 4: Administrative level of statistical data collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City-Region / Sources</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Metropolitan Zone</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>District / Munici pality / Arrondissement</th>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilie- Romagne</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Douala administered its questionnaire to 6,000 inhabitants in the street.

Using the example of Barcelona and its Victimization Survey developed over the past 22 years, numerous cities presently take into consideration quantitatively the feelings of insecurity of their inhabitants. Whether directed by the national, regional, or local police (Rabat, Nairobi), by other municipal institutions (Barcelona, Bogotá), by international organizations (Guatemala City), or by non-governmental organizations (Tshwane), the victimization survey measuring insecurity feelings allows one to consider determining factors for a favorable urban environment.

This also allows to identify if a badly lit or non-lit road, a deteriorated urban space, or even a neighborhood that does not benefit regularly from trash collection, etc., provoke negative feelings that influence the degree of insecurity. However, this feeling is not objective and concerns the specific person. Several examples exist in literature showing the feelings of insecurity by a protagonist that enters an unfamiliar place. Several also show persons living in these situations without having negative feelings. Peculiarity and feelings of insecurity are often related to one another (ref. Frame 2).

Frame 2: Peculiarity and insecurity feelings

Martin Mynhardt, Afrikaner figure from a novel written by André Brink, describes his first visit in Soweto (Johannesburg, South Africa) while accompanied by a friend / colleague of Zulu descent, “I had never been there (and I haven’t returned since). […] It’s maybe my only experience in my adult life that frightened me, although I couldn’t define the reason of this fear, because nothing happened. This is the worst, when nothing and anything can happen at anytime.”

This feeling, although natural, becomes problematic when the foreigner is stigmatized as a source of potential danger. However, the feeling of insecurity varies according to the rhythm

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58 This poses methodological problems due to the conscious or non-conscious influence exercised by police officers on those interrogated.
of migration, with no city being exempt from this due to liberated boarders and globalization. All must affront increasing population flow caused by either internal population movement or immigration, and local authorities must respond to the needs imposed and the difficulty of locals accepting and integrating newly arrived persons.

At Bogotá, for example, the study of Andrés Alarcon for the Urban Violence and Security Policies project illustrates that displaced populations do not influence the crime rate, but rather the perceptions of a citizen of a city’s security. Other studies show that an urban space attracts an immigrant in search of employment or security, and then the immigrant quickly becomes disillusioned. The search fails while enduring miserable living conditions where the chances of finding descent employment and housing diminish every day (ref. Table 5). International organizations and local institutions can therefore refer to conditions of survival, rather than life in an urban space.

Table 5: Migration situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities / Regions</th>
<th>Internal migration</th>
<th>External migration</th>
<th>Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>370.716 (23.56%)</td>
<td>220.275 (14%)</td>
<td>Economical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilie-Romagne</td>
<td>15.195 (0.36%)</td>
<td>242.038 (5.83%)</td>
<td>Employment, health, security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td>549.063 (21%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td>127.651 (19%)</td>
<td>40.310 (6%)</td>
<td>Employment, security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment, insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>8.000 (0.49%)</td>
<td>3.000 (0.18%)</td>
<td>Employment, subsidized housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: At Barcelona, 23.56% of non-Catalan Spaniards has immigrated in the city. Migration considered internal in the Emilia-Romagna region is from the European Union. In Guatemala City, immigration occurs principally from rural zones in conflict within the country.

Labor inactivity (ref. Table 6) is over 20% in the cities of Rabat, Guatemala City, and Tshwane, while Douala and Guatemala City (taking into account the percentage of informal activity) is over 50%.
Table 6: Professional situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities/Regions</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Professional inactivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>5.3 %</td>
<td>35.95 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>12-15 %</td>
<td>25-40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douala</td>
<td>58.5 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilie-Romagne</td>
<td>3.7 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td>+50 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td>1.6 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>+ 60%</td>
<td>20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td>26 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poverty itself is not dangerous, yet its consequences are becoming so. We share this viewpoint of the sociologists Judith and Peter Blau of the American Sociology Association and corroborate the idea that generated segregation, occasionally from a lack of access to basic services, can provoke violent behavior. If regional and local authorities wish to address the criminality problem, they can only accomplish this by attacking its multi-sectored causes. Finally, international, political, or academic institutions admit this when presently referring to human security. While relatively new, this concept is unfortunately little developed and implemented at a local level and within urban settings. This is the weakness that the project of the EPFL “Human Security: Urban Security and Safety Practices” wishes to treat with the support of UNITAR and UN-HABITAT.

Frame 3: Definition of Human Security

« For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. (…) The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace… No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs »


When asked to participants in the questionnaire to identify the most underprivileged populations of their city (ref. Table 7), the analysis showed the relationship established by participants between the disadvantaged and the place where they live. For Guatemala City, the most underprivileged populations reside in the periurban zone. For Katmandu, those not benefiting from descent housing, living in the streets, or in squats are considered disadvantaged. For Douala, those concerned reside in natural high-risk zones or do not have access to basic services. Finally, for Tshwane, the underprivileged live in black townships abandoned by authorities during the years of apartheid.
Table 7: Underprivileged populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities / Regions</th>
<th>Underprivileged populations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Illegal immigrants (single minors specifically), elderly single persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>Displaced and demobilized persons, young dropouts, the poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douala</td>
<td>Populations living in high-risk zones that do not have access to basic urban services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-Romagna</td>
<td>The elderly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td>Populations living in periurban zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td>The homeless, squatters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>The youth and the elderly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td>Populations living in the north and southwest Black townships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The perception of security or insecurity undergoes numerous outside influences. Through cultural inclusion, man builds his vision of society according to what is offered to him. The media therefore generally has a determining role in constructing a citizen’s vision of their close, or even distant environment. They solidify perceptions, but can also be utilized by populations seeking to be heard, as shown through the recent events at Ile-de-France. All the participating cities recognize, to a certain extent, the power of the media on perception, which is nothing more than a societal construction (ref. Graph 1).

Graph 1: Influence of the media on insecurity
Security responses

The socio-cultural diversity of our survey and analysis panel is particularly auspicious to a public policy study, permitting us to understand if a security policy model exists for all cities, or if distinct contexts require specific approaches.

Security policy is often proposed at a national level, as seen concerning human security. However, as Fernando Guzmán Rodríguez demonstrated in his presentation, the sustainability of proposed responses for insecurity problems experienced by inhabitants and afforded by the deciders depends on the accuracy of the diagnosis performed for any given situation. If the city is an ideal, yet complex, laboratory (due to a diversity of problems) to analyze the troubles and obstacles of conviviality, why is it performed at a national level? Naturally, state governments must essentially display a clear and precise security policy, but initially this falls onto local governments that answer daily urgent problems needed to be resolved. As seen through all the examples of participation at the 2nd CIFAL Barcelona-UNITAR workshop, the decentralization of power, both from the national to the local and from the local to the micro-local levels, is currently the trend. For example, at Bogotá, the principal mayor addresses the mayors of the ten city arrondissements to better target the specific multiple difficulties affronting them daily. At Rome, Valerio Albanese Ruffo, director of the Public Security Department, showed in his presentation the importance of municipalities to coordinate police activities with previously taken social actions. Josep Maria Lahosa, director of Prevention Services of the city of Barcelona, highlighted the importance of the role played by local governments to discard the theme of patrimonial security exclusive to the State. He also stated in his intervention the diversity of an urban territory supposes a diversity of proposed responses, resulting in the creation of technical relay posts (secretaria técnica de prevención) in each district of the municipality of Barcelona to give dynamic intra-territorial observations to the direction of prevention services. On the other hand, the exchanges between local authorities are, according to Mr. Lahosa, essential. The progressive cooperation between the cities of Bogotá and Barcelona is a good example. Barcelona is still presently confronted with conflicts generated by the use of public space by newcomers principally from Latin-American descent. We noted that culture influences the reflections of people, but initially influences all of their uses, with public space appropriation not the same in Canada, England, Spain, or Latin America. Currently, to make these spaces convivial, cultural codes of users must be taken into account, an aspect incorporated by few architects in their urban works. The partnership between the cities of Bogotá and Barcelona should incidentally allow Barcelona to adapt public space to its new environmental and human configuration. This comprehension of the interactions occurring in a given territory often separates prevention security policies from repression policies that only measure their success in the short-term. Contrarily, the political choice is difficult to make between immediate, yet rarely durable results, and costly prevention policies (difficult to manage due to their inter-sectored nature and the multitude of actors involved) that can only be judged effective in the long-term. Numerous cities however choose to durably manage conflicts by means of prevention, whether stimulated by political actors themselves, or delegates of international or non-governmental organizations.

Participation is one of the key elements to solidifying prevention policy. Both are interrelated, which is paradoxically the source of difficulty. As we have witnessed, not only is functioning inter-sectorality parallel to growing power decentralization complicated, but this becomes even more problematic when including politics in this structuration game, with actors not having the same vocabulary, interests, or expertise. However, this challenge must be surmounted by local authorities if they wish to see their decisions applied in a durable manner.

This implies to respond to two major objectives:

- The continuation of prevention policies from one mandate to the other, with Bogotá serving as an example.
• The participation of private and community actors to define needs, with Barcelona highly experienced in community participation within the public sphere.

However, one must be prudent, because participation does not necessarily denote representation. The presence of a community actor at a work session does not inevitably imply the representation of the entire community. As the number of actors increases, their interests become numerous, even divergent, and the application of a democratic principle within the community only occurs through the election process of its representatives, assuming the community has a certain degree of consolidated organization to take part in political decision-making. The effort towards participation is therefore distributed between public actors, required to integrate non-politically involved actors, and non-politically involved actors, required to develop legitimization mechanisms in order to provide themselves an active and representative role.

If this action plan is respected, the different actors will be confronted with a supplemental difficulty, particularly significant concerning conviviality in public space, related to the information and training of inhabitants and users. Once again, the responsibility is shared. If policies must respond through actions, community actors fix the social tissue and incite the correct use of the established rules by knowing their definition and application, then sharing this knowledge with the community.

Table 8: Partnership between the public and community sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities / Regions</th>
<th>Yes / No</th>
<th>Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Prevention and security councils (at the city and district level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douala</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Auto-defense committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilie-Romagne</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Unique neighborhood committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Community police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>« Business Against Crime »</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: At Douala, the auto-defense committees are an initiative of the youth in the city’s neighborhoods. They are organized to guard each neighborhood unit. These actions occur every night from 10 pm to 6 am. They are organized in two groups: the first group from Monday to Wednesday and the second group from Thursday to Sunday. Each inhabitant of a unit pays 1000 Fcfa per month to participate towards the security of the neighborhood.

However, local authorities must perform the management of this partnership with the community, in order to avoid the risk of dumping competences and public security functions on the community, or debilitating governmental prerogatives. Furthermore, the risk is high, as the example of Douala shows (ref. Table 8), where auto-defense committees are formed, even lynch mobs in the most extreme cases, in response to the difficulties of local authorities to find an adequate answer for the security of its citizens. Community justice must be controlled by public authorities to avoid the proliferation of deviant acts, if deemed useful to resolve daily problems of conviviality.

In addition, the incompetence, which is our duty to highlight, comes from an almost inexistence of evaluation in these prevention policies. They neither allow to know the real results of these policies, nor to make them known to those interested.
This deficiency is often exploited by the private sector that invades the security field, as much the urban development field, under purely lucrative purposes (ref. Graph 2). Whether private police, guard surveillance or vigilance societies, or technical and technological tools to guarantee surveillance, private security takes advantage of a breach and historic-conjectural based context in economic terms.

**Graph 2: Role of the private sector in security**

![Role of the private sector in security](image)

In numerous cities, the number of private guards surpasses greatly the number of public security agents (ref. Table 9), with 10 private agents for 1 public agent in Bogotá, 5 to 1 in Guatemala City, and 3 to 1 in Douala and Nairobi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities / Regions</th>
<th>Public police/private police ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bogotá</td>
<td>1/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douala</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilie-Romagne</td>
<td>6/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td>1/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: At Douala, private protection is principally employed for the protection of private homes, banks, buildings, and supermarkets. At Rabat, this concerns generally shopping centers, banking agencies, and several public buildings.
The partnership between the private and community sectors occurs increasingly everyday for securing urban space (ref. Table 10). More frequently, resident associations and private societies collaborate together to ensure the surveillance of well-limited inhabited spaces.

This not only endangers state authority, but also public space as a democratic space of interaction and exchanges between all the city’s actors against any privatizing or appropriation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities/Regions</th>
<th>Yes/ No</th>
<th>Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douala</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilie-Romagne</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Residential associations (KARA, LRA, KEPSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Surveillance of green spaces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Local communities form residential associations that work with the private security sector to signal criminality in local areas. This generally coincides with the creation of secured properties and neighborhood vigilantism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the participation of the private sector must not be excluded and its results can be positive, on the condition that their participation is regulated and controlled to avoid exclusion tendencies at the detriment of an inclusive urban space, just like the participation of the community sector.

Furthermore, certain partnerships between the public, private, and community sectors have appeared at Bogotá and have proven to be an effective tool against delinquency, despite being recently created.

**The spatial effects of security policies**

As we have witnessed, regardless of the place, the application of security policy has consequences on the urban environment. Inversely, the environment is an essential element to take into consideration in structuring public security policy. If solving criminality problems without considering economic, social, or educational problems is impossible, identifying habitat and movement forms in a city also can be considered vital. Housing often represents the economical and social situation of the residing person, which is embedded in a neighborhood and is often a microcosm of similar situations. The cities become “ghettoized” more everyday, whether prisons are gilded or doleful.

Through our observations using the participants’ representations of their respective cities, cities are generally fragmented, with the rich, poor, and middle-class neighborhoods easily identifiable (ref. Figure 2). The attractiveness of a city is often related to the social class of its
inhabitants. Degraded neighborhoods often correspond to those inhabited by the poor, while renovated or maintained neighborhoods are often accessible to a higher income population.

**Figure 2: Perceptual maps: sectoralization of the city according to the social scale of its residents**

Legend

- **Rich**
- **Middle class**
- **Poor**

**The example of Tshwane:**

**The example of Barcelona:**
Reading these perceptual maps teaches us to distinguish segregation from fragmentation. A fragmented city is not necessarily a segregated city, which implies spreading apart one population from another, generally done by means of architectural barriers. A city can also be segregated and fragmented according to the neighborhoods referred to. If higher and middle-classed neighborhoods are commonly located in the center, the poorer neighborhoods, despite a few pockets in the center of town, principally occupy suburban and periurban spaces, where contrarily several middle or high-class pockets form. In addition, if the mobility of the wealthier classes is often not a concern (excluding environmental concerns due to the growing rapidity of the automobile market), the mobility of poorer populations is inversely much more problematic. Mobility difficulties logically cause problems related to accessibility of employment, basic urban services, education, etc. Fragmentation therefore implies relegation consequences of the poor in dilapidated neighborhoods, while the rich barricade themselves within genuine fortresses and benefit from new infrastructures and technology developed by the private security industry to be protected from potential danger, or in other words separated from the poor.
Frame 4: Fragmentation of urban space at Tshwane

“A segregated approach to crime prevention in the built environment supports interventions that emphasise the strengthening of boundaries and the separation of areas in the urban environment to reduce opportunities for conflict and/or friction. This is to be achieved through a number of principles including the minimisation of the degree of shared public space inside residential areas, territorility and defensible space, target hardening and access control. These principles can be achieved through a range of interventions in the built environment including hard boundaries between public and private spaces, single use territories, separation of land uses, target hardening measures such as high fences, secure gateways, steel shutters and burglar bars, and measures of access control such as restricted road access, avoidance of through pedestrian routes in neighbourhoods, limiting multiple access points, CCTV cameras, parking lot barriers, entry phones, PIN numbers and visitor check-in booths.\textsuperscript{60}\textsuperscript{60}, Karina Landmann

The “Urban Violence and Security Policies” project showed, using an example from Bogotá, the strong correlation between the degradation of urban space and its criminality potential. The perception of neighborhoods, by citizens not living there, is concrete: poor neighborhoods are considered dangerous and threatening. A geographical representation of fear is embedded, which finally criminalizes poverty, as Loïc Wacquant affirms (2004b.)

If the security of a neighborhood depends on its level of degradation, one must be vigilant at the moment of its transformation. Destroying a degraded neighborhood to be replaced by a modern urban space does not resolve the problem, but rather displaces it. At Bogotá, the ancient central neighborhood of Cartucho was transformed into the Third Millennium Park (ref. Photos 5 and 6), therefore moving the sanitary and security problems to the presently named “cartuchitos” neighborhoods.

At Barcelona, the Raval neighborhood, known for its numerous difficulties due to a major arrival of immigrants occupying non-renovated housing, became the focus of necessary urban transformations. However, this was based on its destruction and reconstruction of luxurious housing and spaces, excluding the appropriation of this space by the previous inhabited populations. Politicians and architects decided mutually to privilege the construction of attractive buildings symbolizing the city, rather than renovating urban space to respond to the needs of the originally established populations. The Contemporary Art Museum of Barcelona, the Rambla of Raval, or the next 5-star hotel reinforce the attractiveness of the city and equally promote the tourism industry and the image of the politicians and architects supporting and planning them. The depression of degraded neighborhoods finally allowed the gentrification of the city-centers to regulate poverty and problems related outside the political vision or action. Finally, the same configuration on an urban level is found concerning destruction-reconstruction, or on a security level when concerning repressive policies.
At an urban level, prevention policies join together with preservation policies of public space. The presentation of Beth Galí of the Federation of Decorative Arts (FAD) of Barcelona illustrated that maintaining security is not only an affair by the police, but a dialectic also exists between citizen culture and public spaces. To promote the coexistence, even the conviviality within public spaces, the social lineage of public spaces and maintaining urban form are essential, which is only possible through an established, durable process. This does not only imply the creation of new urban spaces, but also the evolution of public space by eliminating dangerous elements and improving certain components, such as stairs, ramps, benches, and lights, in order to make the public space accessible to everyone. Physical space partially conditions the behavior of inhabitants and the education of populations through urban space is a fundamental element to take into consideration for all urban development policy. Citizens must also be involved from the beginning of an urban project’s elaboration. Beth Galí cited examples of Dutch municipalities where local actors (sweepers, municipal maintenance services and technical management, etc.) were consulted on the strategies implemented to maintain these public spaces, either at the commencement of their conception or the project of their rehabilitation. According to Galí, the Dutch municipalities serve as a model of urban development, due to the work completed before and after the transformation of public spaces to promote social diversity and eliminate ghettos, regardless of their economic status. She also believes that too much work on urban form presently takes place while forgetting the functional elements. If Barcelona experienced its large period of urban transformation in the 1980’s, the city could not afterwards maintain its public spaces, deteriorated in conjunction with the development of delinquency in the years after the Olympics, with the Sants train station, according to Galí, as a prime example.

Furthermore, for Beth Galí, the 1980’s miracle at Barcelona was largely initiated from the moment when politicians and experts agreed of their conception of the city.

The Mayor and the Federation of Decorative Arts (FAD) of Barcelona recently reiterated the experience of exchanging competences and is associated for the publication of the White Book of the streets of Barcelona: the Urban U (ref. Frame 5).
The White Book of the streets of Barcelona is a study mandated by the municipality of Barcelona at the FAD attempting to improve citizen public space through the study of the incorporated urban and architectonic elements. The ultimate objective of the White Book is to offer systematic tools of intervention in the streets of Barcelona that improve the life of citizens, thanks to more functional, rational, and clean streets accessible to everyone.

Without a doubt, Barcelona is a global reference in the domain of public space, yet the demands of progress call for improvements. Real space for alternative transportation must be sought, [...] with a reduction of pollution from urban elements, which are often not necessary and used sparingly. The contradiction between more services and less elements suggests to propose a hierarchy of uses and a poly-functionality of present elements in the street.

The Urban U, the White Book of the streets of Barcelona is [...] an innovative study applicable globally to other cities of the world through its method of conception and materialization. For the first time, a book lets speak those working in the street and the citizens that use it daily. A book that also includes a very large public potential: the politician that defines the strategic axes of urban intervention and maintenance, the architects and urban planners, the designers and businesses, the technicians of the municipality that work in the streets, and finally the citizens.

Using a multitude of data (analysis of 703,540 urban elements, 2,617 km of railroad, and 11 million m2 of pavement) and a rigorous and detailed study of the uses and functions of these urban elements, with the intense participation of all the districts and other diverse social actors (journalists, psychologists, anthropologists, etc.), numerous concrete propositions appeared that can be summarized by five axes of action: eliminate, conceal, innovate, bring together, systemize. The White Book did not overlook the opportunity to take a position on the Urban U and the city’s wishes. The Urban U must be:

○ Democratic
○ Accessible
○ Respectful
○ Ecological
○ Diverse
○ Dynamic
○ Readable
○ Innovative
○ Interactive
○ Communicative

As Beth Galí affirms, the natural trend of a city leans towards chaos and the anarchic use of its spaces. The municipality must counter daily this natural inclination, so the city does not fall within a process of degradation, which is difficult to escape from if a brutal initiative of destruction-reconstruction is not utilized. Sometimes cities systemize this possibility, leaving certain “bothersome” spaces to fall into destitute in order to better transform them. This anti-historical process is generally synonymous with a gentrification strategy of the city, which generally applies to the city center and the displacement of encumbering populations to the depths of the suburbs, once again penalizing the poor. However, local authorities do not appear conscious of the distortion of certain urban transformations and all consider that large urban works have a positive impact on the security of their city or region (ref. Table 11), more often improving the quality of life for inhabitants and planned to respond to latent insecurity of degraded spaces. On the other hand, these transformations often generate insecurity.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities / Regions</th>
<th>Yes / No</th>
<th>Urban Renovation</th>
<th>Urban Reconstruction</th>
<th>Urban Transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douala</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emilia-Romagna</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Renovation of train stations. Video surveillance cameras, closed parking</td>
<td>Integrate residential zones into other urban spaces and favor urban density</td>
<td>Creation of mixed (residential and commercial) and green zones. Avoid the proliferation of bars/pubs/cafes. Entrance of buildings connected to pedestrian walkways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katmandu</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Road maintenance</td>
<td>Public street lighting (including in shanty towns)</td>
<td>Demolition of illegal infrastructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Development of green spaces and terrain</td>
<td>Construction of posts for close-proximity police</td>
<td>Demolition of shanty towns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tshwane</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Church square (CBD)</td>
<td>Mamelodi (Pretoria East)</td>
<td>Increase and transformation of informal housing zones, particularly at Shosangwe (north of Tshwane)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paradoxically, all the participants also conclude that social, sanitary, and subsidized housing policies in their cities or regions are insufficient (ref. Graph 3 and 4). Yet as the examples of Bogotá and Barcelona show, when politicians were able to target their educational and sanitary policies in a defined space (Cartucho, Raval), they unfortunately diffused frequently the problem they believed to have eradicated through important urban interventions. Note that security is not perceived the same by an inhabitant in a privileged neighborhood as one in a shantytown.
The comprehension of urban space and its socio-economic tissue is essential. Urban planning, as well as the definition of security policy, must also be elaborated with inter-sectorality. If politicians and technicians need to work together, technicians in housing, construction, health, education, immigration, security, etc. must primordially reflect together for the coherence of specific actions towards one global action.
On this topic, the presentation of Laia Soriano-Montagut on the normative framework implemented in urban planning illustrated the effort made at the level of the autonomous Catalan government to coordinate in advance urban development and security policy according to three criteria:

1- System of open spaces

2- System of establishments (avoid spatial segregation, create social cohesion)

3- System of infrastructures and mobility

In the same manner, the Emilia-Romagna region in Italy considers that combining urban development and security approaches is essential to respond to security problems and urban disorders. The Emilia-Romagna region turned to the competences and urban expertise of the Polytechnic School of Milan and its program “Urban Quality and Security” that proposed the implementation of 13 test projects relating security and urban development themes, based on the principals of simulation (anticipation of delinquent acts according to the configuration and movements of the city), translation (from an expert language to a common language) and comparison (usage of lived experiences written in literature).

Finally, the example of Curitiba illustrated the importance to conceive integrated public policies in environmental, urban, economic, social, and cultural fields, favoring the potential and development of communities.
CONCLUSIONS

Charlotte Boisteau and Yves Pedrazzini

One must urgently take distance from dominant theories, with the most popular experts appropriating North American theories and ideologies that frequently participate towards the instauration of societies completely resolved by the culture of control.

We have held to maintain the limited plane between research and action. Initially, this publication aimed explicitly to extend from the field of (urban) sociology towards one of urbanism. Social questions, or the sociology of violence and urban insecurity, are continued by other spatial questions. Which territories possess violence and insecurity? What are the spatial dynamics that transform contemporary cities? How do phenomenon, such as the resort of police or the judiciary apparatus, finally define urban form? We have presently entered a time where urban, political, economic, and social decisions are taken under the influence of a fear created instead of experienced, or a collective fear constructing the basis of choices in the planning field and durably developing the places where we live, work, or play. Urban research pursued here is therefore a practice of extending disciplinary (towards the inter- and trans-disciplinary) and scientific (towards policy and action) fields. This is the innovation that interests our city partners.

In addition, if we desired to analyze comparatively the phenomenon of insecurity and urban transformations observed simultaneously in the numerous cities convened and presented at the UNITAR-CIFAL Barcelona seminar, UNITAR-CIFAL in collaboration with EPFL-LaSUR wish to continue the work led with public actors with the use of “city to city” cooperation, which would be guaranteed by their supervision and evaluation.

The chosen case studies can be used as critical examples by comparing numerous usage practices in Northern and Southern cities and redefining the concept of human security through current security actions. Supplying local authorities the power to humanize their city and to rehabilitate one of the functionalities of urban space, the harmonization of the urban population while preserving cultural diversity, is also essential. One must recreate a sense of urban space, struggle against urban criminality and delinquency by responding to its causes and eliminating its means, but also construct “community living” by favoring participatory policies and the management of community practices very often existent, yet marginalized.

Finally, we defend the idea to not restrict research results within limited areas of a laboratory or a university, but rather render them accessible to the public whenever possible. The capitalization of our work occurs not only through the publication of our book, both scientific and practical, but also the popularization of its results. The importance of the projected work is precisely due to its contribution, equally to the scientific world, the political world, and the general public. This position is important during a time where urban violence and insecurity questions are increasingly becoming a primary obsession in contemporary societies, equally in both urban and rural societies, and in both the so-called developing countries of the South (or Third-World) and Western countries. Therefore, there is little surprise to witness the rapidly growing number of mobilized public and private actors of these urban questions over the past years (generally, from the beginning of the 1990’s and the end of the ancient global obsession of the Cold War). “Senior” and “junior” experts emerge everywhere that provide an opinion, from a political, social, economic, scientific, even cultural or environmental perspective, more or less disturbing of the reality, and are engaged to promote new strategies capable to either resolve the problem, or at least give an impression of undertaking these problems.
However, without being overly critical, the reality observed is that this expertise highly recognized in the halls of Academia, like the editing rooms of all types of newspapers, is far from bringing evident solutions to the phenomenon which could be currently analyzed as one of the probing signs of the end of a certain urban civilization. In fact, while the grand city from a century ago appeared as a seductive machine of modernity, despite a few defaults, notably poverty, lack of hygiene, or criminality, do we not increasingly hear observers describe the metropolises of the South, like of the North, as the branches of hell? Pollution, drug trafficking, all types of violence, unemployment, and growing inequalities are some of the problematic aspects summoning the highest worries of our contemporaries.

Of course, faced with similar states of emergency, whether microstates or states nevertheless, we have discontinued to count the mobilizations, the community actions, and the municipal, national, or international initiatives. Consequently, the work performed by the LaSUR-EPFL on urban violence and insecurity for almost the past two decades is neither exclusive, nor the most radically innovative. However, in our view, our propositions and procedures, even those at the basis of all forms of our work (articles, reports, manuals, research programs, and other scientific, political, and police interventions), have kept a certain degree of innovation and originality. These are largely due to our formulation of urban violence and insecurity questions, not only from a spatial perspective, but also strictly a social viewpoint, to establish the precise analytical modalities that launch a dialogue between these two methods.

This is essentially the remarkable relationship to establish and situate within time. However, this relationship is missing from all analysis, whether by specialists in social questions, or specialists regarding spatial questions, with both being numerous present in cities, or rarer by specialists of socio-spatial (or spatio-social) questions. Therefore, the rarity of interdisciplinary work, required when comprehending the fabrication modalities of the urban world, has forced us to think of the city through the analyses of each separated and expansive portion, divided by one another until the point of abstraction. From a living thing, we have managed to make a still-life, or a collection of isolated elements where we have eliminated the function by abandoning their relationship with all other elements that compose a random space configured within a city in movement, out of a territory obstinately dedicated to survive, to develop, and to form order within the animated episodes of its history.

This also concerns the question of violence or insecurity. By isolating for too long these issues from other urban questions, initially with those from social inequalities and spatial divisions, urban science researchers have made their interest in transforming questions of civilization into the questions of regulations. By undertaking the phenomenon of violence in the city by only exclusively using the questions of criminality and delinquency, the "experts" on security have succeeded in detaching an issue onto itself, concerning only negatively the affairs of the city and focusing on a problem to eliminate that has nothing to do with the profound nature of the city. We know to what extent this point is false. Violence, or urban violence, can never be itself a research object, and less an object of public policy, even if we accept to regroup under a unique term a vast panoply of social and "antisocial" practices. Violence must necessarily be considered related with other elements composing the urban landscape, either judged positively, such as the arts, careers, or urban leisure, or judged negatively, like crime, the underground economy, corruption, misery, etc., but never on its own. Urban violence, as a complex phenomenon, can never occur exclusively. It interacts and is the result of interaction, frequently a social interaction, settled in an instable manner on the basis of an inequality of power between social actors.

The LaSUR-EPFL has always been determined to relate the objects studied in the city, illustrating how they influence, respond, oppose, and fight violently each other to create an urban territory, inevitably socialized as much as spatialized by its responses, exchanges, oppositions, and violence. Therefore, in our perspective, the redundant question of urban security/insecurity and the role of the phenomenon of "urban violence", in the reinforcement of public policies targeting to promote the former and public or private actions implemented to reduce the latter, only serves a purpose if we can better understand the contemporary
mutations of the city. By critically interrogating the effects of insecurity and security policy through the form of cities and the organization of urban societies with the true participation of social actors, we can hope to avoid a sedentary drift that preoccupies, quite peculiarly, all the cities and governments of the world, independently of their real experiences of violence, war, and risk. We can definitely see in this multinational enterprise of urban surety construction an inevitable consequence of the attacks of September 11th, 2001 in New York, of March 11th, 2004 in Madrid, or July 7th, 2005 in London, without counting all the true or false thwarted plans by whatever special service of whatever country. Indeed, September 11th marked clearly the creation of a new Berlin wall, which leaves a deep trace in a city, even a country or a region, that presently extends across the entire planet. Because of this, are we obliged to leave our destiny of humanity in the hands of police and security experts with no questions asked? Our fear of dying violently has become so legitimate that it leads us to reconsider our stature of a public animal (to cite the expression of Manuel Delgado) to the point of voluntarily enclosing ourselves in preference of the horrors of the residence, compared to the beauty of the streets. Can this fear make us lose view of the kind of urbanity that all these exaggerated transformations prepare us for, dictated by the new sedentary reason of the State?!

By collectively and critically reflecting the diverse experiences in urban security, the seminar organized by the CIFAL and UNITAR allowed us to be more attentive, often underestimated by the actors themselves, to how responses for insecurity produce incertitude in the future of cities and the world.
Scientific cooperation is a challenge, not because this procedure is inevitably new, with work of this type existing for decades, but rather because this cooperation works in two levels when concerning inequality relationships between the North and the South. This seeks scientific cooperation in development, responding not only to quality criteria and university recognition, but also development demands in the countries of the South.

This also does not stand by itself! Indeed, if the development and scientific world interact and exchange between one another (principal, the academics are in the command posts!), the ambitions influencing them are generally very distant, and their objectives are diverse, even sometimes antagonistic. The methods of execution and the institutional frameworks are equally factors that specify each of them. In addition, the bridges made between these approaches by their protagonists are relatively recent.

Where is interaction in all this? What accordingly can be done better than what was already done decades ago? Before answering these questions, let us admit that the time period is favorable towards such a reproach for two reasons. This initially is the failure, many times over, of all cooperation effort in development that did not prevent the growth of separation between the rich and poor over the past fifty years, whether regarding countries or individuals. Secondly, this also concerns the change of paradigm in economic and political relations at an international level. The liberalization of markets and the globalization of exchanges, thus reducing the role of the State from a protagonist to a facilitator, opened indirectly the door to new actors in development, such as NGOs, basic community organizations, and also universities and research centers.

Researchers have consequently acquired a new stature. Not only are they producers of knowledge, through education and research, but also actors of change, directly implied on the field with equal and direct interaction between representatives of civil society and public authorities.

Research oriented towards action naturally brings the scientist towards its alter ego, the actor of change, in a will of iteration between reflection and social practices (Pedrazzini & al, 2005). In a work’s conception and implementation, research is launched from social demands, individual and group practices, and the diagnostic of the defined problems by specialists, not only to offer quality results scientifically, but also to participate in targeting transformations of the processes in progress, by the advice and support of follow-up activities, or by other forms of engagement.

Faced with the complexities of urban realities, research is constructed, according to the options that guide it, based on interdisciplinarity, provided that the multidimensionality of urban questions deserves a hybrid approach between social sciences, urbanism, architecture, and quite often environmental sciences and engineering.

Placed within a framework of international cooperation, this scientific process calls for a partnership between research institutions of the North and the South, taking into account the truly solid and material disparities that differentiate the scientific production conditions,
beyond cultures and ideologies, between partners. This targets lesser the transfer of exterior models, often inadequately related to other realities, but rather the creation of a new framework of exchanges and sharing to succeed towards an innovative investigation. The true challenge is a quality research that is not only recognized uniquely by its peers, but also especially by the beneficiaries of the research, through the appropriation of the adapted propositions to the nature and the amplitude of the addressed problems.

This partnership, to refer back to the orientation targeting change by action, is not only limited exclusively to scientists. It integrates, during the different stages of the research, the representatives of different implied sectors in the management and organization of the city, such as the inhabitants, public authorities, and associative and private mediators, favoring a more effective and rapid application of the research results.

This is the spirit of scientific cooperation for development, with the present research engaged in this perspective.
APPENDIX
## Annexe 1 : Self-assessment grid for competencies of local authorities in the field of security policies based on coexistence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. SHARING DIAGNOSES</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.1 Setting up a common framework for analysis</strong></td>
<td>Local security problems are defined ad hoc by the authorities and are assimilated to problems of crime.</td>
<td>We have a method of analysing security problems that makes a distinction between crime and other forms of incivility, but it is not share by all those involved in local security and is not used systematically.</td>
<td>We make a distinction between crime and incivility on the one hand and problems of citizens' coexistence and socio-cultural integration on the other. All local actors share and apply these analytical so a to define the problems and their solutions.</td>
<td>Our analytic framework is based is regularly revised after consultation, and adapted to new urban realities and to the relation between local and global levels.</td>
<td>All our security policies are based on a multidisciplinary understanding of security and a shared conceptual framework. Our integrated approach is considered exemplary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.2 Analysing data and perceptions</strong></td>
<td>We have no or few tools for collecting and analysing data, and have little awareness of local actors working on security issues.</td>
<td>We have tools for collecting and analysing data (police data, victim surveys, etc.), but only use them partially for our diagnoses.</td>
<td>We are able to identify certain causes of security problems thanks to the collection and analysis of data. Our analysis takes perceptions into account.</td>
<td>Our local diagnosis is based on systematic and regular collection of data. It involves an analysis of the perceptions and causes of the feeling of insecurity.</td>
<td>Our instruments for collecting and analysing data on security and coexistence have proved their worth and serve as models for others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.3 Concerted identification of priority problems and their solutions</strong></td>
<td>The problems and solutions identified are not the result of an accurate analysis of a context, but rather an adaptation of external concepts.</td>
<td>We are able to identify certain local problems on the basis of partial interpretation of facts and perceptions and of selective exchanges with those involved locally in security matters.</td>
<td>Our diagnosis enables us to identify the main local security problems and the solutions suited to our socio-cultural context. This is the result of multilateral consultations at the local level.</td>
<td>Our diagnosis enables us to identify all causes and effects of security problems as well as the solutions proposed, which vary according to the public concerned. It is regularly reviewed and adapted, with the participation of those involved locally.</td>
<td>Our local diagnosis is transverse, covering all areas of action in the field. This approach is considered a model by other local authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## II. CO-MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY THROUGH COEXISTENCE

### 2.1 Mechanisms of regulation of actions and of space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Activities: games, shows, leisure activities, prostitution, demonstrations, civil events in public areas, etc.</em></td>
<td>We have no rules – fixed or ad hoc – determined unilaterally and selectively to govern public and private activities* and/or places, but they are not widely known to the public and thus rarely observed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In our community there are no civic rules*, or if there are, they are left to the discretion of the individual.</td>
<td>We have determined rules governing certain public and private activities and/or places, in consultation with local actors and social services concerned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic rights and rules exist, but they are not widely known and thus rarely applied, if at all.</td>
<td>We have determined rules taking into account the diversity of situations and the uses of space. These rules are regularly reviewed after consultation and adapted to changes in the local context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic rules and rights inherent therein are systematically taught and adapted to changes in the local context after consultation with those involved locally.</td>
<td>The rules are well known and absorbed by all social agents. They create confidence and a sense of belonging in relation to public life.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.2 Rules for local citizenship

| *Respect for others as well as for collective and individual property, behaviour within society, rules of civics…* | We have little or no knowledge of the techniques of conflict management or mediation*. Such techniques are little used, if at all, in the field of local security. |
| We have basic knowledge of the techniques of conflict management and mediation that we use when necessary. | Local security agencies have acquired sound awareness and practice in the techniques of conflict management and mediation. |
| Local security agencies systematically incorporate these techniques into their day-to-day work, and have access to training, enabling them to keep up to date with developments. | A set of systematised rules exists. They are well known, applied and observed. This generates social cohesion and a sense of shared responsibility. |

### 2.3 Know-how

| *This includes techniques of conflict management, mediation, and non-violent communication suited to the socio-cultural context.* | We check on situations of insecurity and find solutions, for we are experts in the field. |
| We encourage dialogue and receptiveness to the populations; we respond to their needs by offering predetermined solutions. | We acknowledge the value of responses to insecurity problems suggested by local communities and we support them by helping them to understand the problems and defining solutions. |
| We constantly learn of local responses applied in the field. The lessons drawn from experience are taken into account in the drafting of our security policies. | The local authorities have developed sound practices in the field. These competencies are transferred to and adapted by other authorities. |

### 2.4 Attitudes

| Changes in attitude: from the expert who checks everything over to the facilitator who encourages the appropriation of problems and solutions by the local actors themselves (facilitative leadership) | We have adopted standard situational preventive measures and acknowledge the need to take further preventive measures suited to the causes of insecurity. |
| We have taken various preventive measures (situational and social) so as to reduce opportunity for antisocial action but have no systematic preventive approach. | We have drawn up a preventive strategy based on the concept of proactive security, which advocates improved coexistence among citizens and cohesion of communities in all their diversity. |
| Our proactive preventive strategy is based on socio-cultural solutions and intermediaries that are tailored according to the context and the cause. It is regularly assessed and revised. | Our preventive strategy is fully integrated and covers many sectors. It is considered an example that others have followed. |

### III. MAKING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT

### 3.1 Preventive measures

<p>| <em>Examples: increase in police numbers, installation of security cameras, town planning, etc.</em> | We have adopted standard situational preventive measures and acknowledge the need to take further preventive measures suited to the causes of insecurity. |
| We have taken various preventive measures (situational and social) so as to reduce opportunity for antisocial action but have no systematic preventive approach. | We have drawn up a preventive strategy based on the concept of proactive security, which advocates improved coexistence among citizens and cohesion of communities in all their diversity. |
| Our proactive preventive strategy is based on socio-cultural solutions and intermediaries that are tailored according to the context and the cause. It is regularly assessed and revised. | Our preventive strategy is fully integrated and covers many sectors. It is considered an example that others have followed. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.2 Responsive measures</th>
<th>The intervention of the police is the result of media coverage of events.</th>
<th>Intervention takes place at an earlier stage when specific problems are identified by certain services, such as the social services.</th>
<th>We have a comprehensive intervention plan enabling us to take charge of identified problems or conflicts.</th>
<th>The implementation of the intervention plan and responsive measures is in part delegated to local networks and the communities themselves.</th>
<th>Our intervention strategies are regularly assessed and readjusted. Our responses are diversified.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Measures of justice and restoration</td>
<td>We have little or no alternative judicial measures. We have no restoration plan but are aware of the need thereof.</td>
<td>Those involved are consulted so as to decide on alternative measures, rather than sanctions.</td>
<td>We have an action plan for applying appropriate and targeted alternative measures.</td>
<td>Involvement of parties and of civil society in the acceptance of alternative measures to sanctions.</td>
<td>Alternative judicial measures make possible true restoration, thus preventing the conflict from arising again.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IV. IMPLEMENTING SECURITY POLICIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.1 Roles and responsibilities of those active in security policies</th>
<th>Security policies are centralised and hierarchical, involving few agents (top-down).</th>
<th>The roles and responsibilities of certain key local agents are defined.</th>
<th>Local actors at different levels that must be committed to the implementation of security policies have been identified, and their roles and responsibilities have been defined.</th>
<th>Local security actors receive appropriate training and have at their disposal up-to-date information enabling them to carry out their duties.</th>
<th>The roles and responsibilities of local actors are differentiated and defined within an overall framework for action. The agents are trained, committed and operate in networks.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Information strategy management</td>
<td>Each department has its own information that it only shares with others as and when.</td>
<td>Information is shared in certain fields among the various security services and agencies.</td>
<td>A centralised system of information management has been set up; appropriate protocols on the circulation of information have been defined.</td>
<td>Our system of information management brings about changes in our security policies.</td>
<td>Our information system enables us to anticipate recurrent events, even on a small scale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Partnerships with civil society</td>
<td>We have no partnership outside the local administration.</td>
<td>We develop partnership strategies with certain members of civil society.</td>
<td>Our public security policies make possible the participation of social workers.</td>
<td>The management of certain public security policies is decentralised to civil society organisations.</td>
<td>The management of our public security policies is assessed, audited and the results made public.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexe 2: Questionnaire

Town:

Population: Density of population:

Political parties in power (over the last ten years):

Urban violence and perception of security/insecurity

1. What are the seven most common crimes or offences in your town, in order of importance (from serious to minor), according to known crime statistics?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime/offence</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Specify the source:

2. Who provides the statistics on crime and delinquency in your town? (Please check the appropriate answer or answers)

☐ National police
☐ Regional police
☐ Local police
☐ The court system
☐ The public prosecutor
☐ Medical services
☐ Surveys on victims. If so, indicate the source:
☐ Other (please specify):

3. From which administrative level are the foregoing statistics obtained? (Please check the appropriate answer or answers)

☐ The national government
☐ The region
☐ The conurbation
☐ The town
☐ The district/locality/borough
☐ The wards
☐ Other (please specify):
4. Is the perception of insecurity assessed in your town? (Please check the appropriate answer)
☐ Yes
☐ No

If yes, using what means?

**Sociodemographic profile of the town**

5. Draft an overview of the age structure of your town. (Please complete the table below using absolute figures)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10-15</td>
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<td>15-20</td>
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<td>20-25</td>
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<td>25-30</td>
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<td>30-35</td>
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<td>35-40</td>
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<td>40-45</td>
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<td>45-50</td>
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<td>50-55</td>
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<td>55-60</td>
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<td>60-65</td>
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<tr>
<td>65-70</td>
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<td>70-75</td>
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<td>75-80</td>
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<td>80-85</td>
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<td>85-90</td>
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<tr>
<td>90-95</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>95-100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. What is the migration pattern in your town? (Please complete the table below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Figures</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal migration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External migration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons for migration:

7. What sections of the population in your town are identified as the most disadvantaged?

8. What is the unemployment rate in your town?
9. How many indigent and/or homeless people are there in your town?

Public and private security policies

10. Describe the public security policies (priority initiatives and decisions of public authorities regarding safety) implemented in your town over the last ten years (prevention/suppression).

11. Are these policies assessed? If so, how?

12. What was the budgetary expenditure for the security services in your town for the following years?
   1995:
   2000:
   2005:

   Should you deem it relevant, please specify for those same years the numbers of police officers working for the regional security services in your town.

13. What is the ratio between the public and private policing services in your town?

14. What is the turnover of the private security sector in your town? (Please specify the percentage of the GNP this accounts for)

15. What is the budget spent by the town on private security services? (Please complete the table below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Corresponding budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example: Protection of airports</td>
<td>Airport, etc.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

16. In your town, are there any partnerships between the public sector and the community in the security field? (Please check the appropriate answer)
   □ Yes
   □ No

   If yes, please specify:

17. In your town, are there any partnerships between the private sector and the community in the security field? (Please check the appropriate answer)
   □ Yes
   □ No

   If yes, please specify:
The town and the urban area

18. What was the budgetary expenditure for urban planning in your town for the following years?
   1995: 
   2000: 
   2005: 

19. Do the urban planning department and the department responsible for security in your town work together? (Please check the appropriate answer)
   □ Yes
   □ No

   If yes, how?

20. Have the authorities in your town decided to launch urban projects due to a lack of security in certain urban areas? (Please check the appropriate answer)
   □ Yes
   □ No

   If yes, please complete the table below

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban renovation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban transformation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. For your town, please assess the perception of insecurity over the last ten years:

Example: (use the Excel table below, classify your feeling of security from 1 to 4: 1 = highly secure, 2 = secure, 3 = insecure, 4 = highly insecure), copy the table in Excel, chose the graphic option “dispersion” your curve will be traced by itself). If you have difficulties, trace the line with a pencil and send it by fax)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Feeling of insecurity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example:

2. In your opinion, what is the influence of the media on the perception of insecurity? (Please check the appropriate answer)
Decisive impact
Strong impact
Weak impact
No impact

3. **How would you assess the public housing provision in your town?** (Please check the appropriate answer)

   - Highly adequate
   - Adequate
   - Inadequate
   - Highly inadequate

4. **Do you consider that the social and health policies in your town meet the inhabitants’ requirements?** (Please check the appropriate answer)

   - Fully
   - Adequately
   - Inadequately
   - Not at all

5. **Do you consider that major urban projects have a positive or negative impact on security in your town?** (Please check the appropriate answer)

   - Positive
   - Negative

   **Why?**

6. **In your opinion, how important is the role of the private sector in security in your town?** (Please check the appropriate answer)

   - Essential
   - Important
   - Moderate
   - Nil
7. Draw a schematic diagram of your town, dividing it into sectors according to socioeconomic group: wealthy (red), average (green), poor (yellow).

Example: (use the graphics option including the ellipses and colouring functions of your Word software)
8. Draw a schematic diagram of your town, dividing it into sectors protected by public security services (yellow), private security services (mauve) and community security services (green). Use the graphics and colouring option of your Word software. You may fill in the circle with two colours, if necessary, by using the appropriate two-colour function. Should three sectors (public, private and community) be active in the same area, fill in the circle with white dots on a black background by using the filling and framing options of your Word software.

Thank you for your help!
Annexe 3: Opening statement

Nicolas Frizon de La motte
Administrateur Senior de Programme, UNITAR

Mrs. the Minister of Interior,
Mrs and Mr local elected representatives,
Mr. the Director of CIFAL Barcelona,
Dear colleagues from other CIFAL centres and the United Nations,
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is with great pleasure and honour that I open this second Training Workshop of CIFAL Barcelona, on behalf of the head of the Decentralized Cooperation Programme of UNITAR.

The International Training Centre for Local Authorities and Local Actors of Barcelona is the result of a fruitful cooperation between UNITAR, the UN Institute for Training and Research and the Department of Interior of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Such partnership, which builds on the experience of one of the leading regions in Europe, Catalonia, has as its main objective: facilitate knowledge sharing among local authorities worldwide on security issues so as they can design appropriate security policies at the local level.

Confronted to increasing responsibilities and problems of social cohesion, city authorities need to reformulate their security policies so they can take into account various dimensions.

The present workshop entitled “Building Communities: Urban planning and security policies” is the first one of a series of two, dedicated to analyse the spatial and social processes that contribute to generating safe and lively urban environments.

It will be an opportunity to confront your experiences in your respective cities and regions and hopefully to come up with creative solutions. The challenge will certainly be to understand each other’s context as representatives from all continents are present today from Sri Lanka to Brazil, from Kenya to France and the United States. I trust that it will be a productive exchange and learning experience for all of you.

It is indeed the core mission of CIFAL Centres to provide local authorities with a platform for training and exchange of good practices on sustainable urbanization, environment, local governance, human security. The UNITAR associated training network, the CIFAL Network now counts 11 training centres around the world. I wish to particularly thank our colleagues from CIFAL Curitiba in Brazil, Mr. Pinheiro and Mrs. Liana Valicelli, as well as Mr. Wang from CIFAL Shanghai for being here in Barcelona.

Indeed, the CIFAL Network is not only a network of expertise but also a way for cities and regions that belong to the Network to develop their relationships.

We are honoured to count such prominent cities in the CIFAL Network and work hard to bring new partners around the table.
We strongly believe in city-to-city cooperation or “decentralized cooperation” to enhance local capacities to design sustainable and liveable environments. The whole United Nations family is increasingly engaging with local authorities to better support them in their mission.

I would like to give a special thanks to my colleague from the UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme, Mrs. Laura Petrella, for having made the trip all the way from Nairobi to participate in this workshop. I am sure that it is the first step of what will become a fruitful cooperation between our two institutions.

Associating academia is highly important for UNITAR. That is why we have been developing an important cooperation with the Polytechnic School of Lausanne in various areas of interest for city managers. As you may know, UNITAR and CIFAL Barcelona are closely working with its Laboratory of Urban Sociology to prepare a scientific publication on the results of this workshop. We are expecting to expand such a partnership through further training and research projects. I wish to also take this opportunity to thank EPFL for its backing.

Even though we will have the opportunity to reiterate our thanks to the host authorities, I would like to express both in my name and in the name of UNITAR, and no doubt in the name of all the participants, our sincere gratitude to the Generalitat de Catalunya and to its Minister of Interior, Mrs. Turra, and to all the staff who have made this workshop possible.

I wish you a productive meeting. My colleague Charlotte Diez will stay with you for the whole workshop. I am then leaving you in good hands.

Thank you for your attention.
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